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ABSTRACT
Publish/subscribe (pub/sub) is an attractive communication paradigm that offers efficient
and decoupled information dissemination in distributed environments. Publishers generate
the flow of information as publications, which are routed to subscribers based on their
interests expressed as subscriptions. In the most common functional model, an infrastructure
of brokers store the subscriptions, match incoming publications against stored subscriptions,
and dispatch matching publications to the corresponding subscribers.
Early research on pub/sub mostly focused on improving performance, e.g., by maximizing
the scalability of the pub/sub infrastructure and by minimizing dissemination latencies. The
increase in popularity of pub/sub systems and externalized computing infrastructure lead to
serious concerns about confidentiality preservation. Several techniques and mechanisms have
been proposed to ensure confidentiality in pub/sub. However, these mechanisms come with
performance costs. They also set new requirements that impede with the classical functional
model of pub/sub systems. In this thesis, we present novel and innovative solutions to address
these two aspects and make confidentiality-preserving pub/sub more practical and efficient.
Our first contribution is an overview of confidentiality-oriented research for pub/sub.
We identify classes of solutions and highlight existing and future research directions. We
observe the most important challenge for confidentiality-preserving pub/sub, which is to
hide the content of publications and subscriptions from untrusted brokers, while allowing
matching operations. Among the security models and solutions we identify in the existing
work, encrypted matching schemes emerge as the most flexible solution.
Encrypted matching mechanisms allow untrusted brokers to match encrypted subscriptions
against encrypted publications. However, these mechanisms have major performance over-
heads compared to non-encrypted matching. They may also prevent from using optimization
techniques based on subscription containment. We propose a support mechanism that reduces
the cost of encrypted matching, in the form of a prefiltering operator. This reduces the
amount of encrypted subscriptions that must be matched against incoming encrypted publi-
cations. It leverages subscription containment information, but also ensures that containment
confidentiality is preserved otherwise. We propose containment obfuscation techniques and
provide a rigorous mathematical analysis to determine the amount of leaked information. We
show that while there is a tradeoff between prefiltering efficiency and information leakage, it
is practically possible to obtain good prefiltering performance in secure conditions.
Encrypted matching solutions require also appropriate key management support. Due to
the use of encrypted subscriptions stored in untrusted domains, a key update may require
all subscribers to re-encrypt and resubmit their subscriptions before publishers may use the
new key. This is a costly and long operation. We introduce DynamiK, a lightweight key
management architecture that takes into account the decoupled nature of pub/sub and allows
updating encrypted subscriptions directly at the brokers. We present a security analysis and
implementation of DynamiK for the ASPE encryption scheme, observing a minimal effect on
the pub/sub service performance. We also extend the functionality and enhance the security
of the original ASPE encrypted matching scheme, which we use for encrypted matching
throughout our work.
Finally, we provide an overview of the current challenges implied by confidentiality
preservation in content based pub/sub and discuss future research avenues.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Publish/subscribe systems
Publish/Subscribe (pub/sub) systems [Eugster et al., 2003] have been widely investigated in
the past years as a convenient way to dynamically disseminate information in a distributed
system from several sources (the publishers) to different subsets of interested users (the
subscribers). Publishers produce data in the form of publications. Subscribers express their
interests for receiving a subset of publications by issuing subscriptions. These subscriptions are
composed of predicates, or constraints, that selectively filter the publications. Any publication
matching a given subscription’s constraints is delivered to the corresponding subscriber. The
most common approach in pub/sub systems is to consider that the matching procedure is
performed by a set of dedicated machines, the brokers. The brokers are organized in an
overlay. They store the subscriptions received, filter incoming publications, and forward the
matching ones towards the interested subscribers. Communications between publishers and
subscribers are decoupled in time and space. Publishers do not need to know the identity of
the interested subscribers and do not need to synchronize with them. The task of determining
the subset of interested subscribers and routing the publications is the responsibility of the
pub/sub system itself. A generic broker-based pub/sub system is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Pub/sub paradigms
Pub/sub systems are typically classified according to the model they allow for subscriptions
constraints. The two main models are topic-based and content-based.
In topic-based pub/sub, subscribers declare one or several topics of interest among a list
of predefined topics. Topic-based pub/sub is equivalent to named (multicast) communication
channels. A publication is tagged with a topic and propagated to all the subscribers that
B
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Figure 1.1: Generic broker-based pub/sub system.
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registered a subscription on that topic. The main drawbacks of topic-based pub/sub are
its low expressiveness and flexibility. If only a subset of the publications in one topic is of
interest to a given subscriber, these must be filtered out by the subscriber itself. Examples of
topic-based pub/sub systems include TIB/RendezVous [Oki et al., 1993], Scribe [Rowstron
et al., 2001] or Bayeux [Zhuang et al., 2001].
In content-based pub/sub, publications are no longer classified according to predefined
topics. The set of interested subscribers is determined at runtime based on the content of
publications. The content is typically summarized or represented by a header that contains
a collection of values over attributes. Subscriptions can filter publications of interest via a
set of predicates, which are constraints over these attributes. The paradigm is strictly more
expressive than topic-based pub/sub. A subscriber is no longer limited to a predefined topic
and can combine different types of constraints on any of the attributes. Examples of content-
based pub/sub include Elvin [Segall and Arnold, 1997,Segall et al., 2000], Gryphon [Strom
et al., 1998, Astley et al., 2004], Hermes [Pietzuch and Bacon, 2002], JEDI [Cugola et al.,
2001], PADRES [Li et al., 2005, Jacobsen et al., 2010], Rebecca [Mu¨hl, 2001, Mu¨hl, 2002],
Siena [Carzaniga et al., 2001], X-NET [Chand and Felber, 2004], and StreamHub [Barazzutti
et al., 2013].
The expressiveness and flexibility of content-based pub/sub has led to a broad range
of applications. This includes the dissemination of stock quotes [Machanavajjhala et al.,
2008], E-Health information systems [Ion et al., 2010a,Eze et al., 2010], network management
systems [Martin-Flatin et al., 1999,Perera and Gannon, 2009], RSS feed monitoring [Rose
et al., 2007], or algorithmic trading with complex event processing [Pietzuch et al., 2004,Adi
et al., 2006]. Also, support for content-based pub/sub is present in industrial applications,
like database management systems [Russell, 2002]. Therefore, considering the wider area of
applicability, the contributions in this thesis are concentrated on the content-based pub/sub
paradigm.
1.2 Motivation: the need for confidentiality
The focus of this thesis is on confidentiality-preserving pub/sub systems. In particular we
develop new techniques that overcome drawbacks caused by confidentiality support. Pub/sub
confidentiality is an aspect of great importance with the advent of externalized computing
resources (cloud computing) or generally the trend to use pub/sub systems provided as a
service by external parties. We provide two motivating examples that help identifying the
context and need for confidentiality enforcement in pub/sub systems.
Stock exchange aplications. Our first motivating example is widely used in the literature
(e.g., [Machanavajjhala et al., 2008]). It models a stock quote notification application. Pub-
lishers are stock markets issuing trading quotes. Subscribers are investors or other financial
institutions wishing to receive quotes according to their various interests, such as all quotes
above a certain volume of exchange, quotes with the highest daily variation, etc. A set of
agencies provide pub/sub services by filtering quotes received from publishers according to
constraints defined by subscribers. In this context, publications are public data, but subscrip-
tions represent highly sensitive information. Indeed, leaking the subscriptions originating
from a customer, Alice, would reveal intelligence about Alice’s investment strategies, which
can be used against her by competitors. We point out that encryption of subscriptions using
standard techniques before submission to the broker is inadequate: the pub/sub system
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must be able to route publications based on the constraints set in these subscriptions. If
the constraints are encrypted such that they are completely opaque to the pub/sub system,
routing is impossible and all filtering will have to be performed at Alice’s side. Ensuring
confidentiality in such a system is therefore a compromise between the ability to accurately
route publications and the risk of leaking information.
E-Health applications. E-Health information systems [Ion et al., 2010a,Eze et al., 2010]
are another application that can leverage content-based pub/sub as a communication layer.
Such systems link actors of public and private health sectors (physicians, hospitals, clinics,
pharmacists). These actors share files about patients to ensure a timely dissemination of
cases, tests, etc. A typical publisher could be an emergency unit receiving persons in critical
condition. In this case publications include the identity of the patients along with the
content of their medical file, which are to be disseminated to various hospital units, possibly
geographically separated and in independent administrative domains, where the patient can
be moved when his condition stabilizes or where tests must be performed and analyzed.
Subscriptions can be submitted to the pub/sub system by these particular healthcare units
to take act of new cases, organize and schedule the patient admission and treatment sessions.
While part of the publication (part of the medical file) can be encrypted using end-to-end
encryption, some other parts must be used for routing the publication between authorized
and interested parties. The publication headers (name, address of the patient, nature of the
test, etc.) are highly sensitive information. Subscriptions are also highly sensitive information:
they can reveal for example which patient is treated by which clinic or for which type of
ailment. The leakage of such information can lead to serious consequences: it is not difficult to
imagine an insurance company observing such data and refusing to cover patients undergoing
certain tests. Again, we note that there is a compromise between the ability to route based on
some information and the potential leakage of that information to unauthorized parties. The
situation gets more complex if the e-Health infrastructure interconnects with other systems
through pub/sub communication. We can imagine for instance a secured law enforcement
platform maintained on a private cloud, which needs access to information on accidents and
potential victims or suspects. We further develop this scenario in Section 1.3 when we discuss
the details of the threat model typically considered in such situations.
A characteristic of both scenarios is that the pub/sub service provider can be a third party.
It belongs to an administrative domain that is different from the ones of publishers and
subscribers. It is therefore not necessarily trusted to access sensitive data. Note that
even if the service provider complies to a confidentiality policy and is allowed to access
unencrypted publication headers and subscriptions constraints, the resources onto which
the service is operated should not present intrinsic risks of leaking this information. This
cannot be always guaranteed, in particular when the pub/sub service is operated using
public cloud infrastructures. The use of virtualization and the lack of control on resource
placement and communication in public clouds may prevent users from considering the
pub/sub service secure in terms of confidentiality. Serious concerns have been expressed
in respect to this [Nanavati et al., 2014]. For instance, recent research [Ristenpart et al.,
2009,Somorovsky et al., 2011] has shown that exploits at the hypervisor level, or exploits
based on virtual machines colocation, can be used to gather private information from a virtual
machine running on a public cloud. This indicates that confidentiality cannot be based solely
on agreements between the publishers and subscribers, or between these and the pub/sub
service provider. Since the support infrastructure may be prone to attacks, confidentiality
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should be provided by design such that unauthorized access to the information manipulated
by pub/sub brokers cannot cause critical data leaks.
1.3 Confidentiality in the context of pub/sub
Confidentiality is the property for a communication system to prevent the disclosure of
sensitive information carried in the exchanged messages. Confidentiality in the context of
content-based pub/sub systems is approached in several ways, which we overview in this
section. This overview provides the background on which this thesis’ main contributions
integrate.
In Subsection 1.3.1, we describe a generic functional content-based pub/sub system
model. This system model is widely used as unsecured baseline for existing pub/sub security
solutions. In Subsection 1.3.2, we detail the importance of trust assumptions over this model
and we distinguish two main directions taken in research towards providing confidentiality in
pub/sub systems. In Subsection 1.3.3 we propose a classification of pub/sub confidentiality
properties and in Subsection 1.3.4 we discuss the related issue of key management.
1.3.1 Functional system model
As introduced in Section 1.1, a typical content-based pub/sub system is composed of a broker
infrastructure that provides routing services, and two sets of clients: publishers that submit
publications in the system and subscribers that submit subscriptions with the intent to receive
the publications that match their constraints.
In our model, the structure of a publication includes a header that defines the attributes
on which routing is based and their respective values (e.g., price = 300, name = “ACME”, date
= 2013/1/1), as well as a payload that contains the complete data to be delivered (e.g., a
graph showing the daily variations of the stock value). A complete set of attribute names and
corresponding value types define the attribute schema. Note that in practice a publication
can be represented only by its header, the payload being optional.
The structure of a subscription consists in a set of constraints on the attributes (e.g.,
price > 300 and name = “EMCA”). In our work we also commonly refer at publication attributes
and subscription constraints as message fields when discussing in a general context that
contains both subscriptions and publications (e.g., encryption of both types of messages).
In addition to matching publications against stored subscriptions, a desired func-
tionality for pub/sub systems is the ability to determine containment relations between
subscriptions. A subscription contains another subscription if it is more general, i.e., if publi-
cations matching the contained subscription always match the container subscription (e.g.,
“S1 : stockquote > 100” contains “S2 : stockquote > 300”). Determining containment relations
between subscriptions facilitates building efficient data structures that can considerably speed
up the matching operation [Carzaniga et al., 2001,Chand and Felber, 2004,Jacobsen et al.,
2010,Li et al., 2005].
The majority of the work on providing confidentiality in content-based pub/sub
systems follows this base model. There is little research touching confidentiality aspects
on pub/sub systems that depart from this. For instance, the case of peer-to-peer pub/sub
systems, in which the publishers and subscribers self-organize in a brokerless overlay in order
to perform the routing, is seldom considered in the field’s literature. In our work, we naturally
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focus on the most often used model. However, in Chapter 2 we also overview confidentiality
solutions examples of cases that depart from the described base architecture.
1.3.2 Threat model and directions of research
Almost all research on preserving confidentiality in a pub/sub system naturally defines
a threat model for the system. This can vary from very simple cases when the pub/sub
system architecture is minimalistic and only confidentiality threats are considered, to complex
situations when the pub/sub system spans multiple administrative domains. In the latter
case other threats, like availability related, are sometimes also taken into account. In this
section we identify common traits and differences in the threat models we encounter. We
separate two directions of existing research on confidentiality in pub/sub systems.
The widely considered malicious behavior for confidentiality threats in content-based
pub/sub systems is honest-but-curious (or malicious passive). The entities (publishers,
subscribers, brokers) that are considered untrusted to access the sensitive information act
correctly according to the system functionality specification. In particular they do not replay
or delete messages. However, at the same time they try to collect information that can be
used to access the restricted contents of the exchanged messages, or equivalently provide the
facilities to do so to external entities, unauthorized to use the pub/sub system.
We observe that most of the elements used to define a threat model are similar in the
majority of existing research on pub/sub confidentiality:
 the functionality – routing publications according to submitted subscriptions;
 the entity roles – subscribers, publishers and brokers;
 the data – publications and subscriptions;
 the malicious behavior – honest-but-curious.
Threat models considered in various solutions typically differ in the trust assumptions.
These trust assumptions separate the subjects in the pub/sub system in trusted and untrusted
ones to access particular sets of fields in pub/sub messages.
Relations between different administrative domains generally dictate trust assumptions.
As an example we further detail the e-Health use case described in Section 1.2. In Figure
1.2, we display a sample message flow and marking of domains where data needs protection
against access from untrusted nodes. The hospitals, which publish a patient’s file or subscribe
to take act of new cases, are trusted to access the publications or subscriptions in their local
domain (e.g., sending the file between the same hospital departments). However, the pub/sub
broker service used by the countrywide public health system to disseminate information
between different hospitals can be hosted on a public cloud domain, which is untrusted. The
threat posed to the data confidentiality by the untrusted brokers prohibits sending messages
in clear. This affects the possibility of matching and routing.
At the same time a police-owned routing infrastructure can connect to the e-Health
pub/sub service for collecting information such as the name, age and type of injury of filtered
subsets of victims injured in specific cases: traffic accidents, gun shots, etc. Unlike the
healthcare service, which is externalized to a public cloud, the nature of the police pub/sub
service requires a privately maintained infrastructure. Therefore, the brokers are trusted
to access the publications containing patient data. The police pub/sub service can be used
afterwards by individual departments to track records for particular cases (e.g., in Figure 1.2
John Smith was monitored for future contraventions after having his driver license suspended).
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Figure 1.2: Example of message flow traversing multiple domains with different trust assump-
tions for accessing the data.
A confidentiality policy requires that extended information in the patient file like treatment
costs and insurance provider to be kept private to the healthcare units, and not disclosed to
the police unless mandated by legal actions. Such scenarios that imply interaction between
multiple domains are often met in the literature (e.g., [Bacon et al., 2008,Bacon et al., 2010]).
From our example we can observe a bivalent relation between the pub/sub entities in
a specific domain and the exchanged data. On one hand we have a functional requirement
dictated by the role of the entity: brokers need to perform matching between subscriptions
and publications in order to route, publishers and subscribers do not. On the other hand
we have trust assumptions made about the visibility of pub/sub data that may vary per
domain: entities may not be trusted to read any of the message content (e.g., the brokers
in the countrywide health system infrastructure) but the same message can be partially
accessed as it enters a different domain (e.g., the police broker infrastructure). Based on
these observations we can split publications or subscriptions contents as following:
 routable and non-routable fields based on the functional necessity, in a specific domain,
to use the header fields in routing the message or the absence of this requirement (the
publication payload is naturally non-routable);
 sensitive and non-sensitive parts based on the need for protection against confidentiality
threats in a domain, according to the threat model trust assumptions for the pub/sub
entities (e.g., the age of the patient is a sensitive field in the health system infrastructure
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Figure 1.3: Example of publication field traits variation in respect to traversed domain.
where the brokers are not trusted to access it, but it is non-sensitive in the police broker
infrastructure).
We illustrate in Figure 1.3 how publication field traits vary as the message passes
through various domains, characterized by different levels of trust, in our e-Health example.
Note that the purpose of this example is not to be exhaustive or optimal as an effective
solution, but general enough to cover cases met in most of the existing research and altogether
simple to understand. For instance the pub/sub entities in a domain have the same role,
which is a simplifying assumption but not uncommon in the literature.
We observe two directions in the work that targets confidentiality in pub/sub systems,
directions that tightly relate to the discussion in this subsection. We would like to emphasize
that the two directions are not exclusively separated in the literature, although published
work tends to focus on either one of them.
 (A) - Research focused on encrypted matching. In order to deal with confiden-
tiality threats a form of encryption can be used for the sensitive data. This seems not
feasible when the functionality requires the sensitive information to be also routable
(e.g., in the e-Health broker infrastructure). This case implies the specific need for a
scheme that permits matching over encrypted data, which we generically name encrypted
matching throughout this thesis. There is an important amount of work concerned
with devising such schemes. We overview the most significant examples in Section 2.1.
Given the very specific case handled, the prevalent threat model considered is rather
simplistic. Typically it is assumed that all brokers are untrusted and the entire content
of pub/sub messages is sensitive to confidentiality threats while being routed in the
broker infrastructure (e.g., considering exclusively the e-Health brokers case in Figure
1.2). The focus lies specifically on devising cryptographic mechanisms and on a much
lesser extent on variations in the threat model or underlying trust assumptions.
 (B) - Research focused on security models. The work done in this area is
geared towards finding an optimal architecture or the best security model for a pub/sub
infrastructure that has to respond to confidentiality threats. The effective cryptographic
mechanisms are typically of less concern. The threat model varies from case to case,
with different trust assumptions set for the system components in regard to the data
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accessed (e.g., the difference between the e-Health and police brokers in Figure 1.2). We
can easily observe from our previous discussion, specifically on the message sensitivity,
that this suggests the possibility to derive an access control matrix in which the pub/sub
entities are the subjects, the pub/sub messages constitute the objects, and the trust
assumptions could be actually formalized as access rights. Several articles in this area
actually define an access control model for complex pub/sub systems. We review the
area of work focused on security models in Section 2.2.
The work presented in this thesis aims at providing efficient support for existing
solutions on pub/sub confidentiality, in that purpose extending them. We mostly focus on
the encrypted matching schemes direction. The techniques we devise, presented throughout
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 have a direct applicability in this area. However, part of our work can
successfully integrate with security models covered in the second category above. We further
detail our contribution in Section 1.4.
1.3.3 Flavors of pub/sub confidentiality
Confidentiality in pub/sub systems can be categorized in different flavors. We categorize
it with respect to the sensitive content of the exchanged messages, that can be split in
subscription confidentiality, publication confidentiality and payload confidentiality.
 Subscription confidentiality is defined as the property of hiding information in the
subscriptions (constraints) submitted to the pub/sub system. When the threat model
assumes untrusted brokers, this property breaks the functional system model. Brokers
cannot perform the matching anymore over constraints supposed to be used in routing.
In such cases, ensuring the property requires encryption mechanisms that make the
matching action possible. However, encrypted matching support is not required for
providing subscription confidentiality in cases where routing is not necessary. Any
encryption scheme would suffice in such cases.
 Publication confidentiality is the property of hiding information in the header of a
publication submitted to the pub/sub system. As in the case of subscriptions, enforcing
this property may seem to break the functional system model, impairing the ability of
untrusted brokers to match and route the publications. As mentioned above, encrypted
matching algorithms are used to overcome this issue. Similary, when routing is not
necessary, the scheme does not need to support matching over encrypted data. As an
example this applies in domains where there are no brokers and only subscribers have
restrictions in accessing the data.
 Payload confidentiality is the property of hiding the payload part of the publications
submitted to the pub/sub system. Note that the payload is not used for routing purposes,
only the header is. Therefore, enforcing this property is completely orthogonal to the
specifics of pub/sub communications. It is feasible to use classical encryption techniques
that apply also to other distributed systems.
To our knowledge, the most cited work that provides a particular separation of
confidentiality properties in pub/sub systems is [Wang et al., 2002]. We have several
differences in our classification. For instance publication confidentiality property is defined
in [Wang et al., 2002] in two forms. “Information confidentiality” ensures the lack of disclosure
against the broker infrastructure. “Publication confidentiality” ensures that only a restricted
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Property
Threat model
assumptions
Scheme supporting
encrypted matching
Classic encryption
scheme
Categorization
in [Wang et al., 2002]
Subscription
confidentiality
domain includes
untrusted brokers
required for
routable fields
for non-routable fields Subscription
confidentiality
Publication
confidentiality
domain includes
untrusted brokers
only untrusted
subscribers
required for
routable fields
possible
but not necessary
used for
non-routable fields
typically used
Information
confidentiality
Publication
confidentiality
Payload
confidentiality
any untrusted pub/sub
parties
not applicable
to payload always used
payload separation not
considered
Table 1.1: Overview of confidentiality properties.
set of subscribers are able to access the publications including their headers. We assume
that publication confidentiality is supposed to be provisioned against any (possible different)
untrusted system components. This makes the property independent of the threat model.
We consider confidentiality properties decoupled from the trust assumptions. However,
a property can apply only in cases that require it (e.g., it does not make sense to enforce
subscription confidentiality for a threat model that assumes only subscribers as not trusted,
since subscriptions do not reach other subscribers domain except the one generating them).
What depends on the trust assumptions, and also on the need to perform routing over
encrypted data, is the mechanism used to enforce the property. Our property descriptions
mention the need to use encrypted matching or not. Table 1.1 summarizes our properties
classification.1
We observe that encrypted matching schemes are required for both subscription and
publication confidentiality when the pub/sub system is deployed over a domain that includes
untrusted brokers. This situation resembles closely the nowadays typical externalization of
processing tasks on public clouds, bringing an additional argument for our thesis contributions
focus on the encrypted matching area. Also, in particular, one of the support techniques
we develop relates directly with preserving subscription confidentiality, as we will discuss in
Chapter 3.
1.3.4 Key management in secured pub/sub systems
In section 1.3.2 we have diferentiated two main existing research directions: one targeted on
innovating techniques of encryption that permits matching and another focused on developing
complex security models in respect to threats considered in different interworking domains.
We observe as a common point that for preserving one or more of the confidentiality properties
a form of cryptography is used. Independent of the fact that the cryptographic solution is an
encrypted matching scheme or not, it often requires the exchange of secret information or
negotiating parameters between the participating pub/sub system entities. In other words
the presence of a key management solution is necessary. In essence the functionality of a key
management solution for secure communication in a generic distributed system case can be
briefly summarized to:
 Allow the system components to obtain or negotiate in a secure manner the initial keys
to start the secure communication;
 Deal with situations when the key information has to be refreshed at the different
communicationg parties: when a member is evicted from the system and is not trusted
1In this table we consider only the sensitive pub/sub data. Cases for the messages or parts of the messages
that are not sensitive do not make the subject of ensuring any confidentiality property.
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anymore, when a member joins the system and is not trusted to decrypt previous
communicated information, or cases dictated by the specific encryption scheme for
other security reasons (e.g., counter brute force attacks, etc).
Pub/sub systems introduce an important additional challenge for key management. Unlike in
point-to-point or named channels communication models, publishers are not aware in advance
of subscribers that will eventually receive their message. A key management solution has
to know who are the communicating parties that need to receive related key information.
Therefore, it inherently restricts the natural pub/sub decoupled communication. Along
Sections 2.1 and 2.2 we refer to existing work that offers a pub/sub-specific approach. As
directions observed, we can identify the following:
 Most of work dealing with cryptographic schemes used in pub/sub systems considers key
management as an orthogonal problem, decoupled from the cryptographic mechanisms
that use the keys. These cases usually simply refer to the need of an external solution
that has to ensure key provisioning to the communicating parties.
 A particular case of cryptographic schemes, relying on attribute based encryption,
associates the encryption key information with the actual contents of the pub/sub
messages, rather than with particular communicating parties. This reduces the coupling
imposed by key management. We overview such schemes in Section 2.1.
 Finally, there are some solutions that modify the pub/sub functional model towards a less
decoupled model, therefore allowing more straightforward designs for key management.
We also cover some examples in Section 2.2.
A major contribution in our thesis is providing a new approach for key management
in pub/sub systems. Our solution addresses both the pub/sub coupling problem, as well as a
consequent issue brought by a key update, which is stored subscriptions invalidation. We
thouroughly detail our work in Chapter 5.
1.4 Contributions and structure summary
This thesis is focused on techniques that tackle problems met in confidentiality-preserving
pub/sub systems. A first major issue addressed are the performance drawbacks inflicted
by secure mechanisms. Another critical aspect for which we also contribute is the key
management aspect introduced in 1.3.4.
Our work is mostly applicable as support for optimizing or filling gaps in existing
confidentiality-preserving pub/sub solutions. In particular, from the research directions
described in section 1.3.2, we mostly target encrypted matching schemes. This is the newest
and most flexible paradigm in secure pub/sub systems that has concentrated the interest
in the latest years as we can observe from the published solutions we overview in our study.
Also, it is the area which in our opinion is the most unexplored, and presents multiple
open directions for future research. However, multiple designs for securing pub/sub can
also benefit from our developments. In order to offer a thorough image of the existing
confidentiality-preserving pub/sub solutions that might benefit of our developed techniques,
in Chapter 2 we give an in-depth overview of the most important work that follows the two
main directions of research: encrypted matching schemes and pub/sub security models.
In Chapter 3 we introduce our first technical contribution. We develop a generic
technique that consistently alleviates performance drawbacks inflicted by encrypted matching
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schemes in pub/sub communication. Our mechanism consists in a prefiltering stage that is
executed by the brokers in a pub/sub system before the effective encrypted matching. This
stage reduces the amount of publications passed through the actual encrypted matching
filter by apriori discarding part of the non-matching cases. The normal overhead that
encrypted matching schemes bring is substantially reduced. We perform a thorough analysis
of our technique that evidentiates the existing trade-offs between performance and achievable
security.
In our work we extensively use Asymmetric Scalar Product-preserving Encryption
(ASPE). The scheme was introduced in the field of secure databases [Wong et al., 2009],
being afterwards adapted for pub/sub in [Choi et al., 2010]. We develop and test our support
techniques for secure pub/sub schemes using ASPE as use case scenario. In that purpose
we extend the existing scheme, by adding significant changes to its original form. We also
perform a thorough analysis on both the security and design of the scheme. We identify
existing flaws and we fix these. We present a summary of the original ASPE scheme as part of
the overview included in Chapter 2. Chapter 4 describes our primary functional extensions of
ASPE: multidimensional matching and subscription containment, and presents our position
on the possibility of adapting other existing schemes for encrypted matching purposes.
Chapter 5 introduces our third contribution. We introduce an architecture that deals
with the major issue of key management in secure pub/sub systems. Our solution presents
three major advances compared to the reduced number of existing alternatives. First, we
tackle the inherent coupling problem that a key exchange protocol naturally presents, and
which contradicts the pub/sub decoupled communication paradigm. Second, we are the first
to deal with the significant problem posed by invalidating stored subscriptions. In a typical
scenario, when a key is updated, all subscriptions stored by brokers have to be re-encrypted
and resubmitted by subscribers. This can cause critical problems in the pub/sub quality
of service. Thirdly, our solution is instantiated by extending the ASPE scheme, obtaining
basically a novel enhanced version.
Finally, in Chapter 6 we conclude our work. We summarize our contributions and we
identify open paths for further research.
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Chapter 2
Overview of existing solutions
providing pub/sub confidentiality
2.1 Encrypted matching and pub/sub confidentiality
In this chapter we cover the most representative solutions that follow the two directions of
research on pub/sub confidentiality identified in Section 1.3.2. In this section we overview
encrypted matching, and in Section 2.2 we cover security models.
Our work is mainly centered on providing support techniques that directly target
encrypted matching solutions in this area. Such schemes are needed to encrypt sensitive
fields in pub/sub messages when the threat model assumes the brokers untrusted to access
these fields, but the functional model still requires the fields to be routable and used in
matching. This situation occurs in both the e-Health and stock exchange scenarios previously
described in Chapter 1. Encrypted matching is a paradigm that differs significantly from
classic encryption algorithms. To the best of our knowledge, no comprehensive analysis
and review exists in the literature. Therefore, prior to summarizing details of the most
representative solutions published in the area, we consider useful centralizing some general
characteristics that apply to encrypted matching schemes.
2.1.1 General considerations on encrypted matching schemes
Main class of cryptographic algorithm
A broad classification for cryptographic schemes splits them based on the algorithm class they
fit into: secret-key encryption and public-key encryption. In secret-key encryption algorithms
(also known as symmetric-key) the same private key information is used in both encryption
and decryption. In public-key encryption algorithms (asymmetric) a public key is used in
encryption and a different private one in decryption.
One important characteristic for encrypted matching algorithms used in pub/sub
systems is that the final target is the matching operation. The sensitive data these schemes
protect does not necessarily need to be decrypted. Encrypted matching schemes are normally
used to encrypt subscriptions and publication headers. The subscription flow ends at the
brokers, which store the messages without decrypting. The publication flow ends at the
subscribers, which are normally interested in the publication payload and not in the encrypted
headers (if the headers are of interest, these can be integrated also in the payload).
We observe that many existing encrypted matching solutions rely on, or adapt, an
existing cryptographic scheme (e.g., already used in a normal point-to-point communication
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or in secure database scenarios). The classic definitions of both private and public key
schemes imply though the existence of a decryption algorithm. The lack of need for such
an algorithm is a significant difference that would make improper categorizing an encrypted
matching scheme as a private or public-key one. Moreover, in case of solutions inspired from
established public-key schemes, the encryption phase always uses a private key component.
In some cases this takes the form of an additional secret-key blinding layer added on top
of the public-key scheme. Other designs use the algorithm in a somehow similar manner
with the classic digital signatures case: the private key is used in encryption and the public
key in the matching process. Even if it is cumbersome to define a distinct categorization
for encrypted matching schemes, we can refer to one as based on a secret-key or public-key
algorithm.
Types of constraints handled
A subscription’s constraints can be classified based on two criteria:
 type of field - numerical (including both integer and floating point representations) or
character strings
 type of operator - equality or range for numerical types, and identity, prefix, suffix and
substring for strings
Most of the existing pub/sub encrypted matching schemes handle only numerical
values. Even more restrictive, some of them do not support evaluating ranges over encrypted
data. This can be acceptable for topic-based scenarios, where topic matching could be
expressed by evaluating numerical equalities. However, in case of content-based pub/sub
systems this severely limits the subscription expressiveness. Also, filtering optimizations
based on subscription containment are limited only to equality based relations. Equality
constraints on numerical data are still the predominant type, being available in virtually all
encrypted matching schemes as the most simple constraint type.
Matching algorithm technique
We observe distinct manners to obtain the final encrypted matching result in the existing
schemes:
 Based on a exact relation preserving isomorphism. Let us consider a function ♦ applied
on a publication attribute a and a constraint value c in a subscription, such that a
matching relation between a and c can be determined. For instance the difference
between values: ♦(a, c) = a−c, can determine a “greater than” relation and whether
or not the attribute matches the constraint. Let us then consider the encryption
algorithm E and another function  applied on the ciphertexts E(a) and E(c). If a
correspondence can be established between the results of ♦ and  then based on the
result of  we can determine the exact relation and matching between a and c. In
different words the encryption E gives an isomorphism such that:
♦(a, c)⇔ (E(a), E(c))
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 Based on a pre-mapped equality comparison. In these solutions it is typical to first
perform a pre-mapping of a publication attribute a and a constraint c in a different
domain, which permits to evaluate the matching based strictly on equality comparisons.
One basic example is to consider the bit prefixes that correspond to c and split a in
a similar set of bit prefixes. Then if one prefix in the a associated set is equal to one
corresponding to c the matching can be evaluated as positive. An encryption scheme E
is applied afterwards over the pre-mapping results, such that the semantical equality
can still be evaluated over the resulting ciphertexts.
It can be argued that the latter case is a particularization of the first, when the relation
preserved by the encryption is semantical equality. However, there are cryptographic schemes
which permit evaluating equality only and can follow exclusively this particular method,
requiring the preliminary mapping phase.
Our separation is meant to emphasize different generic design patterns that can be
applied when devising an encrypted matching scheme. In practice, two well-established
classes of encryption schemes typically follow one of these directions when they are adapted
for pub/sub encrypted matching.
 Homomorphic encryption. Such schemes have the property that, given two plaintext
terms t1 and t2 and an operation α applied over these, encrypting the result of α
corresponds to the result of an operation β applied over the individual encryptions of
t1 and t2:
E(α(t1, t2)) = β(E(t1), E(t2))
Let us assume that α can be used to determine matching between an attribute and a
constraint in a pub/sub context. Then, we can easily observe a correlation between α and
β and the functions ♦ and respectively  in the exact relation preserving isomorphism
generic design. The difference here is that the α result is encrypted. Therefore giving
it to a broker is not enough to determine a relation between the terms (unlike the
case of ♦), unless the possibility of decryption is also provided. However, an untrusted
broker cannot be allowed to decrypt encrypted messages. To overcome this issue, a
classic homomorphic scheme normally needs to be adapted for an encrypted matching
scenario. Examples of solutions overviewed we overview in Section 2.1.2 are [Nabeel
et al., 2012,Nabeel et al., 2009].
 Attribute based encryption (ABE). The schemes in this category permit decryption only
if a policy is satisfied by a set of defined attributes. The typical idea in a pub/sub
scenario is to model the publication header as the attributes, and the subscription
constraints as a“key” access structure (the policy). However, in ABE, the attributes or
at least the access structure typically remain in cleartext. The target of the scheme is to
encrypt a payload associated with the attributes that can be decrypted only when these
match the access structure. This applies for payload confidentiality. To hide also the
attributes (publication headers) and the access structure (subscription constraints), and
to peform encrypted matching over them, typically an extra encryption layer must be
added. To support both ABE and this extra layer, publication headers and subscription
constraints are modeled into the ABE attributes and access structure, process which
often follows the pre-mapped equality comparison design. For instance, the previous
given example of pre-mapping to bit prefixes is used in conjunction with ABE in [Ion
et al., 2012, Ion et al., 2010b]. Other examples that we overview in Section 2.1.2
are [Tariq et al., 2010,Srivatsa and Liu, 2007].
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Note that the solutions based on homomorphic encryption or based on ABE do not
cover completely the more generic design paths of exact relation preserving isomorphism and
respectively pre-mapped equality comparison. We point out the use of these design paths also
in other schemes overviewed in section 2.1.2.
Matching performance
Encrypted matching operations typically imply evaluating a function over a pair formed by
an encrypted constraint and an encrypted publication attribute. The schemes we overview in
Section 2.1.2 differ greatly in terms of supported constraints and matching technique. Some
use various flexible cryptographic mechanisms, which can be chosen from a given class of
algorithms (e.g., a commutative cryptosystem [Shikfa et al., 2008]). Therefore, comparing the
performance of the various solutions is cumbersome. However, it is possible to observe the
cases where the encrypted matching between a constraint and an individual attribute implies
computation over a larger set of values than only the evaluated pair (e.g., the complete set of
publication attributes). This typically implies a significant load, which can make a scheme
less usable for some scenarios (e.g., workloads with numerous attributes per publication).
We point out such situations in our overview. The prefiltering support technique that we
develop in Chapter 3 is specifically designed to reduce such performance drawbacks, and make
adequate to use any encrypted matching scheme, independent of its particular characteristics.
Cryptanalytic attack model considerations
A cryptographic scheme has to withstand a range of cryptanalysis attacks in which the
purpose is to obtain the plaintext or the encryption key. There are four basic attack models
considered when evaluating the security of classic cryptographic schemes, based on the
attacker power:
 Ciphertext-only attack (COA) when the attacker can only observe the ciphertexts;
 Known-plaintext attack (KPA) when the attacker can observe the exact correspondence
between ciphertexts and plaintexts;
 Chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) when the attacker has the power to obtain the ciphertexts
corresponding to plaintexts of its choice;
 Chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) when the attacker has the power to obtain the decryp-
tion of specific chosen ciphertexts.
Typically the analysis of security towards CPA or CCA is formalized through an
indistinguishability game, where the attacker has to make a distinguishment decision over
ciphertexts, with a non-neglictible probability. The schemes allowing encrypted matching in
pub/sub scenarios present however, a different case from typical encrypted communication.
[Raiciu and Rosenblum, 2006] expresses the idea that achievable indistinguishability is
limited. By the possibility to match encrypted publications with encrypted subscriptions, an
untrusted broker can draw conclusions about similarities between publications. Moreover,
the schemes that allow to determine if one encrypted subcription contains (is more general)
than another, inherently permit also distinguishing encrypted subscriptions. When functional
requirements permit establishing such relations between encrypted subscriptions and encrypted
publications, the security analysis of existing encrypted matching schemes does not usually
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consider indistinguishability decisions at the level of complete encrypted messages. The
assumed malicious behavior is honest-but-curious. The chosen attack models are rarely
considered. The published work on encrypted matching most often either defers to the weaker
KPA or COA or defines other more particular attack models, and respectively more particular
security proofs.
The contributions in this thesis complement encrypted matching schemes. We focus in
keeping the existing level of security, while adding functionalities that facilitate the practical
deployment by increasing performance. The prefiltering solution we introduce in Chapter 3
takes in account the containment issue. We offer a thorough probabilistic analysis that proves
interesting tradeoffs between performance and security. The key management solution we
propose in Chapter 5 builds upon an existing encrypted matching scheme, enhances it, and
proves its resilience to an attack equivalent to a KPA, more powerful than the one that was
considered in the original scheme [Choi et al., 2010].
2.1.2 Encrypted matching solutions
In the following we overview existing content-based pub/sub encrypted matching schemes.
In our discussion we generically use the notation E(x) for a ciphertext obtained using an
encryption algorithm E applied to the plaintext x, and D(y) for a decryption algorithm D
applied to a ciphertext y. If the context is not general and implies a particular key K, the
notation used is EK(x), respectively DK(y). We give a summary of the surveyed work in this
section in Table 2.1.
Solution
Confidentiality
pub/sub/payload
Containment
support
Key management
support
Encrypted matching
technique design
[Choi et al., 2010] yes/yes/no yes external solution
required
exact relation preserving
isomorphism
[Raiciu and
Rosenblum, 2006]
yes/no1/no
(with false positives)
yes external solution
required
pre-mapped equality comparison
[Nabeel et al., 2009] yes/yes/no yes direct between peers
(coupled system)
exact relation preserving
isomorphism (adapted
homomorphic encryption)
[Ion et al., 2012] yes/yes/yes no managed by central
trusted authority
pre-mapped equality comparison
(adapted attribute based
encryption)
[Li et al., 2004] yes/yes/no no external solution
required
pre-mapped equality comparison
[Tariq et al., 2010] yes/yes/yes
(with false positives)
yes managed by central
trusted authority
pre-mapped equality comparison
(adapted attribute based
encryption)
Table 2.1: Overview of the encrypted matching solutions.
[Choi et al., 2010] describes a solution using asymmetric scalar product-preserving encryp-
tion (ASPE). ASPE was initially introduced by [Wong et al., 2009] in the field of database
security. The solution is applied for any numerical constraints.
We use ASPE extensively in our work. We both consider it as an use case scenario to
test the performance of the encrypted matching performance enhancing solution we introduce
in Chapter 3, and also we directly modify it to provide a key management architecture
in Chapter 5. In the current section we just cover the basics of the scheme, focused on
1Subscriptions are encrypted but the keyed procedure lacks randomness and the subscriptions are admitted
as semantically unsecure by the authors. Nevertheless, the encoding is needed to provide matching with the
encrypted publication.
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the unidimensional case, as presented in [Choi et al., 2010]. In Chapter 4 we describe the
multidimensional case, filling the gaps in the original form, and we also correct flaws in the
containment support.
Figure 2.1: The ASPE subscription split.
Mechanism. Publication attributes and subscriptions constraints are represented as coordi-
nates of multidimensional points. The idea is illustrated, without loss of generality, for the
simple 1-dimension case in Figure 2.1. Consider a subscription point S and a publication
point P that we are interested to match. The subscriber chooses two reference subscription
points S1 and S2, placed symmetrically at equal distance from S. The distance difference:
D1 = dist(S1, P )−dist(S2, P ), can be compared to zero to determine the relation between S
and P :
dist(S1, P )−dist(S2, P ) > 0⇒ dist(S1, P ) > dist(S2, P )⇒ S < P
The reason to use the distance difference instead directly the distance between S and
P is caused by a potential security issue. In [Wong et al., 2009], the authors prove that
any encryption scheme preserving distance recoverability between two points is vulnerable to
known-plaintext attacks (KPA).
The distance difference D1 can be expressed as a sum of scalar products:
D1 = dist(S1, P )−dist(S2, P ) =‖ S1 ‖2 − ‖ S2 ‖2 +2(S2−S1)·P
ASPE offers a solution to encrypt points S1, S2 and P , such that the scalar product
is preserved and the distance difference result can still be obtained from the encrypted data.
The algorithm is based on the properties of matrix multiplication. It uses as keys on the
subscriber side an invertible matrix M and on the publisher side the inverse M−1. The
matching phase relies on the natural reduction of the key when the ciphertext encrypted
with M is multiplied with the one encrypted with M−1. The obtained result is the same
distance difference multiplied with a positive random value: D2 = D1∗q (q > 0). We can
observe that the scheme follows the exact relation preserving isomorphism design defined
in Section 2.1.1. The initial exact relation between points S and P can be determined
based on the correspondence between results D2 and D1, obtained from the ciphertexts and
respectively from the plaintexts. Subscription containment is optionally supported by adding
extra reference points to the split subscription, and following a similar distance comparison
technique as for matching. We detail the accurate containment mechanism, including our
corrections, in Chapter 4.
Security considerations. The security evaluation in [Choi et al., 2010] is rather shallow,
basically considering only a particular attempt for a ciphertext-only attack (COA). To
guarantee subscription and publication confidentiality, the paper relies on more conclusive
security proofs given in the original database scenario [Wong et al., 2009], which handle the
case of a KPA. However, to obtain security in such case [Wong et al., 2009] enhances the
original scheme by introducing artificial dimensions and splitting the original ones. These
additions are not discussed in [Choi et al., 2010], but they are potentially adaptable to the
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Figure 2.2: Equality encrypted matching building block in [Raiciu and Rosenblum, 2006].
pub/sub case. We use a different approach to enhance the scheme, and prove its resilience to
a KPA as part of developing a key management architecture in Chapter 5.
Practical aspects. ASPE is a secret-key algorithm, which naturally needs that the key
information be distributed among participants. However, the paper does not give any
information about key management. As main contribution of this thesis, we develop a key
management architecture, that we integrate with ASPE in Chapter 5.
Another limitation is the multidimensional case (multiple constraints and attributes),
which is only briefly discussed. Our own analysis on this indicates that the encrypted matching
depends on the size n of the schema defining the set of publication attributes, the complexity
being O(n) per evaluated constraint. Therefore, the solution is less appropriate for workloads
with a large number of attributes.
[Raiciu and Rosenblum, 2006] presents a set of encrypted matching schemes that use
different encryption mechanisms according to the type of the values (integers, strings) and
the nature of subscriptions constraints (equalities, ranges).
Mechanism. For equality filtering, the paper presents a simple scheme initially proposed
by [Song et al., 2000]. This scheme is used as a base for the other cases, and is actually
a building block also in other published work [Shikfa et al., 2008, Srivatsa and Liu, 2007].
The mechanism is depicted in Figure 2.2. Given a publication attribute a and a constraint
c, after applying a K-keyed pseudorandom function F , the results FK(a) and respectively
FK(c) are used as keys to encrypt a common random value (using the same function F ). If
the ciphertexts are similar then the matching can be considered positive.
The authors use this simple scheme as building block for more complex cases. One
of them deals with string matching. String matching refers here strictly to constraints of
keyword inclusion (e.g., a constraint could be: “includes ACME”, where “ACME” is the
keyword). The algorithm considers a dictionary with possible words. First, the dictionary
indexes of constraint and attribute keywords are given to a keyed pseudorandom permutation.
The obtained permuted indexes are used essentially as a and c in the first scheme to form
keyes that encrypt a random value. However, the scheme requires for publications to encode
every dictionary index in this manner, and not only the attribute indexes. The values resulted
exclusively from attribute indexes are XORed with 1, to differentiate from the rest. When
matching a constraint resulted value (also using a XOR), the result is positive if the same 1
is obtained.
The other flavors of encrypted matching are similary built, by defining a dictionary fit
to the characteristics of the constraints evaluated. For instance, for numerical inequalities,
a set of reference points associated with a smaller or greater comparator are chosen as the
dictionary (e.g., {< 1, < 3, < 5, > 1, > 3, > 5}). In such cases, an initial approximation of
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Figure 2.3: Encrypted matching mechanism in [Nabeel et al., 2012].
the values is required before encryption to pick the closest reference point in the dictionary.
Basically, the scheme follows a pre-mapped equality comparison design as defined in Section
2.1.1. Subscription containment is determined in a relatively similar manner. This implies
adding an additional reference vector with approximation points for each constraint.
Security considerations. The article points out the indistinguishability limitation in encrypted
matching schemes. In case of subscriptions, this comes naturally as effect of the distinguisha-
bility resulted from containment. The authors admit that in such case the subscription
encryption is not semantically secure (although containment support is optional). Therefore,
they focus on publication confidentiality. In particular we can notice that only the publication
encryption includes a random factor. The particular attack model considered is focused on
the broker’s ability to distinguish between publications. For this, the security evaluation
ensures that the only information leaked is the positive or negative matching result.
Practical aspects. All schemes are based on secret-key encryption algorithms. The article
does not propose any key management solution to distribute the needed information between
peers.
The approximation used for numerical constraints generates false positives. Their rate
increases as the granularity of the dictionary decreases. It is desirable, however, to have a
small dictionary for performance purposes because the size of the encrypted messages depends
directly on the dictionary size. Our scheme study revealed that the approximation phase can
also produce false negatives in the containment tests. This does not have any implication in
the matching of individual subscriptions, but it prevents some useful optimizations at the
broker level.
[Nabeel et al., 2012, Nabeel et al., 2009] present a solution based on the public-key
Paillier scheme [Paillier, 1999] applied for any constraints on numerical values. The Paillier
cryptosystem benefits of homomorphic properties (e.g., E(x)·E(y) = E(x+y)).
Mechanism. The pub/sub system architecture in the paper is adapted in order to support
the scheme’s specific design. It is assumed that subscribers know in advance the publishers
from whom they wish to receive publications, and that the publishers are also aware of this
intention.
A sketch summarizing the encrypted matching is shown in Figure 2.3. For the following
discussion it is essential to mention that the original Paillier cryptosystem private key has
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two components used in decryption: λ and µ. In the initial phase the subscriber encrypts
the complement to each constraint value c using the public key pkey obtaining Epkey(−c).
These values are sent to the publisher of interest. The publisher applies an additional layer
of blinding, on top of the received Paillier encryption. The blinding scheme can be described
as follows:
 pre-applying part of the Paillier decryption operation, which we note as D′, using the
secret λ parameter: D′λ(E(−c)) = E ′(−c)
 applying an additional encryption B, which makes use of a private random component
rm, and obtaining the blinded value: Brm(E
′(−c))
The blinded encrypted constraints are sent back to the subscriber, which registers the
encrypted subscriptions with the broker. The publisher follows a rather similar path for
first encrypting and then blinding each attribute a, using the same separate private rm, but
also an extra random parameter r, finally obtaining Br,rm(E
′(a)). For matching, the broker
is given the second part of the Paillier private key: µ. Using this, and the homomorphic
properties of the Paillier cryptosystem the broker is able to perform a computation diff over
the blinded attribute and constraint. This computation completes the Paillier decryption,
obtaining:
diff µ(Br,rm(E
′(a)), Brm(E
′(−c))) = rm(a−c)+r
The randoms rm and r are chosen in an interval that is limited according to the values
domain, such that the diff result gives the relation between a and c. Optionally, containment
is supported through a similar technique.
Security considerations. The scheme achieves subscription confidentiality and publication
confidentiality according to the security assumptions it considers. However, the article does
not define a specific attack model. The scheme’s security analysis is merely based on the
fact that the primitives used are secure on their own ground. Due to the change of the
private µ parameter in the Paillier cryptosystem into a public one, we believe that a more
extensive analysis of the implications would be useful, but this exceeds the limits of the
current overview. Further, the rm random parameter chosen when encrypting a publication
cannot differ from the one used when encrypting the subcription that is supposed to be
matched. This means that the publisher must reuse the same value of rm when sending other
publications. [Nabeel et al., 2009] acknowledges the possibility that eventually this could be
brute forced and the actual differences a−c could be determined, therefore the addition of
the extra random parameter r done in [Nabeel et al., 2012]. Note that the difference a−c
would give the exact distance between the two values, which according to the proofs in [Wong
et al., 2009] would make the scheme a distance recoverable encryption, which is unsecure to a
known plaintext attack (KPA).
Practical aspects. In our opinion, a main drawback is the tight coupling considered in the
design. The initial subscriber-publisher communication seems to be advantageous however, in
regard to the issue of key management. Nevertheless, the model is not equivalent to an initial
key exchange. Every subscription must be sent first to the publisher of interest before being
registered to a broker. This will cause both a communication overhead and a processing
overhead at the publisher side. We think that a basic optimization idea would be to delegate
these operations to a trusted third party instead of a publisher.
[Ion et al., 2012, Ion et al., 2010b] present a scheme (also referred in [Ion et al., 2010a])
that is using attribute based encryption (ABE) and multi-user searchable data encryption
(SDE). The scheme is applied for any numerical constraint and string equalities.
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Figure 2.4: ABE resulted subscription representation (four bits).
Mechanism. We discussed the generalities of ABE in Section 2.1.1. In this scheme the
main use of the paradigm is in encrypting the publication payload. The publications can
be decrypted only if an access policy associated with the subscriber that receives them is
satisfied. The access policy sets a specific structure for the subscription constraints. It also
dictates the publication attributes format. The constraints are encoded into an access tree in
which the non-leaf nodes are threshold gates specifying the number of subtrees that need to
be satisfied. Consider the case of a subscription with two constraints depicted in Figure 2.4.
This will result in a root node with a value of 2, meaning that each of the two subtrees needs
to be satisfied (equivalent with a logical AND between the constraint subtrees). Further, a
constraint is expanded following the representation in [Bethencourt et al., 2007]. Following,
one leaf-node token per bit is required in order to take a decision. For instance, for a predicate
like “v ≥ 12” in a 4-bit representation, the constraint subtree will have a leaf-node with
v = 1*** (“bit 1 of v must be 1”) and a leaf-node with v = *1** (“bit 2 of v must be 1”)
joined by a parent “AND” node. For publications, the attributes are also split into 1-bit
similar tokens (e.g., v = 12 will be split in v = 1***, v = *1**, v = **0*, v = ***0, which
matches the example constraint subtree in the subscription representation).
Figure 2.5: SDE private key usage applied in pub/sub context.
The 1-bit tokens obtained from publications and subscriptions are encrypted using
multi-user SDE [Dong et al., 2008]. This technique adapts the public key El Gamal scheme
[El Gamal, 1985] to a proxy encryption context. A trusted authority generates the public key
parameters and a private key formed by two components x and s0. The idea is to randomly
split the private x in two pieces x = xi1+xi2 for each pair i formed by an end node (publisher
or subscriber) and the edge broker through which the end node sends the messages. The
sketch in Figure 2.5 summarizes the technique. The end node performs an initial encryption
E1 in which his private part xi1 and s0 are used. The broker performs a re-encryption E2
using his part of the private secret xi2. The algorithms used for publications and subscriptions
differ. However, it is provided that for any split configuration of the private parameter x, the
obtained ciphertexts can be compared to determine the matching. The paper does not give
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any information about performing containment evaluations. Due to different random values
used by subscribers in the encryption process we conclude that the brokers cannot establish
any relation between two encrypted constraints.
Security considerations. The security for providing subscription confidentiality is analysed
using a chosen plaintext attack (CPA) model. In case of publication confidentiality the scheme
is evaluated on a model which has similarities with the one in [Raiciu and Rosenblum, 2006]
the goal being that nothing be leaked to an adversary besides the results observed from
matching history traces. The analysis uses the fact that the employed ElGamal mechanism
is proven CPA secure on its own ground. Finally, payload confidentiality provided by ABE
is proven secure under a stronger threat model, which takes in account the possibility of
collusion between malicious subscribers, publishers and brokers.
Practical aspects. The paper elaborates also on an access control model that can be applied
in more complex scenarios such as the e-Health platform taken as use case. This relies on
restrictions that can be imposed on various groups of subscribers through ABE. In that
regard [Ion et al., 2012] is one of the articles which touches in sufficient extense both areas of
research we distinguished in Section 1.3.2.
The article considers the lack of need for key exchange as a decoupling advantage.
However, this does not eliminate the need for a common key material set at the communicating
peers. The difference is that this key material is not exchanged between participants, but
retrieved from a trusted authority.
The scheme is integrated with PADRES [Jacobsen et al., 2010] pub/sub middleware,
for evaluation. [Ion et al., 2012] mentions that matching time increases linearly with the
number of comparisons done between constraint and attribute 1-bit tokens. A constraint
subtree can have at most n leaf-nodes, and a 1-bit attribute set has n elements where n is the
number of bits used to represent a value. The worst case scenario is that each 1-bit attribute
must be compared with each 1-bit leaf-node. The maximum number of comparisons per
constraint is n2.
[Li et al., 2004] presents a scheme that applies a technique based on prefix preservation
to evaluate any numerical constraints. The idea has some conceptual elements in common
with [Ion et al., 2012].
Mechanism. The scheme considers subscription constraints as always expressed through a
closed interval (e.g., x ∈ [32, 111]). The principle is that the membership to the closed interval
can be mapped into a finite set of prefixes (e.g., for the example above, in case of an 8-bit
value representation: 001*, 010*, 0110*). A publication attribute that matches the interval
will naturally match one of the associated prefixes (e.g., x = 64 = 01000000 matches 001*).
The next step is to encrypt such sets obtained for interval constraints and as well the
publication attributes values in a manner that preserves the significant prefix. The solution
makes use of a simple pseudorandom permutation of the bits. The plaintext prefixes can
be represented on a binary tree in which each node under the root corresponds to a bit as
displayed in Figure 2.6. A permutation is obtained by flipping any sequence of bit values
in the non-leaf nodes and switching the two child subtrees accordingly. Each of all possible
prefix-preserving ciphertext domains is generated through such a bit flip permutation. The
matching on the ciphertexts simply consists of comparing the prefixes as in the plaintext
case. We observe that the technique fits in the pre-mapped equality comparison design. The
paper does not specify anything about containment support.
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Figure 2.6: The bit-flip based prefix preserving permutation.
Security considerations. The authors admit that the scheme has limited resistance under a
KPA attack model. Subscription confidentiality and publication confidentiality are therefore
achievable only on a weaker ciphertext-only-attack (COA).
Practical aspects. The scheme requires a secret key to determine a common permutation at
the publisher and subscriber sides. Key exchange is considered however as an orthogonal
problem. Performance-wise, the authors prove that the maximum size of a subscription prefix
set is 2(n−1) for any interval in which the bounds are represented on n bits. This is also
the maximum number of comparisons needed to determine a match, which is lower than
quadratic as in [Ion et al., 2012] solution that also uses bit prefixes. This limit is set by the
number of ciphertexts resulted following publication encryption. In the current scheme there
is one ciphertext per publication attribute, compared to one per attribute bit in [Ion et al.,
2012]. However, the heavy security drawbacks limit severely the possible usage of this prefix
preserving solution.
[Tariq et al., 2010] is one of the very few solutions considering confidentiality provisioning
in a peer-to-peer pub/sub architecture. Therefore we find useful discussing it and pointing
some general traits that can apply in other cases. The article elaborates a secure design
using attribute based encryption (ABE), which potentially supports any numerical or string
constraints.
Mechanism. The peers in the system have both publisher and subscriber roles. The subscrip-
tion constraints and publication attributes are first mapped into bit strings using domain
decomposition. The domain is decomposed by gradually spliting in half for the numerical case,
as displayed in Figure 2.7, or considering prefix and suffix trees for strings. A containment
relation can be established between the split subspaces based on their bit prefixes.
The bit strings obtained are formalized as credentials for a publication or subscription.
Publishers and subscribers self-generate public keys for each credential, which are used in
encryption. A publication is encrypted using every public key associated with the credentials
of a publication. This enables decryption for every peer who subscribed on a matching
criteria which covers the publication’s credentials. Decryption is done with the private keys.
A private key for a subscription credential is obtained from a centralized key server. The
credentials themselves are not included in the encrypted publications. A subscriber tries to
decrypt a ciphertext under its subscription credentials and knows if it was successful based
on a hashed checksum. The ABE schemes algorithms used in the scheme are [Bethencourt
et al., 2007] and [Goyal et al., 2006].
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Figure 2.7: The domain decomposition mechanism.
Practical aspects. The fact the pub/sub system is formed from equivalent peers brings some
significant changes from the broker-based model. First, the subscriptions are not effectively
disseminated in the system. Consequently, the cryptographic scheme does not provide
subscriptions encryption. Peers self-organize in a hierarchical overlay based on subscription
containment when they connect to the pub/sub architecture. A peer has links with parent
peers which have subscriptions containing the peer’s own ones. The same peer has links with
children that store subscriptions contained in the peer’s own ones. To establish the position
in this overlay a peer issues a connection request. The connection request message is similar
to a publication encrypted under the credentials of the joining peer’s subscription. As the
usual publication case this connection request is also encrypted under all the other containing
credentials. The request is forwarded and decrypted by peers having matching subscriptions
in the overlay, gradually, until it successfully reaches the closest subscribers in terms of
selectivity who will become parents of the joining node. An actual publication is essentially
disseminated the same way. Since the publication routing is based on the containment relation
derived from the domain decomposition, the solution admits false positives.
Security considerations. Encrypted matching does not require preserving publication confiden-
tiality against the peer that performs the operation if the result is positive. If a peer matches a
publication with one of its subscriptions, then the peer is also a destination for the publication.
This is a fundamental difference from the broker based model where the encrypted matching
operation is not supposed to disclose the publication content after a successful match. The
solution defines a specific notion of subscription confidentiality. It is assumed that any leaks
on information about subscription containment are acceptable between neighbor peers in the
overlay, which comes as a consequence of a subscriber’s connection request.
The first two of the following solutions permit exclusively matching equality constraints but
present interest in regard to the key management technique. Finally, the last two use ABE to
perform encrypted matching. However, these do not provide neither publication confidentiality
nor subscription confidentiality, which makes them more suitable as building blocks in
specific use cases. Therefore, we just briefly describe some of their specific mechanisms and
functionality.
[Srivatsa and Liu, 2005, Srivatsa and Liu, 2007, Srivatsa et al., 2011] cover the
development of a full-fledged pub/sub securing framework named EventGuard. [Srivatsa et al.,
2011] details the most recent development on a set of functionality designs named guards,
which provide an extensive set of security properties, but their functionality is limited to
a topic-based scenario. However, the key management scheme used can be applied in a
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content-based pub/sub architecture. This scheme is mainly discussed in [Srivatsa and Liu,
2007] for the case of numerical constraints (under the name of PSGuard) and extended in
the later work.
An encryption key Kp is used to encrypt the publication payload. An authorization
key Ks is associated with a subscription such that Kp can be derived from Ks by a subscriber
only if the received publication matches. The mechanism is based on a key tree in which
the root is a key associated with the entire domain range for an attribute. Each child of a
tree node is a key associated with a partition of the parent’s node domain and is obtained by
hashing the parent key. A trusted centralized key distribution point is in charge with the
keys dissemination in the system.
The idea resembles the usage of ABE as previously described in other schemes. The
design has similarities with the one in [Tariq et al., 2010] (which references EventGuard).
However, the schemes differ in the individual building blocks like the key generation procedures
and encryption. Another design having some resemblance is the one in [Ion et al., 2010b].
Nevertheless, both the encryption techniques and the value mapping in 1-bit tokens are
different. EventGuard is focused mostly on preserving payload confidentiality. With respect
to publication confidentiality and subscription confidentiality the paper uses a tokenization
technique similar to [Song et al., 2000] (previously overviewed in [Raiciu and Rosenblum,
2006]). This restricts encrypted matching to equality comparisons.
[Shikfa et al., 2008] presents a scheme based on multiple layer commutative encryption
(MLCE). This implies using several layers of encryption, which can be applied in different
order independently of the action performed, encryption or decryption, as permitted by
the commutative property. For instance, for two keys, k1 and k2, and plaintext d, we have:
Ek2(Ek1(d)) = Ek1(Ek2(d)). The scheme supports only equality comparisons.
The brokers are organized in a chain, each one sharing a different key with each
other broker from a set of r ancestors and descendants. Assume for instance the chain of:
S−B1−B2−B3−P with r = 2. B1 will share kS,B1 with his subscriber predecessor and kB1,B2 ,
kB1,B3 with his broker successors. When a message is received, a broker is able to remove
the cryptographic layer given by the set of keys it shares, but not further. After doing this
and performing the equality matching, the brokers change one layer of encryption from the
packet. In the given example B1 will receive from S a message d encrypted as EkS,B1 ,kS,B2 (d).
It will remove the layer for which it knows the key: kS,B1 , and will add a layer excluding
the following broker: kB1,B3 , before routing the message to it. Using this technique the
message “travels” through the broker overlay being covered at all moments by an encryption
layer. This layer does not allow the brokers to access the plaintext. However, it permits to
evaluate the equality matching. This design potentially fits any cryptographic algorithm that
has commutative properties, the paper considering the application of the Pohlig-Hellman
scheme [Pohlig and Hellman, 1978].
The scheme presents interest due to the simplified key management requirements
directly related with the design used. A broker has basically the need to maintain shared
secrets with the neighbors only up to degree r. One thing to note is that the scheme will work
with an r as small as 2, but the value of r also reflects the minimum number of colluding
neighbor nodes to obtain the plaintext. Therefore, this parameter should be set according to
the compromise between the security requirements of the system and key management costs.
[Shi et al., 2007] is not specifically related to providing confidentiality in pub/sub in-
frastructures, but discusses a scheme closely resembling other ABE solutions [Tariq et al.,
2010,Ion et al., 2012]. This can be adapted for a pub/sub system where brokers are selectively
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allowed to access subscriptions based on the matching result. The paper describes the use
case of a stock trading scenario. The proposed mechanism offers the possibility to encrypt
a query formalized as a hyper-rectangle B, and to decrypt only if a point X ∈ B. The use
case considered is of an investment broker assigned to execute a transaction order: buy or
sell stock for an investor when an event matches the query B. The investor does not trust
the broker enough for revealing his query before the order is executed. Basically, a positive
matching result implies decrypting the query. As long as the matching fails (the order is not
executed) the broker does not learn anything about the client’s subscription.
[Pal et al., 2012] presents a secure middleware pub/sub solution that departs from
the broker based pub/sub model. Instead of brokers, publishers and subscribers rely for
publication delivery on dissemination and repository servers. The publisher encrypts the
publication payload using ABE [Bethencourt et al., 2007] and publication headers using
hidden vector encryption (HVE) [Boneh and Waters, 2007], a technique which is conceptually
close to ABE. HVE effectively hides the publication attributes, which in case of an ABE
scheme as [Bethencourt et al., 2007] must be revealed to decrypt the payload. Encrypted
publications are sent to the dissemination server. This forwards the payload to the repository
server and the header to the subscribers. The subscribers perform the matching at their own
site over encrypted publications headers. Subscriptions are not sent into the system, since
HVE does not support also encrypting these. In case of an unsuccesful match the subscriber
does not obtain anything. If the matching is positive the subscriber gets an ID which is
afterwards used to retrieve the payload from the repository server, this being decrypted using
the ABE scheme.
2.2 Security models and access control in pub/sub
Solution
Security model design Confidentiality
enforcement
Message routing Base test
platform
[Bacon et al.,
2008]
RBAC-based: nodes are
granted rights according to
specific roles in their
domains
messages encrypted through a
symmetric scheme (e.g., AES)
restricted to
decryptable attributes
based on node rights
Hermes [Pietzuch
and Bacon, 2002]
[Zhao and
Sturman, 2006]
RBAC-based: nodes are
granted rights according to
an associated principal
identifying a role
publication oriented, through
distribution restriction caused
by limited principal
subscription rights
normal filtering on
accessible messages
Gryphon [Strom
et al., 1998]
[Khurana, 2005] system-wide separation
between sensitive and
non-sensitive fields
publication-oriented, encrypted
sensitive fields (secure XML
document
dissemination [Bertino and
Ferrari, 2002])
based on accessing
exclusively the
non-sensitive fields
secure XML
document
dissemination
[Bertino and
Ferrari, 2002]
[Fiege et al., 2004] access control policies at
the level of scopes
(grouping structures)
publication-oriented, through
distribution restriction caused
by limited scope subscription
rights
normal filtering on
accessible messages
Rebeca
[Parzyjegla et al.,
2010]
[Wun and
Jacobsen, 2007]
post-matching policies set
at the broker filtering level
publication-oriented, through
distribution restriction based
on post matching rules
normal filtering on
accessible messages
PADRES
[Jacobsen et al.,
2010]
Table 2.2: Overview of pub/sub security models.
The second area of published work we overview considers security models research.
The articles we cover in this section consider different trust assumptions in their threat
models. For instance it may be possible that (some) brokers are allowed or trusted to access
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the content of publications and subscriptions, given that these brokers are granted a certain
level of authorization. An example is the police routing infrastructure presented in Chapter 1
in Figure 1.2. Also, the issue of unauthorized subscribers and publishers that might try to
access the pub/sub service and gain access to sensitive data is taken sometimes in account.
The security architecture design often targets the case of multiple interconnected domains in
which the threat model and consequently the trust assumptions on data access are different.
In the overviewed security models this often results in developing an access control solution.
Unlike the work described in the previous section, the articles we overview here are
far less focused on the cryptographic mechanisms and their internals. Cryptography is still
used for preserving confidentiality. However, what is required or used in the implementation
of the models are well-known schemes, which do not feature specific functionalities like
encrypted matching. In the following we focus on such research that does not imply matching
over encrypted data. Our main thesis contributions do not apply directly to this area of
confidentiality related work, being tightly coupled to encrypted matching schemes. However,
for completeness, we consider of interest a short overview of this material. Moreover, we
believe solutions ensuring confidentiality through encrypted matching in pub/sub, which are
usually presented in a simplistic security model context can integrate with more complex
designs, like the ones we survey in this section. Actually, some of the work surveyed in Section
2.1.2 overlaps with the current overviewed area. In particular articles like [Nabeel et al.,
2009], [Ion et al., 2012] or [Tariq et al., 2010] go beyond the encrypted matching technique,
touching issues such as access control.
[Bacon et al., 2008] describes a pub/sub security solution that uses a role-based access
control model. The initial form of the proposed architecture is described in [Belokosztolszki
et al., 2003], with extensions developed in [Bacon et al., 2005, Pesonen and Bacon, 2005,
Pesonen et al., 2007a, Pesonen et al., 2007b]. Most of the presented work builds upon
OASIS [Bacon et al., 2002], an architecture providing role-based access control in the general
area of distributed systems. The work in the referenced papers is integrated on top of the
Hermes [Pietzuch and Bacon, 2002] pub/sub platform. We concentrate our presentation
on the development status presented in [Bacon et al., 2008], which specifically focuses on
confidentiality. This work is followed by [Bacon et al., 2010], where the authors present a
general look upon security in multi-domain pub/sub systems. [Singh et al., 2011] also takes a
further step from the initial solution into the area of disclosure control.
Architecture organization. The system participants (publishers, subscribers, brokers) are
not trusted to access the pub/sub data until they obtain authorization for their assigned
role, which grants specific access rights. [Bacon et al., 2008] considers multiple domains of
administration. In each domain an access control manager is responsible to grant rights related
to pub/sub operations according to predefined policies. Key group managers administrate a
distinct organization of key groups in a similar manner for rights related to cryptographic
operations.
Functionality description. The model functionality is based on a role-based access control
(RBAC) system. Clients that have the right to define message types (e.g., the right to
register a ”patient data” publication type) become the owners of the types they register. The
owners of a message type establish the access control policy for the respective type. A policy
associates different roles with specific pub/sub action rights on a particular message type:
advertise before publication, publish, subscribe, and extend (modify) the type. The access
control managers enforce the pub/sub rights policy in their domain: after authenticating,
a system node will benefit of the specific set of rights associated with his role. The access
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control manager grants the access to the pub/sub system functionality and implicitly to
pub/sub data in its plaintext form. For providing fine-grained confidentiality the system
design further considers the usage of cryptography. Initial encryption and final decryption of
pub/sub messages before delivery are carried out by edge brokers (brokers that are directly
connected to the publishers and subscribers). The generic assumption is that edge brokers are
trusted to access the pub/sub data in the domain of the clients they are connected to. Besides
this assumption, the type owners establish the access rights in case of non-edge brokers
through policies. These policies are enforced by key group managers, which authorize brokers
to join key groups. A key group is formed of brokers, which share the same level of access to
keys required to encrypt or decrypt pub/sub data. [Pesonen et al., 2007a] and [Bacon et al.,
2008] suggest the usage of OFT (One-way Function Trees) [Sherman and McGrew, 2003] for
key management in the groups formed. [Pesonen et al., 2007b] mentions AES [Daemen and
Rijmen, 2002] in EAX mode [Bellare et al., 2003] as the preferred encryption scheme.
Confidentiality provisioning. The level of protection for pub/sub data depends on the
encryption granularity. Two cases are considered: encryption of the whole message and
encryption per attribute. The first case permits any broker to route messages based on the
type, which is always accessible, similar to a topic based routing scenario. Authorized brokers
can decrypt the complete message and perform content based routing. In case of encryption
per attribute, an independent encryption key is associated to each attribute. A broker routing
capacity depends on how many attributes it can decrypt according to its given rights. This
allows to model fine-grained trust assumptions by the type owners but also implies a level of
overhead that grows proportionally with the number of accessible attributes.
[Zhao and Sturman, 2006] presents a service model providing access control in a pub/sub
system with specific focus on the dynamic character of the solution. This refers to the effects
caused by changing the rules enforced at runtime. The pub/sub system used to implement
the service model is Gryphon [Strom et al., 1998].
Architecture organization. The access to pub/sub data traversing multiple interconnected
domains is regulated through access control rules. Neverheless, the article limits the discussion
mostly to the context of a single domain. Subscribers and publishers are not trusted to
perform actions on pub/sub data unless specifically authorized. A security administrator
is the authority that has the responsibility of adding or performing changes to the rights
granted to the pub/sub system clients.
Functionality description. Pub/sub clients obtain action rights as connect, publish or subscribe,
if they authenticate successfully as a principal. This is similar to a role, multiple clients being
able to run on behalf of the same principal. The service model formalizes access control
rules into rights using an extended format for pub/sub messages: [Principal, Type of Access,
Filter ]. The filter can specify, depending on the type of access, either a simple boolean value
(e.g., in case of connection right) or an extended filter similar to a subscription (for setting
restrictions in subscriptions and publications). The rights are stored into a database by
the security administrator, which also handles rights changes. Such changes are processed
in atomic batches distributed in the broker network. A broker receiving such a batch of
access control changes chooses a starting point in the message stream routed, from where to
enforce the new rights. This starting point is communicated to the security administrator.
Afterwards, new rules are propagated and enforced in a consistent manner throughout the
whole system.
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Confidentiality provisioning. The property is considered with respect to subscribers un-
trusted to access specific publications. Confidentiality is provided by restricting publication
distribution. This is achieved by limiting granted subscription rights.
[Khurana, 2005] presents a model relying on proxy encryption. Messages are represented
by XML documents. The actual pub/sub functionality is ensured through a solution targeting
secure XML document dissemination [Bertino and Ferrari, 2002].
Architecture organization. The threat model assumes that brokers are not trusted to access
sensitive parts in pub/sub messages. Routing is done over non-sensitive fields. The secure
pub/sub system requires the presence of trusted servers that will host a proxy security and
accounting service (PSAS).
Functionality description. From the publications that are sent to the system, only the part
that is considered to be sensitive and non-routable is encrypted. The technique used is the
secure XML document distribution [Bertino and Ferrari, 2002] by the means of symmetric
encryption. The key used for this purpose is further encrypted with a public key belonging
to the publisher and sent as part of the encrypted publication. In order to distribute the
symmetric key the system relies on the PSAS provided by the set of trusted servers. The
PSAS acts on broker requests, and transforms the packets encrypted with the publisher
public keys into packets encrypted with the subscribers’ public keys, therefore avoiding the
issue of the necessary key exchange between the source and destination. The scheme is based
on [Jakobsson, 1999]. It is assumed that a quorum formed by a given number of PSAS servers
will be always available.
Confidentiality provisioning. The property is enforced by protecting the publication attributes
that are not routable. Since publications are represented entirely through XML documents,
the payload case is not specifically referred, but one can assume that this is protected through
the same mechanism as the headers.
[Fiege et al., 2004] introduces a security model based on scopes as the underlying
support for creating groups of trust. The pub/sub platform used as test bed for the model
implementation is Rebeca [Parzyjegla et al., 2010].
Architecture organization. Common groups of trust cover the entities in the system (publishers,
subscribers, brokers). Communication in these groups is separated from the outside world.
The admission of new members is based on credential authentication, according to group
acceptance criteria. In order to support the creation of trust groups, the paper introduces
the notion of scopes, which we detail below.
Functionality description. Mutual trust relationships between different administrative domains
lead to the creation of scopes. A scope is a group that encapsulates a number of system
nodes. A scope can recursively be a member of other scopes. Scopes are used to limit the
visibility of a message to their members. This is achieved through access control policies.
The enforcement of the rules in these policies is based on checks performed on attribute
certificates [Farrell and Housley, 2002], which represent credentials consisting of a signed
identity associated to a set of attributes. Such attribute certificates are issued either by an
attribute authority or by the owner of the broker network in the scope of interest.
Nodes obtain the credentials and use them when advertising a type of publication
(the functional model requires this step before publishing) or when they try to submit
subscriptions. The edge brokers enforce the checking of credentials and further permit the
dissemination inside the scope. A broker tries to match the attributes in a subscriber’s
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certificate to the ones in the publisher’s advertisements previously received. If the match
fails, the subscriptions will not be processed against the type of publications corresponding
to the respective advertisement.
Confidentiality provisioning. The property is not specifically addressed in the article. However,
the access control mechanisms provide confidentiality against any node that falls outside a
scope of trust, although this does not imply modifying the messages content for protection,
but merely restricting their dissemination.
[Wun and Jacobsen, 2007] presents a policy management framework dedicated to content-
based pub/sub architectures. This framework offers general policy management services, not
necessary related to security. However, the use case proposed in the paper is that of specifying
security policies. The framework was implemented on top of the PADRES [Jacobsen et al.,
2010] pub/sub system.
Architecture organization. The article considers a simple setting of trust groups in the security
policies use case, in which the entities present in groups (publisher, subscriber, broker) interact
as discussed in the following.
Functionality description. The design is centered on a post-matching policy model. In
this model, a certain rule defined in a policy is triggered immediately after or even during
matching. The main purpose is to avoid testing the rules a priori, which would duplicate the
matching functionality in case of policy rules that are semantically based on the publication
content.
In the use case considered for security policies, it is assumed as a precondition that
each trust group is associated with a shared group secret. This secret information is used by
the pub/sub entities for authentication and encryption using specific group related protocols.
The effective contribution brought by the policy management framework to confidentiality
preservation in the system comes under the form of authenticated event scopes and security
zones.
Confidentiality provisioning. The authenticated event scopes are associations of an authentica-
tion policy to rules in the post matching model. For instance, if a message must be routed to
a certain broker after it was matched, an authentication of the receiver might be performed
first according to the policy. Security zones extend the functionality of the authentication
policies. The attributes in the matched publications can be either pruned or encrypted before
forwarding, based on criteria given by established zones with different policy settings.
2.3 Summary
In the current chapter we have overviewed existing solutions that target confidentiality
in publish/subscribe systems. In Section 2.1 we have discussed first in detail encrypted
matching as a cryptographic paradigm. The particularities and the novelty of this approach
among cryptographic solutions make cumbersome to characterize solutions that follow this
design. We have identified several characteristics of encrypted matching, that helped further
classifying the schemes. A practical deployment of these schemes can benefit directly of our
main contributions in this thesis, presented in Chapters 3 and 5.
Further, in Section 2.2 we surveyed the most cited work on security models, that
targets scenarios with more complex threat assumptions, and which does not rely or reference
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encrypted matching as effective tool for confidentiality preserving. In our view, although
some common approaches exist, there is just a minor gap between the two areas of research
surveyed. We believe that encrypted matching schemes can be integrated with security
models based on other paradigms like access control, which often rely on classic cryptographic
algorithms that lack flexibility, but are nevertheless needed for the model’s confidentiality
requirements.
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Chapter 3
Pub/sub prefiltering: alleviating
performance drawbacks in encrypted
matching
3.1 Motivation, problem description and contributions
Matching and routing publications over subscriptions in untrusted domains is an issue in
pub/sub systems. Encrypting the pub/sub data provides the required confidentiality. Schemes
that permit performing comparison operations over the resulting ciphertexts are the most
flexible alternative to maintain the pub/sub filtering functionality. This is the reason why, as
overviewed in the previous chapter, encrypted matching is lately under focus and seemingly the
preferred paradigm to use. Despite the latest advancements in this direction, content-based
pub/sub is not very often deployed as the communication mechanism of choice for applications
requiring confidentiality and spanning multiple administrative domains. We believe one of
the main reasons is the performance penalty associated with the privacy-preserving filtering.
As an example, one of the existing solutions we overviewed in Section 2.1 is ASPE [Choi
et al., 2010]. The scheme permits both equality and ranged comparisons over encrypted data,
making it interesting in terms of functionality. As a drawback, the filtering costs have a
worst-case quadratic increase with the number of attributes. In comparison, the plaintext
matching cost increases at most linearly. Figure 3.1 presents the average time required to
filter one publication against one subscription, measured over 1,000 publications and 1,000
subscriptions. ASPE is compared against plaintext matching and uses a naive approach where
each constraint is evaluated separately and no optimization is used for the filtering process.
The workload used is composed of simple multi-dimensional uniformly distributed ranges.
Note that the y axis represents the number of constraints actually evaluated. We clearly
observe that the cost of evaluating one subscription is higher and evolves in a quadratic
manner in the number of constraints with ASPE. Similar or higher increasing cost rates are
obtained with the other encrypted schemes (e.g., [Nabeel et al., 2012, Ion et al., 2012]).
Subscription containment (also referred as coverage) is a characteristic of subscriptions
workload that is largely used to speed up the filtering operation [Jafarpour et al., 2009,
Carzaniga et al., 2001,Jacobsen et al., 2010]. We remind that it is said that a subscription
si contains another subscription sj if any event that matches sj also matches si, in other
words if si is more general than sj. For instance, subscription {x > 0} contains both
subscriptions {x = 1} and {x = 1 ∧ y = 0}. Figure 3.2 displays the containment relationships
established between five subscriptions. When a subscription contains another subscription,
any publication known not to match the former will never match the latter. Conversely,
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Figure 3.1: Performance overhead of encrypted matching: example of the ASPE mechanism.
any publication known to match the latter will always match the former. Note that the
containment relationship creates a partial order on subscriptions. By organizing subscriptions
according to that order, it is possible to quickly discard or accept many subscriptions before
they are tested against a publication.
s1
x > 0
s2
x = 1
x = 1 y = 0∧
s3
x ≥ 1
s5
x = 2
s4
Figure 3.2: Five sample subscriptions and their containment relationships (represented by
arrows).
Despite the practical functional advantages, the ability to determine containment
between subscriptions can pose a threat to confidentiality, even when these subscriptions are
encrypted. It indeed allows determining groups of similar subscriptions. These groups may
later be used in conjunction with domain-specific knowledge in order to infer information about
the subscriptions. For instance, in the example of Figure 3.2, three subscriptions for the same
field name would be grouped together in the same containment sub-tree. In a stock exchange
scenario, using domain-specific information on relative stock popularity, an attacker may be
able to derive information about the symbol such a sub-tree is associated to, based on the
relative sizes of these sub-trees. Imagine for instance the situation of a highly transactioned
symbol. It is likely to assume that this can be found in the root of a dense populated
encrypted subscriptions sub-tree. Even without such domain-specific knowledge, containment
information can be leveraged by an attacker to obtain the information that two particular
subscribers have common interests (yet not knowing what these common interests are). Similar
observations were made in [Raiciu and Rosenblum, 2006]. As described in Section 2.1 some
schemes do not offer by design the possibility to determine containment [Shikfa et al., 2009,Li
et al., 2004]. Some other schemes [Choi et al., 2010, Raiciu and Rosenblum, 2006, Nabeel
et al., 2012] have optional support for containment. For example, with ASPE [Choi et al.,
2010], the ability to determine containment is determined by the availability of additional
reference vectors attached to each subscription. It is the responsibility of the application to
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include or not this additional information. We name the ability of a encrypted matching
scheme to prevent containment determination as containment confidentiality.
The main drawback of encrypted matching techniques is their high computational cost.
The objective in the work presented in this chapter is to reduce these costs while preserving
the confidentiality properties. The main contributions are represented by Figure 3.3 and
summarized below. We do not propose novel encrypted matching techniques but build upon
existing ones. We consider both the case where containment determination is permitted by
the scheme (left-hand side of Figure 3.3) and the case where the scheme provides containment
confidentiality (right-hand side of Figure 3.3).
3.1.1 Prefiltering using Bloom filters
The first part of the work covered in this chapter defines an efficient prefiltering technique to
significantly reduce the space of subscriptions that must be tested by the encrypted filtering
engine during routing. In a nutshell, the principle is to embed Bloom filters [Bloom, 1970]
inside publications and subscriptions. These Bloom filters encode the values carried by the
publications and the equality constraints of the subscriptions. By testing the Bloom filters of
subscriptions for inclusion in those of publications, one can efficiently determine the possibility
for a message to match a subscription: if the test is negative, the message is guaranteed not to
match; otherwise, it might match. An encrypted publication is matched against an encrypted
subscription only in the latter case. The prefiltering operator can also leverage the possibility
to determine containment information by the encrypted filtering operator. The prefiltering
operator significantly improves the performance of privacy-preserving encrypted matching,
with or without the support for containment determination. The work on prefiltering we
present in this chapter follows closely the solution we published in [Barazzutti et al., 2012b].
35
3.1.2 Containment obfuscation
The second part of this chapter considers explicitly the case where the base scheme provides
containment confidentiality. Since prefiltering requires additional information (the Bloom
filters) to be attached to subscriptions, we analyze the power this additional information gives
to an attacker. Indeed, despite their hash-based construction and their probabilistic nature,
Bloom filters may still convey sensitive information. In particular, identical subscriptions
yield equal Bloom filters, and contained subscriptions produce Bloom filters that are included
in one another. As illustrated on the right-hand side of Figure 3.3, the use of prefiltering atop
a scheme providing containment confidentiality may result in potential leaks of containment
information–albeit strictly less so than with the ability to determine containment directly
from encrypted subscriptions.
We propose a method for containment obfuscation, and determine through a com-
prehensive mathematical analysis the impact of prefiltering on containment confidentiality.
Containment obfuscation introduces randomness in the prefiltering process by randomly
choosing a small number of hash functions from a larger set for each subscription equality
constraint encoded in the Bloom filters. The main difficulty is the analysis of the dependencies
introduced by hash functions collisions, which are cumbersome to model mathematically.
We show that there is a fundamental tradeoff between the information that can be leaked
to an attacker from the Bloom filters and the performance of the prefiltering operation.
We provide evidence, both mathematically and using numerical simulations, that efficient
prefiltering preserving containment confidentiality can be achieved nonetheless. The results on
containment obfuscation presented in this chapter follow the analysis we published in [Mercier
et al., 2013].
3.2 The prefiltering algorithm
In this section, we present a prefiltering operator based on Bloom filters embedded with
subscriptions and publications, and that can take advantage of containment relationships
when available. The two mechanisms: Bloom based prefiltering and containment, can be
used in isolation but provide the best performance when combined. Both aim at reducing the
number of calls to the actual encrypted matching operation, which we denote as ENC-Match.
They do so by pre-discarding subscriptions that are known not to match (negative matching)
and pre-selecting subscriptions that are known to match (positive matching), before calling
ENC-Match for these subscriptions. The contributions we bring are oblivious to the nature
of the ENC-Match encrypted matching operation used, the only difference being made by
the possibility or restrictions of leveraging subscriptions containment.
3.2.1 Exploiting containment relations
We start by discussing how we can leverage containment relationships at the level of entire
subscriptions. This approach only works when the encrypted matching scheme does not
preserve containment confidentiality and therefore it allows determining containment relations
from encrypted subscriptions.
We follow a classical approach to exploit containment relationships as part of the
filtering process [Carzaniga et al., 2001,Jacobsen et al., 2010]. We organize subscriptions in a
partially ordered set (or poset for short). Precedence relations in the poset correspond to
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Figure 3.4: Information used for prefiltering: Bloom filters embedded with subscriptions and
publications, and containment-based matching.
containment relations between subscriptions. Note that a poset can be formed of several, non
connected sub-graphs. Upon filtering, when encountering a subscription s that matches a
publication, we know that all its containers (ancestors in the containment poset) also match
the publication. This triggers the positive matching of its containers up to the root of the
corresponding sub-graph of the poset. Conversely, if s does not match the publication, all
its containees (descendants in the poset) do not match either, and are applied the negative
matching decision.
We leverage both positive and negative containment-based matching. As we describe in
Section 3.2.3, the algorithm we propose works by evaluating the complete set of subscriptions,
split in several lists. The order in which subscriptions are tested is of great importance for
the ability to take matching decisions based on containment. A random evaluation order
may lead, for instance, to containers being evaluated with positive matching before their
containees, resulting in two calls to the costly ENC-Match function instead of a single one
with the opposite evaluation order. Similarly, it is better to evaluate containers for negative
matching before their containees. Determining positive matching requires calls to ENC-
Match while determining negative matching is based both on calls to ENC-Match or, in a
more cost-efficient manner, on the Bloom filters attached to subscriptions and publications,
as we describe in the next section. We evaluate subscriptions in an order that respects the
precedence relation in the poset, to take full advantage of these early negative matching
decisions. We further describe the data structure used to store subscriptions in Section 3.2.3.
3.2.2 Negative matching using Bloom filters
One of the key principles of prefiltering is to quickly identify subscriptions that are known
not to match an incoming publication (negative matching), without calling the costly ENC-
Match function. To that end, we embed Bloom filters [Bloom, 1970] in publications and
subscriptions, when applicable, and use simple bit-wise operations to discard non-matching
subscriptions.
Bloom filters are probabilistic data structures that provide efficient testing of whether
or not an item belongs to a set. A Bloom filter is essentially a bit array. When adding an
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item, one or several hash functions h1, . . . , hk are used to identify bit(s) of the Bloom filter
that must be set to 1. To test whether an item belongs to the set, it is hashed again and, if
all corresponding bits are set, it is likely to be part of the set; otherwise, it is guaranteed to
not belong to the set. Therefore, Bloom filters can yield false positives but no false negatives.
The accuracy of the Bloom filter can be tuned by properly choosing its size and the number
of hash functions.
When injecting a publication p in the system, besides encrypting it, we additionally
hash the values of all its fields and insert them in a non-encrypted Bloom filter B(p). On the
other side, every subscription s also embeds a Bloom filter B(s), that contains the hashed
values of its constraints with equality constraints (or a subset of those). For instance, given a
constraint x=2, the value 2 will be added to the Bloom filter. Figure 3.4 shows the same
subscriptions as Figure 3.2, along with the information that can be used for prefiltering for a
sample publication p1. We assume for the illustration a size of 8 bits for the filters and 2
hash functions h1, h2.
1 Upon matching, if B(s) * B(p),2 we know that s does not match p,
irrespectively of the other (non-equality) constraints, and we can discard it. This is the case,
for instance, for s2 where two bits in B(s2) are set that are not set in B(p1). Otherwise, s
must be checked using the ENC-Match function (s1, s3 and s5).
The Bloom filters do not produce false negatives: no matching subscription can
be discarded by the Bloom filter comparison. In respect to false positives, non-matching
subscriptions may be evaluated by the ENC-Match function for three reasons. First,
a Bloom filter B(s) only encodes values associated to the equality constraints of s. A
subscription may not match due to other, non-encoded constraints such as inequalities (e.g.,
s = {x = 3 ∧ y < 0}). Second, B(s) includes values irrespective of the attribute they are
associated with. This can yield false positives, e.g., with s5 the value 2 is associated to a
constraint on x while it is associated to a value for attribute y in p1. Finally, Bloom filters
themselves produce false positives because distinct values can be associated to the same
bits. The likelihood of such collisions can be controlled by carefully choosing the size and
number of hash functions used by the Bloom filters. We will evaluate the false positive rate
for different configurations and workloads in Section 3.5.
For security reasons, the hash function configuration used in the Bloom encoding is
kept private from the brokers. The hashes can be typically parameterized by a secret key,
and use a cryptographically secure scheme such as SHA-1 in a HMAC [Bellare et al., 1996]
construction.3 This hash key is known only to subscribers and publishers. The exchange of
this secret key between the peers can be carried on by the preliminary key agreement protocol
required by the encrypted matching scheme itself. We elaborate on the key management
issue in Chapter 5.
Despite the above summarized security measures, the Bloom filters attached to
subscriptions may however permit determining a subset of containment relationships. We
analyze this risk and provide a mitigation in Section 3.4. Beside these potential containment
relations, by design the Bloom filters do not allow untrusted parties to obtain further
information about the non-encrypted subscriptions.
1Note that two values may hash to the same bit, hence the number of bits set in the Bloom filter is not
necessarily equal to the number of hash functions multiplied by the number of distinct values associated with
equality constraints, as for s4 in the figure.
2Operator ⊆ denotes here bitwise inclusion, i.e., all the bits in B(s) are also set in B(p).
3Even if SHA-1 (or other possible cryptographic hashes) output values over 160 bits, we can consider
without loss of generality that a summary of these is used to set bits in the filter.
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Figure 3.5: Data structures used for prefiltering.
3.2.3 Algorithm description
The prefiltering algorithm takes advantage of both types of information available about
subscriptions that we described previously and represented in Figure 3.4. Bloom filters
allow to determine negative matching, and containment relationships (when available) allow
determining negative and positive matching. Both allow reducing the number of calls to the
costly ENC-Match encrypted matching function.
The prefiltering algorithm uses the data structures shown in Figure 3.5. We maintain
an array (candidates[]) of n+1 lists of candidate subscriptions, where n is the number of
bits in Bloom filters. The i th list for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n−1} contains subscriptions that have the
i th bit of their Bloom filter set. It follows that each subscription may belong to several lists.
The last list contains subscriptions that have no equality constraint represented in the Bloom
filter, i.e., an empty Bloom filter B(p). A subscription part of the default list is not part of
the other candidate lists.
When containment relationships can be determined between encrypted subscriptions,
we sort subscriptions in the candidate lists in such a way that containers appear before their
containees. To that end, when inserting a new subscription, we place it just before its first
containee appearing in the list, or at the end if no containee is found.
We additionally maintain an array (tested[]) to keep track of which subscriptions have
already been tested,4 as well as any known containment relationships between subscriptions
(denoted by arrows in the figure but actually stored as a graph as in Figure 3.2).
We will consider several variants of the basic algorithm. For instance, if containment
relationships are known, we may discard additional subscriptions when one is found that
does not match, or conversely accept several subscriptions at once upon successful match,
respectively denoted by CB-NEGATIVE-MATCH and CB-POSITIVE-MATCH in the code (CB stands
for containment-based).
The prefiltering process works as shown in Algorithm 1. Initially, the tested[] array
is reset to indicate that no matching has taken place yet (line 2). We then traverse the
list candidates[i] associated with each bit i set in the publication’s Bloom filter B(p), as
well as the default list (lines 3–5). If the current subscription s has not yet been tested, as
indicated by tested[s], we check if it is a possible match (lines 6–8). This can happen in
two cases: s is part of the default list, i.e., B(s) is empty; or B(s) ⊆ B(p). If so, we must
use the costly but accurate ENC-Match encrypted matching function that tells us with
certainty if the publication must be forwarded to the corresponding subscriber (line 9).
In case of a match, we forward the publication to the interested subscriber (line 11)
and we optionally use containment-based positive matching to accept any yet-untested
subscription (lines 12–16). On the other end, if the publication does not match s, we may
4The reason for using an array is that we can efficiently reset it (e.g., using bzero).
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Algorithm 1: Prefiltering algorithm.
1 PF-Match(p);
2 tested []← {false, . . . , false}; // No subscription tested yet
3 for i← 0 . . . n do // Check every list (including default)
4 if i = n∨B(p)[i] = 1 then // Default list or bit set in BF?
5 foreach s ∈ candidates[i] do // Traverse list
6 if ¬tested [s] then // Not yet tested?
7 m ← false; // Initially not a match
8 if i = n∨B(s) ⊆ B(p) then // Possible match?
9 m ← ENC-Match(p, s); // Must do costly test
10 if m then // Match?
11 Forward(p, s); // Forward to subscriber
12 if CB-POSITIVE-MATCH then // Do positive match?
13 foreach s′ ∈ containers(s) do
14 if ¬tested [s′] then // Not yet tested?
15 tested [s′]← true;
16 Forward(p, s′); // Forward to subscriber
17 else // No match
18 if CB-NEGATIVE-MATCH then // Do negative match?
19 foreach s′ ∈ containees(s) do
20 tested [s′]← true;
21 tested [s]← true;
use containment-based negative matching to mark all the subscription’s containees as having
been tested, effectively discarding them for the rest of the filtering process (lines 18–20).
3.2.4 Discussion
Let us first consider prefiltering when containment is not available or restricted in the encrypted
matching scheme. Bloom filters are still attached to messages, and this might reveal some
degree of containment. However, as we will present in Section 3.3 containment obfuscation can
still be obtained by changing the Bloom filter encoding. In fact, the very role of the Bloom
filter is to perform aggressive negative matching without knowing containment relationships
between subscriptions. During prefiltering, we only need to traverse the candidate lists
associated with the bits set in the publication’s Bloom filter, as well as the default list. All
other subscriptions are implicitly discarded. This negative matching step is expected to
account for a vast majority of subscriptions that can be filtered out, as we will study during
the evaluation in Section 3.5. The number of lists to traverse is therefore function of the
number of fields (i.e., attributes) of the publication, which is expected to be much smaller
than the size of the Bloom filters. Further, no subscription is tested more than once thanks
to the bookkeeping of the tested[] array.
Let us now consider containment-based prefiltering. If containment relationships
are known, one can perform additional negative and positive matching. When testing a
subscription that does not match, one can immediately discard all of its containees. Remember
that we place subscriptions in candidate lists such that containers appear before containees,
therefore in all likelihood one can significantly reduce the number of tests (and hence calls to
the costly ENC-Match encrypted matching function) by applying this negative matching
optimization.
However, it might happen that a subscription is tested before some of its containers,
because the latter may not belong to the same candidate lists as the former. In such cases,
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when successfully matching a subscription, one can apply the positive matching optimization
to immediately accept any yet-untested container.
The likelihood for any of these scenarios to occur depends on the nature and distribution
of the publications and subscriptions. We experimentally evaluate the efficiency of the
prefiltering variants in Section 3.5.
3.3 Prefiltering truncation: handling containment con-
fidentiality losses
We now focus on the case where it is not possible to determine containment relations between
subscriptions. This can result either from a design limitation of the used encrypted matching
scheme, or can be the consequence of security restrictions that explicitly require disabling the
containment support, even if the encrypted matching scheme could support it. As depicted
in Figure 3.3, we are interested in preserving containment confidentiality while still benefiting
from the gain of performance obtained from prefiltering.
As mentioned in the introduction, we consider that in a non trusted environment such
as a public cloud, there is a risk that an attacker collects a snapshot of a broker’s state,
and in particular its set of stored subscriptions. We are interested in knowing whether the
addition of the prefiltering Bloom filters to subscriptions allows an attacker to determine
more information about subscribers than otherwise possible (i.e., when observing encrypted
subscriptions only). We mention again that the prefiltering solution described in this chapter
can be applied independent of the encrypted matching scheme used, and therefore we are
not interested here in evaluating any encrypted matching scheme security. We assume
the encrypted matching preserves the messages confidentiality, and we consider this as the
security level baseline for the additions we make. More precisely, we consider that the
attacker is only allowed to use the available operations on the encrypted matching scheme
(ENC-Match and contains) as well as any computation on the prefiltering Bloom filters.
The normal prefiltering described in the previous section introduces a problem when the
contains operation is restricted.
A property of prefiltering using Bloom filters is that contained subscriptions produce
Bloom filters that are included in one another. This may allow an attacker to derive some
of the containment relationships between subscriptions. Indeed, if subscription s contains
s′ (s w s′), there are two possibilities. If B(s) = B(s′) = 0 (no bit set), s and s′ do
not contain any equality constraint and the link cannot be inferred from the filters. If
B(s) ⊆ B(s′), then s w s′ can be inferred but with less certainty than using containment
evaluation: it is not possible to distinguish between (1) real inclusions; (2) inclusions only for
the equality constraints but not for the range constraints, e.g., if s = {x = 1 ∧ y < 3} and
s′ = {x = 1 ∧ y > 12}; (3) false positives due to collisions in the filter or constraints setting
values for different attributes (e.g., s = {x = 1} and s′ = {y = 1 ∧ z = 2}). Conversely, when
s 6w s′, if B(s) * B(s′) then s 6w s′ is a correct guess.
To counter the possibility to derive containment relationships from Bloom filters, we
provide containment obfuscation mechanisms. Their principle is to introduce additional
randomness in the Bloom filters by randomly removing set bits from the subscriptions Bloom
filters (truncation) and randomly setting bits in the publications Bloom filters (pollution).
Pollution and truncation are illustrated by Figure 3.6. As can be seen from the figure, s1
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Figure 3.6: Polluting publications Bloom filters and truncating subscriptions Bloom filters.
contains s2, but after truncation their Bloom filters do not contain each other anymore. This
noise makes it much harder for an attacker to derive accurate containment graphs.
It should be clear that polluting publications and truncating subscriptions increases
the probability of false positive and do not introduce false negatives. Polluting subscriptions
and/or truncating publications would introduce false negatives, and prefiltering would not
work.
3.4 Security analysis
In the following study, we target the situations where the used encryted matching scheme
does not support subscription containment, or has it disabled for security reasons (e.g., in
case of ASPE removing some necessary additional structures added in the encryption process).
Therefore, we focus in the following on the analysis of truncation. More precisely, we study
the tradeoff between prefiltering efficiency and containment information leaked to an attacker.
We show that efficient prefiltering is possible while making containment information so noisy
that it essentially becomes useless for potential attackers.
3.4.1 Notation and assumptions
Consider a subscription s1 with c1 ≥ 0 different equality constraints encoded in a Bloom filter
Bα(s1) of size n. By truncating, in the encoding we use only α out of total k hash functions
available per constraint. Furthermore, let us consider a second subscription s2 with c2 ≥ c1
different equality constraints also encoded in a Bloom filter Bα(s2) of size n with α out of k
hash functions per constraint. We also consider a publication p with cp ≥ c1 different values.
The publication is encoded in a Bloom filter Bk(p), that is, all k hash functions are used. We
write Bα(s1) ⊆ Bα(s2) if and only if all the nonzero bits in the Bloom filter of s1 are also
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si Subscription i
ci Number of different equality constraints in si
p Publication
cp Number of different values in p
k Cardinality of the set of hash functions used to encode values in
Bloom filters
α Number of hashes randomly chosen out of k to encode a value in a
subscription Bloom filter
Bα(si) Bloom filter representation of Subscription si using α hash functions
per value
Bk(p) Bloom filter representation of Publication p using all k hash functions
per value
n Bloom filter size
a Number of attributes in the domain
v Number of values per attribute in the domain
γ Number of common values between two subscriptions (or between
a subscription and a publication)
Pα The probability that s1 v s2 when Bα(s1) ⊆ Bα(s2)
Pf pos The false positive probability that Bα(s1) ⊆ Bk(p) when s1 6v p
Table 3.1: Notation and definitions for prefiltering.
nonzero in the Bloom filter of s2.
5 Likewise, we write Bα(s1) ⊆ Bk(p) if the Bloom filter of a
subscription s1 is included in the Bloom filter of a publication p. The notation is summarized
in Table 3.1.
We only consider the number of distinguishable values for subscriptions and publica-
tions since it is assumed that the same value appearing for multiple attributes is only hashed
once. We only consider the values for equality constraints, which are the only ones encoded
in the Bloom filters. Thus, s1, s2 and p can formally be defined as sets of cardinality c1, c2
and cp, respectively, and we use A v B to denote that A is a subset of B. The reason behind
this nonstandard notation is to keep in mind that when s1 v s2, the set s1 is included in the
set s2, but the subscription s1 is more general and is a container of s2.
It is assumed that the Bloom filters use a set of k independent and perfectly random
hash functions. The hashing strategy we use: Hα consists, for a fixed α ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, of
randomly selecting α among the k hash functions for each subscription constraint value to be
encoded. We emphasize again that the hashing strategy is only applied to subscriptions; all
the k hash functions must be used for publications, otherwise false negatives can occur.
3.4.2 Subscription/publication domain
We assume that there are a possible attributes A1, A2, . . . , Aa with equality constraints that
can be used for each subscription and in publications, and that the set of v possible values
for attribute Ai is Vi = {vi1, vi2, . . . , viv}. It is assumed that when a subscriber or publisher
selects an attribute to put in a subscription or publication, it chooses any of the a attributes
with probability 1
a
. It is also assumed that the attribute takes each of its possible values with
probability 1
v
. The domain we consider assumes that Vi ∩ Vj = ∅ for i 6= j. Non-disjoint value
5Bloom filters can be viewed as sets.
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sets can always be made disjoint by encoding each value with a small prefix representing its
attribute.
We assume that an attacker knows the domain and its probability distribution and
also k and α. When this attacker examines a subscription Bloom filter, it knows the number
of different equality constraints that were encoded in it. This increases its power, but only
slightly because the number of nonzero bits in a Bloom filter is highly correlated with the
number of encoded values. Furthermore, this allows us to do the analysis without any
assumption on the distribution of the number of equality attributes per subscription.
The domain uniformity is not a realistic assumption for most content-based systems,
although two remarks must be made. Firstly, the domain uniformity allows us to analyze
rigorously how an attacker can infer subscription containment from the Bloom filters as
well as the performance of the prefiltering scheme. Secondly, the analysis can be carried
out numerically for any content-based system for which an estimate of the statistics at
the subscriber, publisher, or system level is available. One such example is presented in
Section 3.5.
3.4.3 Problem statement
The objective we have is to study the tradeoff between the amount of information about
subscriptions containment that can be inferred by an attacker and the performance of the
prefiltering process. We formalize these two notions below.
Containment leaks
We want to prove that randomly selecting a small number of hash functions for each coded
attribute of the Bloom filters restricts the attacker capacity to derive containment between
the two subscriptions based on their attached Bloom filters. The expression of interest is
Pα , Pr[s1 v s2 | Bα(s1) ⊆ Bα(s2)]. (3.1)
The higher this probability is, the easier it is for an attacker to build an accurate containment
graph when having access to a large number of subscription Bloom filters included in other
subscription Bloom filters. Using Bayes’ law, we can write
Pα = Pr[s1 v s2]·Pr[Bα(s1) ⊆ Bα(s2) | s1 v s2]
Pr[Bα(s1) ⊆ Bα(s2)] . (3.2)
When all the k hash functions are chosen, Pr[Bk(s1) ⊆ Bk(s2) | s1 v s2] = 1.
Prefiltering efficiency
Decreasing the amount of information to potential attackers is useless if it results in a
prefiltering operation that fails to discard a significant fraction of subscriptions that do not
match an incoming publication. The expression of interest is the probability of false positive
Pf pos , Pr[Bα(s1) ⊆ Bk(p) | s1 6v p]. (3.3)
It is the probability, when the equality constraints of a subscription are not included in the
values set of a publication, that the Bloom filter of the subscription is included in the Bloom
filter of the publication.
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3.4.4 Exact analysis with collisions
We first present preliminary results followed by the exact expressions for Pα and Pf pos.
We start by analyzing the number of common values between a pair of subscriptions. Let
Pr
common
[γ] be the probability that there are γ common values between subscriptions s1 and s2
for 0 ≤ γ ≤ c1.
Lemma 1
Pr
common
[γ] =
(
c2
γ
)·c1−γ∑
δ=0
[(
c2−γ
δ
)(
a−c2
c1−γ−δ
)
(v−1)δvc1−γ−δ
]
(
a
c1
)
vc1
.
Proof. There are
(
a
c1
)
ways to choose c1 attributes and v possible values for each attribute,
thus the number of ways to choose the values for subscription s1 is given by(
a
c1
)
vc1 . (3.4)
We now fix subscription s2 and count, among the possible ways to assign the values
for s1, how many of them have exactly γ common values with s2. First, the number of ways
to select the attributes containing the values in s1 which are also common to s2 is given by(
c2
γ
)
. (3.5)
The c1−γ values of s1 that must not be in s2 fall in one of the following two categories:
either they are associated with an attribute that is also present in s2 (but must take a different
value) or they are from an attribute not present in s2. Let δ be the number of values of s1
that fall in the first category. Since there are c2−γ attributes to choose from, each with v−1
allowed values, the number of ways to assign δ values of s1 in the first category is(
c2−γ
δ
)
(v−1)δ. (3.6)
With γ common values and δ different values in the first category, there are c1−δ−γ values
of s1 that must be put in the second category. Since there are a−c2 attributes to choose
from, and since all v values per attribute are allowed, the number of ways to assign c1−γ−δ
values in the second category is (
a−c2
c1−γ−δ
)
vc1−γ−δ. (3.7)
From (3.5)-(3.7) and the fact that δ can vary between 0 and c1−γ, the number of
ways to assign values to s1 with γ common values with s2 is(
c2
γ
)
·
c1−γ∑
δ=0
[(
c2−γ
δ
)(
a−c2
c1−γ−δ
)
(v−1)δvc1−γ−δ
]
. (3.8)
The probability that s1 and s2 have exactly γ common values follows from (3.8) and (3.4). 
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Corollary 2
Pr[s1 v s2] = Pr
common
[c1] =
(
c2
c1
)(
a
c1
)
vc1
.
Proof. The probability that s1 v s2 is the probability that all c1 values of s1 also appear in
s2. 
We now focus on Pr[Bα(s1) ⊆ Bα(s2) | s1 v s2] and Pr[Bα(s1) ⊆ Bα(s2)]. The main
insight is to split the hashes into two categories. First, consider an attribute value common
to subscriptions s1 and s2. If, for this value, there is a hash function h, which is randomly
chosen for both Bloom filters Bα(s1) and Bα(s2), we say there is a good hash between s1
and s2. Second, it is also possible that unrelated hash functions selected by both s1 and s2
randomly hash at the same position in the Bloom filters; this is called a lucky hash. Since we
want Bα(s1) ⊆ Bα(s2), all the hashes of s1 in Bα(s1) must be covered by the hashes of s2 in
Bα(s2) by good and/or lucky hashes.
Let Pr
good
[g, γ] be the probability that there are g good hashes between s1 and s2, where γ
is the number of common values between both subscriptions. Pr
good
[g, γ] is difficult to calculate
for α > 1 because, for instance, the probability that there are two good hashes for one
common value between s1 and s2 is different from the probability that there are two common
values with one good hash each. Thus, to evaluate Pr
good
[g, γ] we must consider the integer
partitions of g [Andrews, 1998].
Let IntPart(g, γ, αmin, α) be the set of all integer partitions of g into exactly γ parts
with the additional constraint that the size of each part is at least αmin and at most α.
We write λ ` IntPart(g, γ, αmin, α) to denote that λ is an integer partition of g with the
desired properties. The frequency representation of a partition λ ` IntPart(g, γ, αmin, α) is
(αmin
pαminαmin+1
pαmin+1 . . . αpα), meaning that the value αi appears pαi times in the partition.
Lemma 3
Pr
good
[g, γ] =
∑
λ`IntPart(g,γ,αmin,α)
[(
γ
pαmin , pαmin+1 , . . ., pα
)
·
α∏
β=αmin
[(
α
β
)(
k−α
α−β
)(
k
α
) ]pβ]
where αmin = max(0, 2α−k).
Proof. We first explain why we must consider all the partitions λ ` IntPart(g, γ, αmin, α)
(we recall that IntPart(g, γ, αmin, α) is the set of all integer partitions of g into exactly γ
parts with the additional constraint that the size of each part is at least αmin and at most
α). The g good hashes must be chosen among the hash functions of the γ common values
between s1 and s2, thus we consider the partitions of g into exactly γ parts. Since there
are α hashes per attribute value, each part of the partitions is at most α. Furthermore,
when α > k
2
, it is not possible that the hashes chosen by s1 and s2 for a common value are
mutually exclusive. More precisely, the number of good hashes per common value is at least
αmin = max(0, 2α−k), which explains why the size of each part in the partitions is at least
αmin. The reason to consider all such partitions is that they have different probabilities of
occurrence when α > 1.
As mentioned before, we consider a fixed partition λ ` IntPart(g, γ, αmin, α) using the
frequency representation
(αmin
pαminαmin+1
pαmin+1 . . . αpα),
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meaning that the value αi appears pαi times in λ. The number of ways to assign the
number of good hashes for each common value for the fixed λ corresponds to the number of
different permutations of γ objects, where there are pαi indistinguishable objects of type αi
for αmin+1 ≤ αi ≤ α. This is given by the multinomial coefficient(
γ
pαmin , pαmin+1 , . . . , pα
)
, γ!
pαmin !·pαmin+1 !·. . .·pα!
. (3.9)
We now fix the number of good hashes for each attribute and calculate the probability
of occurrence of this assignment. The probability of having β good hashes (and α−β lucky
hashes) for a common value between both subscriptions is given by(
α
β
)(
k−α
α−β
)(
k
α
) (3.10)
and it follows that the probability of having g good hashes for a given number of good hashes
per common value is given by
α∏
β=αmin
[(
α
β
)(
k−α
α−β
)(
k
α
) ]pβ . (3.11)
From (3.10) and (3.11), the probability of having g good hashes for a fixed partition λ
is (
γ
pαmin , pαmin+1 , . . ., pα
) α∏
β=αmin
[(
α
β
)(
k−α
α−β
)(
k
α
) ]pβ (3.12)
and by considering all partitions λ ` IntPart(g, γ, αmin, α) we can conclude that
Pr
good
[g, γ] =
∑
λ`IntPart(g,γ,αmin,α)
(
γ
pαmin , pαmin+1 , . . ., pα
) α∏
β=αmin
[(
α
β
)(
k−α
α−β
)(
k
α
) ]pβ . (3.13)

The formula is much simpler when α = 1, since there is only one integer partition of g
into γ parts when each part is either 0 or 1. This is described by the following corollary.
Corollary 4 When α = 1,
Pr
good
[g, γ] =
(
γ
g
)(
1
k
)g (
k−1
k
)γ−g
.
Proof. When α = 1, the problem is a direct application of the binomial distribution with g
successes out of γ events and probability of success 1
k
. 
If Bα(s1) ⊆ Bα(s2), all the Bloom filter bits derived from the hash functions randomly
chosen for s1 must somehow be covered by some of the hash functions randomly chosen for
the Bloom filter of s2. If we have g good hashes between s1 and s2, that leaves c1α−g lucky
hashes of s1 that must be covered by some of the hash functions of s2 randomly hashing at
the same positions in the Bloom filter. Let Pr
lucky
[h1, h2] be the probability that h1 hashes of a
subscription or publication are covered by some of the h2 hashes of a second subscription or
publication randomly hashing at the same positions in the Bloom filter.
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Lemma 5
Pr
lucky
[h1, h2] =
1
nh1+h2
h2∑
i=0
[(
n
i
)
i!
{
h2
i
} i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
j!
{
h1
j
}]
.
where
{
k1
k2
}
represent the Stirling numbers of the second kind [Graham et al., 1994].
Proof. The probability that a Bloom filter of size n with c constraints and α hash functions
per constraint has exactly i nonzero bits is(
n
i
)·i!·{ cα
i
}
ncα
(3.14)
More precisely, there are
(
n
i
)
distinct Bloom filters with i nonzero bits, each occurring
with probability
i!·{ cα
i
}
ncα
. (3.15)
We prove the lemma with two subscriptions s1 and s2. We remove the bits of Bα(s1)
obtained from the good hashes between s1 and s2 and only consider the h1 lucky hashes that
need to be randomly covered by the h2 hashes of s2. Let B
′
α(s1) be the Bloom filter of s1
with only the h1 lucky hash functions.
Pr
lucky
[h1, h2] =
h2∑
i=1
∑
B′α(s2) with i nonzero bits
Pr[B′α(s2)]·Pr[B′α(s1) ⊆ B′α(s2)] (3.16)
and from (3.14) and (3.15) it follows that
Pr
lucky
[h1, h2] =
h2∑
i=1
(ni)∑
δ=1
i!·{h2i }
nh2
i∑
j=1
(
n
j
)·j!·{h1
j
}
nh1
·
(
i
j
)(
n
j
)

=
h2∑
i=1
(ni)·i!·{h2i }
nh2
i∑
j=1
(
n
j
)·j!·{h1
j
}
nh1
·
(
i
j
)(
n
j
)

=
1
nh1+h2
h2∑
i=1
[(
n
i
)
·i!·
{
h2
i
} i∑
j=1
(
i
j
)
·j!·
{
h1
j
}]
.
(3.17)

Lemma 6
Pr[Bα(s1) ⊆ Bα(s2) | s1 v s2] =
c1α∑
g=0
(
Pr
good
[g, c1] Pr
lucky
[c1α−g, c2α]
)
.
Proof. Since s1 v s2, there are c1 common attribute values between s1 and s2. The
probability that Bα(s1) ⊆ Bα(s2) can be obtained by summing, for all values of g between 0
and c1α, the probability of having g good hashes times the probability that the c1α−g lucky
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hashes of s1 can be covered by the c2α hash functions of s2 randomly hashing at the same
place in the Bloom filter of s2. 
Lemma 7
Pr[Bα(s1) ⊆ Bα(s2)] =
c1∑
γ=0
(
Pr
common
[γ]
γα∑
g=0
(
Pr
good
[g, γ] Pr
lucky
[c1α−g, c2α]
))
.
Proof. Suppose that there are γ common attribute values between s1 and s2. The probability
that Bα(s1) ⊆ Bα(s2) given γ can be obtained by summing, for all values of g between 0
and γα, the probability of having g good hashes times the probability that the c1α−g lucky
hashes of s1 can be covered by the c2α hash functions of s2 randomly hashing at the same
place in the Bloom filter of s2. The probability that Bα(s1) ⊆ Bα(s2) can be obtained by
summing, for all values of γ between 0 and c1, the probability that there are γ common
attribute values between s1 and s2 times the probability that Bα(s1) ⊆ Bα(s2) given γ. 
We are now ready to prove the main result.
Theorem 1
Pα =
((
a
c1
)
vc1
)−1 (
c2
c1
) c1α∑
g=0
(
Pr
good
[g, c1] Pr
lucky
[c1α−g, c2α]
)
c1∑
γ=0
(
Pr
common
[γ]
γα∑
g=0
(
Pr
good
[g, γ] Pr
lucky
[c1α−g, c2α]
)) .
Proof. The theorem can be derived by merging (3.2), Lemmas 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, and Corollaries
2 and 4. 
Theorem 2
Pf pos =
c1−1∑
γ=0
(
Pr
common
[γ] Pr
lucky
[α(c1−γ), cpk]
)
.
Proof. From (3.3), Pf pos , Pr[Bα(s1) ⊆ Bk(p) | s1 6v p]. Suppose that there are γ < c1
common attribute values between s1 and p. Since the publication uses all the k hash
functions for each value in its Bloom filter, it follows that there are αγ good hashes for s1,
leaving α(c1−γ) lucky hashes that must be covered by the cpk hashes of p randomly hashing
at the same positions in the Bloom filters. The probability of this occurring is given by
Pr
lucky
[α(c1−γ), cpk]. The result can be obtained by summing, for all values of γ between 0 and
c1 (s1 v p if γ = c1), the probability that there are γ common attribute values between s1
and p times the probability of α(c1−γ) lucky hashes. 
3.4.5 Other attacks
An attacker can also try to derive containment relationships based on mismatched Bloom
filters, i.e., Bloom filters Bα(s1) and Bα(s2) such that Bα(s1) 6⊆ Bα(s2) and Bα(s2) 6⊆ Bα(s1).
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Figure 3.7: Pα for Bloom filters of varying size (c1 = c2 = 3).
Let us consider the probability Pα , Pr [s1 v s2 | Bα(s1) 6⊆ Bα(s2)], which from Bayes’ law
can be rewritten as
Pα =
Pr[s1 v s2]·Pr[Bα(s1) 6⊆ Bα(s2) | s1 v s2]
Pr[Bα(s1) 6⊆ Bα(s2)]
=
Pr[s1 v s2]·(1−Pr[Bα(s1) ⊆ Bα(s2) | s1 v s2])
1−Pr[Bα(s1) ⊆ Bα(s2)] .
(3.18)
Pα can be evaluated using the formulas derived earlier in this section. It should be clear that
P k = 0 and that Pα > 0 for α < k, so at first sight randomly choosing some of the hash
functions appears to provide more information to a potential attacker than selecting all the
hash functions. This is misleading, since Pα essentially increases from zero to Pr[s1 v s2],
providing no more information to an attacker than from random subscriptions. This is
a welcome tradeoff considering how the hashing strategy we use decreases the amount of
information leaked from contained subscriptions. An example comparing Pα and Pr[s1 v s2]
is displayed in Figure 3.7.
Finally, although it is unclear what could be done with such information, an attacker
could try to derive “noncontainment” attributes about pairs of encrypted subscriptions. In
that case, the probability of interest is Pr [s1 6v s2 | Bα(s1) 6⊆ Bα(s2)], which with Bayes’ law
and a little work can be rewritten as
Pr[s1 6v s2 | Bα(s1) 6⊆ Bα(s2)] = 1−Pr[s1 v s2]·Pr[Bα(s1) 6⊆ Bα(s2) | s1 v s2]
Pr[Bα(s1) 6⊆ Bα(s2)] . (3.19)
Interestingly, Pr [s1 6v s2 | Bα(s1) 6⊆ Bα(s2)] = 1 with α = k and smaller than 1 when α < k.
This means that when α < k, the attacker cannot even conclude with certainty that two
subscriptions are not included into each other.
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3.5 Evaluation and discussion
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the prefiltering strategy we proposed under
a wide range of scenarios. The evaluation when containment information is available is
presented in Section 3.5.1, whereas the performance-confidentiality tradeoffs with containment
obfuscation are covered in Section 3.5.2.
3.5.1 Prefiltering performance
First, we experimentally study the efficiency of prefiltering. We focus on the reduction in the
number of calls to the ENC-Match encrypted matching function with the different variants
of prefiltering. Afterwards, we study the effect of varying the size of the Bloom filters, and
the number of hash functions on the effectiveness of all prefiltering variants. Finally, we
evaluate the actual performance gains on a complete implementation of the matching engine
using ASPE [Choi et al., 2010] as the encrypted matching operation.
Workloads
We constructed an experimental workload inspired by the one used for the evaluation of the
Meghdoot publish/subscribe system [Gupta et al., 2004]. We gathered five years of quotes for
200 randomly selected stocks from the Yahoo! finance website,6 which corresponds to a set of
over 250,000 publications with between 8 and 11 attributes. We built synthetic subscriptions
based on the same categories as in [Gupta et al., 2004]. These subscriptions contain a variety
of equality and range constraints on the attributes of stock quotes, namely the symbol, date,
exchanged volume, and daily statistics on their price (open, close, high, low). By default,
equality constraints are expressed on the symbol, while ranges apply to the volume and the
various daily statistics. For workloads with additional equality constraints, we used extra
attributes from the Yahoo! finance data: the stock exchange on which the stock is available;
the trend indicating if the stock is higher or lower than the previous day; and the type of
product (among 8 possible categories).
We also experimented with workloads containing more attributes than available in
the original Yahoo! finance data. To that end, we simply created additional copies of the
volume and daily statistics attributes by merging data from multiple quotes. We produced
workloads with twice and four times more attributes on which subscriptions can express
range constraints.
We finally experimented with different subscription distributions, by choosing con-
straint values either uniformly at random, or according to a Zipf’s law with exponent s = 1.7
Recall that publications are real data from Yahoo! finance and we did not modify their
distribution in any way.
Table 3.2 describes the nine workloads used in the evaluation. For every type, we
experimented with populations of up to 100,000 subscriptions.
Table 3.3 presents characteristics of the workloads that are instrumental in the
interpretation of experimental results. For each workload of 100,000 subscriptions, we created
a containment graph. The second column indicates the number of nodes in the graph, with
identical subscriptions being collapsed in a single node. Columns 3–5 respectively show the
6http://finance.yahoo.com/.
7Zipf’s law and other power laws appear in a wide range of disciplines like finance, demography, biology,
networks, . . . [Newman, 2005].
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Workload Number of equality Number of Distribution
name constraints attributes of values
e100 100% : 1 eq. pred.
e80
8–11 (default)
e80-2x
20% : 0 eq. pred.
2× more
e80-4x
80% : 1 eq. pred.
4× more
15% : 0 eq. pred. Uniform
e+-2x
60% : 1 eq. pred.
2× more
15% : 2 eq. pred.
e+-4x
10% : 3 eq. pred.
4× more
e80-z 20% : 0 eq. pred. Zipf on symbol
e80-z+ 80% : 1 eq. pred. 8–11 (default) Zipf on all
e100-z+ 100% : 1 eq. pred. attributes
Table 3.2: Description of the workloads.
Workload Nodes Roots Leaves R∩L Depth Children Parents Identical constraints Equality Matches
µ− µ+ max µ max µ max µ max µ min max µ min max µ (%)
e100 89102 1688 3839 27 53.04 53.80 192 1.47 13 1.44 10 1.12 5 2.20 2 3 1.00 1 1 0.19
e80 79786 45 3504 0 78.41 298.29 2056 3.02 75 2.89 17 1.25 28 2.00 1 3 0.80 0 1 7.48
e80-2x 99944 1705 21812 320 3.90 27.73 106 10.64 336 8.46 49 1.00 2 3.20 2 5 0.80 0 1 2.78
e80-4x 100000 41315 78624 32229 1.61 2.09 9 16.52 307 6.02 63 1.00 1 5.60 4 9 0.80 0 1 0.40
e+-2x 99980 1956 36416 621 3.76 23.68 88 12.25 573 7.94 43 1.00 2 3.60 2 7 1.21 0 3 2.14
e+-4x 100000 46635 83596 38793 1.55 1.93 9 17.60 344 5.41 59 1.00 1 5.99 4 11 1.20 0 3 0.30
e80-z 63671 31 2821 0 118.70 309.75 2019 3.27 76 3.13 18 1.57 29 2.00 1 3 0.80 0 1 7.49
e80-z+ 43059 23 2453 1 59.91 205.96 483 2.92 201 2.75 19 2.32 1015 2.00 1 3 0.80 0 1 8.93
e100-z+ 46125 1148 2648 32 45.30 54.70 477 1.57 11 1.52 11 2.17 898 2.20 2 3 1.00 1 1 0.21
Table 3.3: Workload characteristics for 100,000 subscriptions (matches evaluated on 1,000
publications).
number of nodes that are root, leaf, or both (i.e., isolated nodes) in the graph. A node may be
reachable from several roots and by multiple paths. Column 6 presents the average shortest
(µ−) and longest (µ+) paths from some root to each node, as well as the maximum path
length. Column 7 gives the average and maximum number of children at each node (excluding
leaves), while Column 8 provides the same statistics for parents of each node (excluding
roots). Columns 9, 10, and 11 respectively list the number of identical subscriptions in
the workloads, the number of constraints in the subscriptions, and the number of equality
constraints. Finally, the last column specifies the percentage of matching subscriptions for
each of the considered workloads, averaged over a set of 1,000 publications.
Reducing the number of tests
We first study the number of calls to the ENC-Match encrypted matching function. We
express this value as a “tests ratio” over the number of subscriptions. A value of 1 indicates
that a call to ENC-Match must be performed for each subscription, as would be the case
with a naive approach consisting in traversing the whole collection of subscriptions to test
each one individually.
We evaluate the following algorithms:
 CB: Containment-based strategy (baseline).
 PF: Prefiltering with complete Bloom filters.
 PF-TB: Prefiltering with truncated Bloom filters, using α = 1 out of k = 3 hash
functions.
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 PF+NM: PF combined with containment-based negative matching.
 PF+NM+PM: PF combined with containment-based negative and positive matching.
We use Bloom filters of 128 bits. The reason for using Bloom filters of this dimension
is that, as results show, this size is sufficient to provide good results for the considered
workloads.
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Figure 3.8: Evolution of the number of tests, i.e., calls to the encrypted matching function,
with different populations of subscribers (128-bit Bloom filters and 3 hash functions).
Results are shown in Figure 3.8 (note the logarithmic scales). Let us first consider the
baseline CB strategy. One can observe that the most important savings can be obtained with
workloads that have few matches (e100, e80-4x, e+-4x, and e100-z+, all of which report
less than 1% of matches in Table 3.3) because many subscriptions can be discarded early
while traversing the containment graph. With other workloads, the performance of CB still
improves with the number of subscriptions, albeit at a lower rate.
Both PF and PF-TB exhibit almost constant performance independent of the number
of subscriptions. The reason is that savings depend in these cases only on negative matching
obtained from subscriptions Bloom filters, which do not have an impact on the matching of
other subscriptions as containment is not exploited. The only noticeable exception is with
e80-z+ and e100-z+ where PF slightly improves. This is due to the fact that PF collapses
identical subscriptions (which reach up to 1,000 in these workloads) into a single node in the
lists, while PF-TB does not (recall that PF-TB is designed for containment obfuscation, thus
it does not allow to determine subscriptions equality).
PF is significantly more efficient than PF-TB because truncation adds false positives.
The difference between both strategies is more important for workloads that report few
matches. It is also worth pointing out that PF-TB it more efficient that CB on most of the
workloads up to large populations of subscriptions. This is notably the case of workloads
with shallow containment graphs (e80-4x and e+-4x, with average node depth lower than 2).
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Figure 3.9: Evolution of the number of tests when varying the size of the Bloom filters, using
k =3 hash functions.
Finally, the PF+NM and PF+NM+PM strategies perform best in all the experiments. They
combine the benefits of PF and CB: like the former, they perform already well with few
subscriptions; like the latter, they can take advantage of the large number of containment
relationships available with many subscriptions. Unsurprisingly, positive matching is helpful
with workloads that exhibit sufficient matches (e80, e80-2x, e+-2x, e80-z, and e80-z+,
which report between 2% and 9% of matches). Workloads with high depth and a good
proportion of subscriptions with no equality constraint (e80, e80-z, and e80-z+) exhibit
an interesting trend, with performance initially improving and then slightly degrading as
the number of subscription grows. The reason why PF+NM and PF+NM+PM do not follow the
same slope as CB is that traversal is performed in containment order within the lists, but not
globally in the whole graph. Consider two subscriptions s and s′ with s w s′ with s containing
s′. The containee s′ may have additional equality constraints and, therefore, belong to more
lists in the prefilter structure than s. If s′ is first encountered as part of a list to which
s does not belong, the containee may be tested before its container against a publication
p. If neither matches p, PF+NM would still test both subscriptions while CB would only test
s as it strictly follows the global containment graphs. Note that despite the difference in
slopes, CB does not catch up PF+NM nor PF+NM+PM in any of the workloads up for to 100,000
subscriptions, and the gains of the latter are in most cases close to one order of magnitude.
Tuning Bloom filters
We further evaluate the impact of varying the Bloom filter size and the number of hash
functions on the number of tests that have to be performed using the costly ENC-Match
operation.
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Figure 3.10: Evolution of the number of tests when varying the number of hash functions,
using n =128-bit Bloom filters.
Figure 3.9 shows the tests ratios as function of the size of the Bloom filters. In
Figure 3.10 we count the same test ratio when we vary the number of hash functions.
A first observation is that the default values we have chosen (128-bit Bloom filters and
3 hash functions) perform well with all workloads and most algorithm variants. The benefits
one can expect from larger Bloom filters and more hash functions are not significant, although
for workloads with more attributes and equality constraints one should likely increase the
size of the Bloom filters.
PF-TB is the exception: its efficiency continues to increase with larger Bloom filters,
reaching almost the performance of PF with 2,048 bits. This shows that the higher rate of
false positives resulting from truncation can be compensated by properly dimensioning the
Bloom filters. Conversely, with more hash functions, the performance of PF-TB degrades
faster than the performance of PF because the number of bits in the Bloom filters of the
subscriptions does not change (only one hash function is used), while the Bloom filters of the
publications become more densely populated, yielding additional false positives.
Improving filtering time
To complete the performance evaluation, we present the impact of prefiltering on the time
complexity of confidentiality-aware pub/sub. We use for encrypted matching engine our
implementation of ASPE [Choi et al., 2010]. The goal is to verify how the reduction in calls
to the ENC-Match function affects the actual filtering time. To that end, we have executed
the same experiment as in Figure 3.8 on a 2.4 GHz Xeon with 64 GB RAM. Figure 3.11
reports the average time necessary to filter a publication with all considered workloads and
algorithm variants, with the addition of a “naive” strategy that simply iterates through the
set of subscriptions and tests them one by one using ASPE.
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Figure 3.11: Filtering performance using ASPE with different populations of subscribers
(n =128-bit Bloom filters and k =3 hash functions).
The gains expected from the evaluation of the tests ratio are mirrored in most of the
graphs. While the behavior of the algorithms is consistent with results of Figure 3.8, PF+NM
and PF+NM+PM strategies do not scale as well as anticipated on some workloads, notably when
the average depth of nodes is high and many subscriptions have no equality constraint (e80,
e80-z, and e80-z+). This can be explained by memory management and cache effects on
the test hardware, as well as the prohibitive size of the last list in the prefilter structure.
More precisely, even though the ENC-Match function may not be actually called, the
whole list must still be traversed; in contrast, exploration of the containment graph can be
interrupted early. Despite these implementation artifacts, performance results clearly show
that prefiltering provides a significant time reduction of the matching operation.
3.5.2 Performance/confidentiality tradeoffs
We now use Theorems 1 and 2 to study the fundamental tradeoffs between the efficiency and
the containment confidentiality of prefiltering using truncation for containment obfuscation.
We first consider as an example the uniform domain with a = 10 attributes and v = 100
values per attribute. We further assume that all the subscriptions contain c1 = c2 = 3 equality
constraints, that all the publications contain cp = 5 values, and that a set with k = 5 hash
functions is used. Figure 3.12 shows how Pα and Pf pos vary with the Bloom filter size. For
both Pα and Pf pos, the five curves correspond to α ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, where α is the number of
hash functions randomly selected out of k. It can be observed that Pα converges to 1 as the
Bloom filter size increases. This can be explained by the fact that when Bloom filters are
large, the probability that a pair of subscriptions that do not cover each other generates two
Bloom filters such that one is included in the other approaches zero. We also notice that
Pα converges much slower to 1 with small values of α. This indicates that using truncation
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used in conjunction with Bloom filters of reasonable size is an efficient strategy to decrease
containment information leakage.
Figure 3.12: Pα/Pf pos tradeoff as n increases.
Fixed parameters: a = 10, v = 100, c1 = c2 =
3, cp = 5 and k = 5.
Figure 3.13: Pα/Pf pos tradeoff as k increases.
Fixed parameters: a = 10, v = 100, c1 = c2 =
3, cp = 5 and n = 128.
Figure 3.12 also shows that Pf pos decreases as n and k increase. Figure 3.13 uses the
same domain as Figure 3.12, except that it shows how Pα and Pf pos vary with k with Bloom
filters of 128 bits. It should be clear from both figures that in order to minimize the amount
of information leaked to an attacker, we can choose a small Bloom filter and select one hash
function randomly out of a very large set. In fact, we can show from (3.2) and Theorem 1
that
lim
k→∞
Pα
= lim
k→∞
(
Pr[s1 v s2]·Pr[Bα(s1) ⊆ Bα(s2) | s1 v s2]
Pr[Bα(s1) ⊆ Bα(s2)]
)
= Pr[s1 v s2]· lim
k→∞
Pr[Bα(s1) ⊆ Bα(s2) | s1 v s2]
Pr[Bα(s1) ⊆ Bα(s2)]
= Pr[s1 v s2].
(3.20)
With a very large value of k, there is no containment information leaked to an attacker
who knows the domain probability space. However in this case, since all the hash functions
must be encoded in the Bloom filters for publications, the publications Bloom filters have most
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of their bits set to one. The probability of false positive then approaches 1 and prefiltering
becomes useless.
Figure 3.14: Evaluation of Pα when
Pf pos ≈ 0.03. Other fixed parameters:
a = 10, v = 100, c1 = c2 = 3 and cp = 5.
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Figure 3.15: Evaluation of Pα for varying
n and different c1 and c2. Fixed parame-
ters: a = 10, v = 100, k = 5 and α = 1.
Figure 3.14 further illustrates the tradeoffs. In Figure 3.14, we choose k such that
the false positive rate is always 3% (Pf pos ≈ 0.03). We study how it affects Pα as α and the
Bloom filter size vary. The observation is that for a fixed false positive rate, the containment
confidentiality of the prefiltering is essentially fixed no matter how we vary the size of the
Bloom filters and the cardinality of the hash functions set. One observation that can be
drawn from this is that for complexity reasons we should set the Bloom filter size as small as
acceptable (for very small Bloom filters it is not possible to set the probability of false positive
low enough). Typically, Bloom filters of size 64 or 128 are more than sufficient. Figure 3.14
also shows that the best tradeoff is reached when randomly selecting only α = 1 hash function
from the set. We mention that for some values of c1 and c2 we obtained a slightly better
tradeoff for α = 2 than for α = 1, but we believe that the small gain, the increased complexity
(much larger k) and infrequent occurrence do not really justify considering α > 1. Despite
the observed tradeoffs, the truncating strategy is a valuable mechanism. For instance, it
can be observed from Figure 3.14 that for a 3% false positive rate, which is excellent, Pα
is approximately 1·10−6. This makes it challenging for an attacker to build an accurate
containment graph and run statistical attacks using a set of encrypted subscriptions.
Figure 3.15 shows that the confidentiality of the prefiltering scheme increases dramati-
cally when the number of equality constraints per subscription increases, but decreases slightly
if an attacker tries to gain information by comparing a subscription with a small number
of constraints with a second subscription with a large number of equality constraints. In
Figure 3.16 we again choose k such that the false positive rate is always 3% (Pf pos ≈ 0.03). It
shows that the performance/confidentiality tradeoff is better when the number of subscription
equality constraints approaches the number of publication values. Of course, in practical
systems, subscribers do not necessarily generate subscriptions with a fixed number of equality
attributes nor do publishers generate publications with a fixed number of values. When
this occurs, the performance/confidentiality tradeoff must be approximated based on an
estimation of the system workload.
Finally, since real-world publication and subscription domains are rarely uniform, we
also test the prefiltering scheme on a nonuniform domain. We use Zipf’s law with exponential
parameter 0, i.e., Pr[X = x] = Pr[X=1]
x
for x = {1, 2, 3, . . . }. We consider that the domain
attributes follow Zipf’s law; likewise, we assume that the possible values for each attribute
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Figure 3.16: Evaluation of Pα when
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Figure 3.17: Comparison of Pα and Pf pos
for uniform and non-uniform domains. Nu-
merical simulations using a = 10, v = 100,
c1 = c2 = 3, cp = 5, k = 5 and α = 1.
also follow Zipf’s law. We use a = 10, v = 100, 5 values per publication, 3 equality constraints
per subscription, k = 5 and α = 1. We compute Pα and Pf pos using numerical simulations.
The results are shown in Figure 3.17. It can be observed that Pα is slightly higher when the
domain follows Zipf’s law, which is not surprising since the domain entropy is lower and the
probability that the subscriptions share common values increases. Pf pos is almost equal for
small Bloom filters. This example provides evidence that the prefiltering scheme we proposed
can be made secure and efficient with nonuniform real-life practical workloads.
3.6 Prefiltering extensions
The prefiltering mechanism we presented brings obvious advantages for the performance
exhibited by confidentiality-aware pub/sub systems, as evaluated in the previous section.
However, one of the major limitations comes from the application restriction to equality
constraints. In this section we present an extension that is a first step towards also prefiltering
inequality constraints.
Our approach has similarities to a dictionary search technique using reference points.
Raiciu et al. [Raiciu and Rosenblum, 2006] already used such a technique for ranges filtering
in their encrypted matching scheme proposed for pub/sub. We have overviewed their work in
Section 2.1.2. The idea follows the generic pre-mapped equality comparison design in encrypted
matching schemes described in Section 2.1.1. More precisely, the pub/sub data domains are
first partitioned in smaller intervals. We use the boundaries of these intervals by encoding
them in “inequality Bloom filters” to approximate inequality constraints. An example is
given by Figure 3.18. In this example, the domain V = {1, 2, . . . , 100} is partitioned into
five intervals, each containing 20 values. If a subscription contains the constraint v > 25, the
closest interval boundary covering the inequality, in this case ≥ 20, will be encoded in its
inequality Bloom filter. Each incoming publication must encode all the interval boundaries
covering its values. In the figure, the publication is v = 30. The interval bounds ≥ 1, ≥ 20,
≤ 100, ≤ 80, ≤ 60 and ≤ 40 thus must all be encoded in its inequality Bloom filter. The
inequality Bloom filters of subscriptions and publications can then be compared exactly like
the Bloom filters for equality constraints. This can be performed in a second prefiltering stage
executed after the prefiltering on equality constraints. It should be noted that failure to encode
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Figure 3.18: Inequality prefiltering pre-mapping mechanism.
Figure 3.19: Probability of false positives for inequality prefiltering as the size of the Bloom
filters and the number of domain intervals vary, using a = 10, v = 100, c1 = 3, cp = 5, k = 5
and α = 1.
all the covering interval bounds in publications may lead to false negatives. Interestingly, the
pollution and truncation containment obfuscation techniques discussed in Section 3.3 can
also be applied to the inequality Bloom filters.
One drawback of prefiltering inequalities is the amount of information leaked by
the Bloom filters. The analysis of containment information leaked from the subscriptions
inequality filters is similar to the analysis done for equality constraints, with two differences:
on the one hand, the size of the subscription domain is reduced to twice the number of
interval boundaries, but on the other hand those boundaries do not correspond to the exact
inequalities. Unfortunately, the size of the publication domain is also reduced to the number
of interval boundaries, which can be very small.
We simulated inequality prefiltering with uniform publication and subscription domains
of a = 10 attributes and v = 100 values per attribute, c1 = 3 inequality constraints per
subscription, cp = 5 attributes per publication, and one hash function randomly chosen out of
5 for the subscriptions Bloom filters. The results are in Figure 3.19 for {5, 10, 20} equal-size
domain partitions. For a Bloom filter of 256 bits and 5 domain intervals, we can prefilter more
than 50% of the non-matching publications. Unsurprisingly, the performance is significantly
worse than for equality constraints. This is due to the difference between the real constraints
and the interval boundaries, but more importantly to the large number of values that must
be encoded in the publications Bloom filters.
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3.7 Summary
Prefiltering, and when available containment relationships between subscriptions, allow us
to greatly reduce the performance gap between non-encrypted and encrypted filtering. By
adding Bloom filters that encode publication values and subscription equality constraints, we
can discard a large fraction of subscriptions before reaching the costly encrypted filtering
operation. Evaluations confirmed that the mechanisms we proposed reduce the number
of such costly operations required to filter an incoming publication by approximately one
order of magnitude. Furthermore, when selecting a subset of the hash functions for encoding
subscription equality constraints in the Bloom filters, we showed that it is still possible to
prefilter a large fraction of the subscriptions while leaking very little containment information
to potential attackers.
Several extensions of this work are possible. In Section 3.6, we discussed how Bloom
filters could be used to prefilter inequality constraints. We also believe that the results
and techniques we obtained, can be applied to other problems in distributed systems where
set inclusions are represented using a compact structure such as Bloom filters, and where
confidentiality requirements are stringent. One such application is encrypted distributed
databases [Popa et al., 2011,Kurpicz, 2013]. Also, a rigorous mathematical analysis following
the same steps as ours could be applied to other case that were presented empirically, for
instance the filter obfuscation technique in Perl et al. [Perl et al., 2012].
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Chapter 4
Advances in ASPE functionality
4.1 Multidimensional pub/sub matching with ASPE
We introduced the basics of the ASPE (Asymmetric Scalar-product Preserving Encryption)
applied in pub/sub [Choi et al., 2010] in Section 2.1.2. In their discussion, the authors mainly
consider the unidimensional case. We support multidimensional subscriptions, case which is
just briefly suggested by the original work. In the following, we present our extensions that
cover this situation.
Let n be the number of attributes in a publication. A subscription also contains up
to n constraints on these attributes. Each value vi in a constraint is first encapsulated in
an intermediate multidimensional subscription point Si = (s1, s2, . . . , vi, . . . , sn), where all
the other dimensions: s1, . . . , sn are randomly chosen. Two reference subscription points
Si1 = (q1, q2, . . . , vi−ri, . . . , qn) and Si2 = (q1, q2, . . . , vi+ri, . . . , qn) are chosen symmetrically
at random and at equal distance ri from Si, as for the unidimensional case. The ri values are
private parameters of the scheme. The need for identical qk random values for Si1 and Si2 is
not specifically stated in [Choi et al., 2010], but our analysis proves this requirement. We
formulate the following theorem.
Theorem 3 Matching theorem. Let Si1 = (q1, q2, . . . , c, . . . , qn), Si2 = (q1, q2, . . . , d, . . . , qn)
and P (x1, x2, . . . , m, . . . , xn) be three points in a n-dimensional space, such that c = vi−ri and
d = vi+ri (vi = (c+d)/2). Then, dist(Si1, P )  dist(Si2, P )⇔ m  vi, where  ∈ {>,<,=}.
Proof. Without loss of generality we consider  as >. We have
dist(Si1, P ) > dist(Si2, P )⇔
(q1−x1)2+· · ·+(c−m)2+· · ·+(qd−xn)2 > (q1−x1)2+· · ·+(d−m)2+· · ·+(qd−xn)2 ⇔
c2−2cm+m2 > d2−2dm+m2 ⇔
2m > (d2−c2)/(d−c)⇔
2m > d+c⇔
m > vi.
(4.1)

We observe that matching each constraint value vi with publication P can be obtained
from Di = dist(Si1, P )−dist(Si2, P ). The effective encryption of the points resembles the
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unidimensional case for the scheme discussed in Section 2.1.2, and proceeds as follows. The
distance difference Di can be expressed as a sum of scalar products
Di = dist(Si1, P )−dist(Si2, P ) =‖ Si1 ‖2 − ‖ Si2 ‖2 +2(Si2−Si1)P. (4.2)
ASPE encrypts points Si1, Si2 and P such that the scalar product is preserved and
the distance difference can still be obtained from the encrypted data. The key K used on the
subscriber’s side is MT , the transpose of an invertible matrix. On the publisher’s side the
key is the matrix inverse M−1. The resulting encrypted values are:
S ′Ki1 = EK(Si1) = M
T (Si1,−0.5 ‖ Si1 ‖)T ;
S ′Ki2 = EK(Si2) = M
T (Si2,−0.5 ‖ Si2 ‖)T ;
P ′K = EK(P ) = M
−1q(P, 1)T .
where q is a positive random scaling factor added for security purposes. An untrusted broker
that receives S ′Ki1, S
′
Ki2 and P
′
K can compare S with P by evaluating
(S ′Ki2−S ′Ki1)P ′K = 0.5qDi. (4.3)
We can observe that for the multidimensional case determining, matching is basically
reduced to a sequence of unidimensional matches. The solution is similar to projecting point
P on the axis determined by Si1 and Si2, and solving the problem for the dimension of
interest i. A similar reduction applies also in extending the ASPE containment support for n
dimensions, and proving its correctness, as we detail in Section 4.2.
4.2 Pub/sub containment with ASPE
As discussed in the existing research [Raiciu and Rosenblum, 2006,Barazzutti et al., 2012b],
and previously in Chapter 3, containment support diminishes the achievable level of confi-
dentiality in secure pub/sub scenarios. Nevertheless, as overviewed in Chapter 2 there are
encrypted matching schemes like [Choi et al., 2010, Raiciu and Rosenblum, 2006, Nabeel
et al., 2012], which offer valuable optional containment in applications with less stringent
security constraints. Original work on ASPE proposes a containment extension to the original
scheme [Wong et al., 2009], but only considers the unidimensional case, and in a rather
informal manner. We develop a proof of correctness, and make the necessary adjustments to
the ASPE unidimensional containment case presented in [Choi et al., 2010]. We continue
with a description of the multidimensional case. This can be solved by reduction to a
unidimensional case following an approach similar to the generic multidimensional matching
we discussed in Section 4.1.
The unidimensional containment case presented in [Choi et al., 2010] is based on the
following example, which we further denote as the generic setting. Two subscriptions on values
a and b must be evaluated for containment by a broker. The subscriptions are constructed
and encrypted as in the normal ASPE case by using two reference subscription points for each.
For a the reference points are c = a−s and d = a+s. For b the reference points are e = b−t
and f = b+t. In both cases s and t are positive integers. In addition, to obtain a containment
decision, two points y >> d and z >> f are selected for the two subscriptions, respectively.
Both y and z are encrypted following the publication encryption algorithm and are attached
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to their corresponding encrypted subscription. The containment objective is to obtain a
relation (>,<,=) between the two subscription points a and b using the ASPE encrypted
values of c,d,e,f ,y and z. In [Choi et al., 2010] the authors try to detemine containment by
evaluating distance relations computed between points in plaintext form. The ASPE property
to preserve the distance difference for encrypted values, ensures that this containment result
is valid also after encryption. In the following, we offer a correctness proof on obtaining
the containment relation between a and b, starting from the generic setting baseline. This
extends the description in the original scheme, eliminating several inaccuracies.
Lemma 8 If y > b, then:
dist(c, y)+dist(d, y) > dist(e, y)+dist(f, y)⇒ dist(a, y) > dist(b, y).
Figure 4.1: Subscription points when y > b and y ≥ f .
Figure 4.2: Subscription points when y > b and y < f .
Proof From y > b we have that dist(e, y) = t+dist(b, y). It follows that
2s+2dist(d, y) > t+dist(b, y)+dist(f, y)⇔ 2dist(a, y) > t+dist(b, y)+dist(f, y). (4.4)
We further distinguish two cases: y ≥ f , shown in Figure 4.1 and y < f , shown in Figure 4.2:
 If y ≥ f , we have t+dist(f, y) = dist(b, y), and it results from (4.4) that dist(a, y) >
dist(b, y).
 If y < f , from y > b we have dist(b, y)+dist(f, y) = dist(b, f) = t and dist(b, y) < t.
From this and (4.4) it follows that dist(a, y) > t⇒ dist(a, y) > dist(b, y).

Lemma 9 If z > a, y > b, and z > d, then:
dist(c, z)+dist(d, z) > dist(e, z)+dist(f, z)⇒ dist(a, y) > dist(b, y).
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Proof Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show valid points configurations for the lemma assumptions. From
z > a we have that dist(c, z) = s+dist(a, z). It follows that:
s+dist(a, z)+dist(d, z) > 2t+2dist(f, z)⇔ s+dist(a, z)+dist(d, z) > 2dist(b, z). (4.5)
From z > d we have dist(a, z) = dist(a, d)+dist(d, z) = s+dist(d, z). From this and (4.5) it
follows that dist(a, z) > dist(b, z).
Then, from y > b it follows that dist(a, y) > dist(b, y). 
Lemma 10 If y > b, then:
dist(a, y) > dist(b, y)⇒ dist(c, z)+dist(d, z) > dist(e, z)+dist(f, z).
Figure 4.3: Subscription points when y > b and z ≤ d.
Proof Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 show valid point configurations for the lemma assumptions.
From dist(a, y) > dist(b, y), y > b and z > f (from the initial generic setting), we have
dist(a, z) > dist(b, z). (4.6)
We prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose that
dist(c, z)+dist(d, z) ≤ dist(e, z)+dist(f, z). (4.7)
From (4.7), dist(a, c) = s and dist(e, b) = t we have
s+dist(a, z)+dist(d, z) ≤ t+dist(b, z)+dist(f, z)⇔ s+dist(a, z)+dist(d, z) ≤ 2dist(b, z).
(4.8)
From (4.6) and (4.8) it follows that
s+dist(d, z) < dist(b, z). (4.9)
We now have to consider the possible cases for the position of z relatively to d on the axis:
 If z ≤ d (Figure 4.3), from dist(a, z) ≤ dist(a, d)⇔ dist(a, z) ≤ s it follows that (4.9)
contradicts (4.6).
 If z > d (Figure 4.1 or 4.2), then from s+dist(d, z) = dist(a, d)+dist(d, z) = dist(a, z)
it also results that (4.9) contradicts (4.6).
It follows that the assumption of (4.7) cannot be true, which proves the lemma. 
Lemma 11 If y > b and y > f , then
dist(a, y) > dist(b, y)⇒ dist(c, y)+dist(d, y) > dist(e, y)+dist(f, y).
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Proof Figures 4.1 and 4.3 show two valid point configurations for the lemma assumptions.
We prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose that
dist(c, y)+dist(d, y) ≤ dist(e, y)+dist(f, y). (4.10)
It follows that
s+dist(a, y)+dist(d, y) ≤ t+dist(b, y)+dist(f, y)⇔ 2dist(a, y) ≤ t+dist(b, y)+dist(f, y).
(4.11)
From (4.11) and the initial premise of dist(a, y) > dist(b, y) it follows that
dist(a, y) < t+dist(f, y). (4.12)
If y > f , t+dist(f, y) = dist(b, y). It follows that (4.12) contradicts the premise of dist(a, y) >
dist(b, y). 
Lemma 12 If y < f , then z > d.
Proof We know that d < y and f < z. If y < f it trivially results that z > d. 
We now have all the preliminary results required to formulate a containment theorem
that can be used to rigorously determine when a constraint in a subscription contains (or
covers) a constraint in another subscription by comparing distances preserved by the ASPE
encryption.
Theorem 4 Containment theorem. Let a, b, c, d, e, f, y, z be a set of points on an axis
such that a−s = c, a+s = d, b−t = e, b+t = f , y > d, z > f , where s and t are random
positive integers. Consider also the reference points x1, x2 such that y−u = x1 and y+u = x2
where u is a random positive integer (for generality, in a similar manner, two values q1, q2
can be considered in respect to z). The relation between points a and b can be determined
based on the following cases.
Case 1:
dist(e, y)−dist(f, y) ≤ 0⇒ a < b (4.13)
Case 2:
dist(c, z)−dist(d, z) ≤ 0⇒ b > a (4.14)
Case 3:
((dist(c, y)+dist(d, y) > dist(e, y)+dist(f, y) ∧ dist(x1, z)−dist(x2, z) ≤ 0) ∨
(dist(c, z)+dist(d, z) > dist(e, z)+dist(f, z) ∧ dist(x1, z)−dist(x2, z) > 0))
⇔ b > a
(4.15)
Proof
Case 1:
If dist(e, y)−dist(f, y) ≤ 0, then y ≤ b. Since a < y it results that a < b.
Case 2:
If dist(c, z)−dist(d, z) ≤ 0, then z ≤ a. Since b < z it results that b < a.
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Case 3:
The first two cases cover the situation when y ≤ b ∨ z ≤ a. If (dist(e, y)−dist(f, y) >
0) ∧ (dist(c, z)−dist(d, z) > 0) (contradicting premises of both preceding cases) it follows
that y > b ∧ z > a. This is complementary with the preceding cases, covering all space
of posibilities. We prove the expression in (4.15), having y > b ∧ z > a, and the following
possible situations:
 If y > f , then from Lemma 8, Lemma 11 and y > b, we have that
dist(c, y)+dist(d, y) > dist(e, y)+dist(f, y)⇔ dist(a, y) > dist(b, y)⇔ b > a. (4.16)
 If z > d, then from Lemma 9, Lemma 10 and y > b, we have that
dist(c, z)+dist(d, z) > dist(e, z)+dist(f, z)⇔ dist(a, y) > dist(b, y)⇔ b > a. (4.17)
We don’t know which of the assumptions of y > f or z > d is valid. Therefore, we don’t know
which of (4.16) or (4.17) to test for determining the relation between a and b. Nevertheless,
from Lemma 12 we know that y > f and z > d are mutually exclusive. We have to determine
which case is valid. For this, it is enough to compute
dist(x1, z)−dist(x2, z) ≤ 0⇔ z ≤ y. (4.18)
The two possible valid cases are:
 If z ≤ y, from z > f , it follows that y > f , and we can determine whether b > a from
(4.16).
 If z > y, from y > d, it follows that z > d, and we can determine whether b > a from
(4.17).

About false positives and negatives
The reference points x1 and x2 introduced in the Containment theorem are a mandatory
addition to the scheme presented in [Choi et al., 2010], in order to support subscription
containment. These points should be encrypted like c and d in the first subscription. Without
x1 and x2, the scheme is not able to determine precisely the containment result. We explain
the necessity to add these points in the following.
The idea is that we cannot determine the position of y relative to f , and of z relative
to d, without these additional points. Let us try, lacking these points, to determine if b > a.
If dist(c, y)+dist(d, y) > dist(e, y)+dist(f, y) we can determine that b > a. However,
if dist(c, y)+dist(d, y) ≤ dist(e, y)+dist(f, y) (left side of 4.16 is false), then we are not
certain whether b > a is false. We have the following possibilities:
 If y > f , from the if-and-only-if in (4.16) it results that b ≤ a. This situation is depicted
in Figure 4.4.
 If y < f and dist(a, y) ≤ t it might happen that b > a. An example is shown in Figure
4.5.
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Figure 4.4: Subscription points when dist(c, y)+dist(d, y) ≤ dist(e, y)+dist(f, y) and y > f .
Figure 4.5: Subscription points when dist(c, y)+dist(d, y) ≤ dist(e, y)+dist(f, y) and y < f .
 If y < f it also might happen that b ≤ a. A situation of this case is presented in Figure
4.6.
To determine which case is valid, and continue exploring the space of solutions, we require
the positioning of y relative to f . Without the points x1 and x2 we do not have enough
elements in the scheme to determine the relation between y and f when dist(c, y)+dist(d, y) ≤
dist(e, y)+dist(f, y) (left side of 4.16 is false). It is impossible therefore to obtain an accurate
containment decision.
The description in [Choi et al., 2010] suggests in this case to evaluate containment
similarly using z and (4.17). However, following a similar path, we can obtain an accurate
answer for the evaluation of b > a only in the case where we know if z > d. Since we do not
know if y > f , we also cannot know if z > d.
This lack of precision in the process of determining the containment leads both to
false positives and false negatives. Let us consider a containment function contains(S1, S2)
that determines if subscription S1 contains S2. Let us consider if the left side of (4.16) is false
we give an answer that b > a not true (with a high probability of being correct, the other
case being quite restrictive). Depending on the operators of constraints in the evaluated
subscriptions we can reach the situations in the following example:
 Let S1 : [field < 5] and S2 : [field < 7] (a = 5, b = 7). contains(S1, S2) should return
true. If we evaluate b > a (7 > 5) erroneously as false, we obtain that S1 does not
contain S2, which is a false negative.
 Let S1 : [field > 5] and S2 : [field > 7] (a = 5, b = 7). contains(S1, S2) should return
false. If we evaluate b > a(7 > 5) erroneously as not true, we obtain that S1 does
contain S2, which is a false positive.
The additional reference points we introduced: x1 and x2, prevent such inaccurate
results.
Multidimensional Containment
We can evaluate containment for two multidimensional subscriptions by splitting per con-
straint, using the formulas and following the same reasoning as for a single dimension. Let us
consider two subscriptions S1 and S2, having a and respectively b as constraint values for a
dimension of interest di.
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Figure 4.6: Subscription points when dist(c, y)+dist(d, y) ≤ dist(e, y)+dist(f, y) and y < f .
The prerequisites for multidimensional encrypted matching described in Section 4.1
require setting C and D, two intermediary subscription points associated with the value a for
di in S1. Similarly, let E and F be the intermediary subscription points associated with value b
for di in S2. C andD have as structure (r1, r2, . . . , a−ri, . . . , rn) and respectively (r1, r2, . . . , a+
ri, . . . , rn), where the r values are randoms. E and F present a similar construction in respect
to b. Points Y and Z are chosen such that the value of the dimension of interest di in Y is
>> than the value of di in D, and respectively the value of di in Z is >> than the value of
di in F . Finally, two multidimensional points X1, X2 are chosen as for the unidimensional
case, symmetrically to the dimension of interest di in point Y . We can rewrite now for the
multidimensional case the expressions (4.13), (4.14) and (4.15) in the Containment theorem:
dist(E, Y )−dist(F, Y ) ≤ 0⇒ a < b; (4.19)
dist(C,Z)−dist(D,Z) ≤ 0⇒ b > a; (4.20)
and respectively:
(dist(C, Y )+dist(D, Y ) > dist(E, Y )+dist(F, Y ) ∧ dist(X1, Z)−dist(X2, Z) ≤ 0) ∨
(dist(C,Z)+dist(D,Z) > dist(E,Z)+dist(F,Z) ∧ dist(X1, Z)−dist(X2, Z) > 0)
⇔ b > a.
(4.21)
Multidimensional case containment requires an additional restriction. The c, d, e, f
values must be situated on the same axis in order to preserve the correctness in relation
4.21 (as proven in the unidimensional case). In this example, c = a−ri, d = a+ri, and e and
f are the similar values constructed in vectors E and F . To enable this restriction every
random r value in vectors C,D,E, F has to be the same per corresponding dimension, with
the exception of the dimension of interest (the values subtracted and added to a, respectively
b). Even more, the same restriction on the dimension of interest has to be valid also for
points X1 and X2.
From the Matching theorem in Section 4.1, we observe that elements in vectors Y and
Z do not need however to be set as points on the same axis as the corresponding values in
C,D,E, F,X1, X2. Y and Z can be constructed uniquely per subscription. More precisely,
there is no need to have an Y and Z vector per dimension, but each dimension’s value in the
vectors is chosen to correspond to a dimension of interest in the subscription points. The Y
and Z vectors basically resemble the case of the publication in the multidimensional Matching
theorem in Section 4.1.
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4.3 From confidential kNN queries to confidential pub-
/sub
We discuss in this section the rationale of the ASPE scheme adaptation from its initial use for
confidential kNN queries in databases [Wong et al., 2009] to an encrypted matching scheme
for pub/sub [Choi et al., 2010]. We believe that the approach taken by the authors can be
applied for other existing schemes and thus we offer a generalization of the procedure.
A kNN query on a database searches for the nearest k entries (records) A1, ..., Ak that
are closest to a query point Q. The database entries and the query can be modelled as points
in a n-dimensional space, where each dimension corresponds to a field in the database schema.
Being closer to the query is determined by comparing the Euclidean distances between the
query point and each of the record points (e.g., dist(Q,A1) compared with dist(Q,A2)).
Subscriptions and publications in a pub/sub system can be modelled as points in a
n-dimensional space. However, the matching in pub/sub is fundamentaly different from the
evaluation of kNN queries. The objective for pub/sub is not to evaluate how close a point is
to another one. The target for pub/sub matching is the exact relation (>,<,=) between an
individual dimension of a point (the subscription) and the same dimension in another one
(the publication). A kNN query does not specifically take into account the relations between
individual dimensions, being resolved by just comparing distances. For instance, in Figure
4.7, points A1 = (1, 2) and A2 = (3, 0) are equally close to query point Q = (2, 1). Therefore,
a kNN query for point Q, will not distinguish between points A1 and A2. The kNN query
result does not help us to determine the exact relation between the corresponding individual
dimensions (the x and y coordinates) in Q and in either A1 or A2.
Figure 4.7: Distance comparison between points in a kNN query.
For pub/sub matching we need the exact relation per dimension, and we proceed as in
the following. Let us consider the particular case where all corresponding dimensions in each
point are equal, except the dimension of interest di. Furthermore, let us consider that the
relation (<,>,=) between the value of di in A1 and A2 is known. We can obtain the target
result: the relation between the value of di in Q and in points A1 and A2, through a kNN
query comparing dist(Q,A1) and dist(Q,A2). Q, A1 and A2 are all on an axis determined by
the other dimensions except di, which is the only coordinate that varies. Since di is the only
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Figure 4.8: Distance comparison between points in the pub/sub case.
dimension that influences the comparison between dist(Q,A1) and dist(Q,A2), the result
also excludes false positives.
In Figure 4.8 we depict an example, that follows the above reasoning for the bidimen-
sional points A1 = (1, 1), A2 = (3, 1) and Q = (2, 1). Let us consider the case where pub/sub
matching needs to evaluate the exact relation between the value corresponding to the first
dimension d1 in point Q and the one in the other two points A1 and A2. As assumed above,
we consider a known fact that the value for d1 in A1 is smaller than the value for d1 in A2
(and the second coordinate is equal). We know the kNN query result for the query point Q,
which shows that dist(Q,A1) = dist(Q,A2). It naturally results that the value for d1 in Q is
bigger than the value for d1 in A1 and smaller than the value for d1 in A2. In particular, from
the distances equality, we also observe that the d1 dimension in Q coincides with the middle
of the segment [A1A2]. This additional observed relation is fundamental for generalizing the
way to adapt kNN queries to pub/sub matching.
From the matching theorem in Section 4.1 we can observe that the distance comparison
between: dist(Q,A1) ∼ dist(Q,A2) is preserved when Q is projected on the axis determined
by A1 and A2. Therefore, it is enough that only points A1 and A2 (and not necessarilly also
Q) have all corresponding dimensions equal, except di.
We can define a generic approach, similar with the one used for ASPE, that facilitates
incrementally constructing a confidentiality-preserving pub/sub solution. The base require-
ment is having any encryption scheme that preserves the possibility to compare distances
between pairs of encrypted points. Then, for matching a subscription S with a publication
P on dimension di, we consider two points Si1 and Si2, symmetrically placed in respect to
di. This is similar to choosing points A1 and A2 in respect to the middle of segment [A1A2]
in the previously discussed example. From the comparison result given by the encryption
scheme: dist(Si1, P ) ∼ dist(Si2, P ) (where ∼ ∈ {<,>,=}), we obtain the relation between
the value for dimension di in P and dimension di in S. Following the above example, this is
similar to the relation obtained between dimension di in Q and the middle of segment [A1A2].
The security of the obtained confidential pub/sub solution relies (as in the ASPE case)
on the fact that the original distance comparison-preserving encryption scheme is secure.
Note that preserving distances comparison is a weaker property than preserving distances. In
particular, the latter should not be possible to derive from the former, contrary resulting in
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confidentiality leaks as discussed in [Wong et al., 2009]. Secure kNN schemes are a particular
case that might preserve distances comparison, due to their functionality.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed the work on the multidimensional matching and containment
support for the ASPE scheme. This extends the functionalities from [Choi et al., 2010],
and covers gaps in the original scheme adaptation that can lead to both false positives and
negatives.
We have also discussed how to adapt a secure kNN query to an encrypted matching
scheme used in pub/sub systems. This solution was adopted by the authors of [Choi et al.,
2010] for the ASPE scheme. We believe that a similar approach could be adopted for other
secure kNN queries, and in that purpose we have generalized the design. It remains as future
work to investigate which secure kNN schemes could undergo such adaptations.
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Chapter 5
Key management for confidential
pub/sub
5.1 Motivation, problem description and contributions
As introduced in Chapter 1, the typical assumption in confidential pub/sub is to consider
brokers as honest-but-curious. For routing flexibility purposes, the most interesting solution
to encrypt sensitive data passed through the broker overlay is to use an encrypted matching
scheme. Encrypted matching schemes typically require a prior key exchange between com-
municating parties. We already summarized the key management problem in confidential
publish/subscribe systems in Section 1.3.4 of Chapter 1. In this section we further detail its
implications, and introduce our solution. A difficulty lies in the fact that publishers have
no a-priori knowledge of the subscribers which will receive a given publication. As we have
seen in the overview of Chapter 2, schemes based on secret key (symmetric) encryption
algorithms [Choi et al., 2010,Raiciu and Rosenblum, 2006,Li et al., 2004] expicitly require
a key exchange, but consider this an orthogonal issue. The corresponding papers do not
develop a solution. Schemes that adapt public key algorithms still require either common
private information used in encryption to be sent at both the publisher and subscriber [Ion
et al., 2012] or an initial communication link between these two entities [Nabeel et al., 2012].
Besides the initial key exchange, updating a key introduces even more serious challenges.
A key update is needed in cases of changes in the client trust (e.g., a host using the current
key is corrupted and has to be evicted), or simply as a periodic key refresh in order to
increase resilience to brute-force attacks. Following, all subscriptions stored by the brokers
and encrypted with the old key can no longer be matched with publications encrypted with
the new key. A naive solution requires that the clients resubmit all their subscriptions,
encrypted with the new key. This presents several major drawbacks. It forces subscribers to
keep track and store their set of previous subscriptions. This might be a problem in case of
failures. The key update process becomes prohibitively long (depending on the constraints of
the network layer) and resource consuming, as a large amount of incoming subscriptions and
un-subscriptions have to be handled by the brokers. Consequently, the impact on the quality
of service, e.g., in terms of throughput and delays, can become significant.
We present in this chapter DynamiK, a key management architecture maintaining
a partial decoupling between the individual publisher and subscriber nodes. We eliminate
the need for subscription resubmission upon a key update by introducing a particular
requirement for the encrypted matching scheme: the ability to perform in-broker subscriptions
re-encryption. Untrusted brokers storing subscriptions can be given a specific token KR
directly related to both the previous and the new encryption key that allows them to update
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encrypted subscriptions in place. Obviously, this token should not permit obtaining the
original or the new encryption key.
We present an implementation of the DynamiK architecture for an existing encrypted
matching scheme, Asymmetric Scalar-product Preserving Encryption (ASPE) [Choi et al.,
2010]. In this purpose we modify the scheme introduced in Section 2.1.2, for which we have
already covered the multidimensional case functionality gaps in Chapter 4. In this chapter we
present a novel set of substantial additions to the original version. We introduce the support
of in-broker subscriptions re-encryption to ASPE and prove that this addition does not allow
deriving the actual encryption keys. This requires changes that also increase the security
of the scheme in its basic form. Note that these changes and related analysis apply on the
multidimensional case of the scheme, but without the optional containment support, and
therefore without the containment additions presented in Chapter 4. Our implementation
integrates with the StreamHub [Barazzutti et al., 2013] content-based pub/sub engine. It takes
advantage of the ZooKeeper coordination service [Hunt et al., 2010] for the key distribution
and synchronization, inheriting its dependability. Finally, we present evaluation results for
our implementation of DynamiK that demonstrate that the key update can be conducted
with a negligible impact on the quality of service.
5.2 Architecture requirements
Key management for pub/sub is considered a difficult challenge to overcome due to the
decoupled nature of communication [Ion et al., 2012,Srivatsa and Liu, 2007]. However, this
disregards a practical side of the problem. Indeed, following the stock exchange example in
Section 1, a host belonging to an investment company that registers a subscription does not
know the exact host that emits publications. However, the investment company does know
from which stock exchange it wants to obtain the publication flow (e.g., New York, London,
etc). Likewise, the stock exchange might charge fees for providing the publication flow to
investment companies. It is often the case that while no direct communication between the
publishers and subscribers themselves exists, there are relations between their respective
domains. This assumption gives the first requirement for our architecture:
Requirement 1: grouping hosts in established security domains for individual subscribers,
publishers and brokers.
Our key dissemination architecture follows a simple and generic model. Each security
domain is administered by a domain manager. A key distribution coordinator handles the
generation and transmission of key information to each domain manager, which distributes
the key information to the individual hosts of the domain. This distribution covers the initial
key dissemination and subsequent key updates in the system (e.g., when a host joins or is
evicted).
Security domains have different levels of trust. Brokers are typically part of an
untrusted security domain. The key is not to be distributed to this domain. However, the
key management architecture supports the disseminating of key update tokens. These tokens
allow brokers to update the encrypted subscriptions they store in place, if the underlying
encryption scheme supports it.
Our architecture model makes available common or correlated key information to
hosts in different domains. A partial decoupling of these hosts is preserved. The model keeps
only a loose coupling at the domain level.
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Our proposal resembles a generic hierarchical secure group communication key man-
agement architecture. In fact, we consider viable to adapt well established secure group
communication key management protocols (e.g., [Wong et al., 2000,Sherman and McGrew,
2003,Perrig et al., 2001]) for key dissemination in pub/sub systems. As mentioned in our
overview in Chapter 2 the idea of adapting such a protocol for pub/sub systems was proposed
in [Bacon et al., 2008] with OFT [Sherman and McGrew, 2003] for key management, but
without support for encrypted matching. In [Li et al., 2004] the authors suggest ELK [Perrig
et al., 2001] as another example but do not develop the idea. We establish the second
requirement of our architecture:
Requirement 2: a secure group communication key management protocol that can be
adapted to the trust assumptions of the pub/sub domain grouping.
A specificity of pub/sub key management is that untrusted domains (containing the
brokers) persistently store encrypted information (the subscriptions). These need to be
updated when there is a key update. We already detailed in Section 5.1 why resubmitting
all subscriptions encrypted with the new key will create an unacceptable burden for the
pub/sub system. We favor a novel approach where the transition from subscriptions encrypted
with a previous key to subscriptions encrypted with the new key is performed directly by
the broker and does not require the subscribers to re-encrypt or re-send the subscriptions
themselves. This requires that the used encrypted matching scheme supports in-broker
subscriptions re-encryption. We detail this operation below. Let us consider EK(S), the
ciphertext obtained by encrypting subscription S with key K using an encrypted matching
algorithm E. The support for in-broker subscriptions re-encryption implies that for two
keys K1 and K2, a function KR = f(K1, K2) can be defined, such that for an encrypted
subscription EK1(S) there exists a transformation τ(EK1(S), KR) = EK2(S). KR is then the
token that is submitted to the brokers to perform the in-place re-encryption. Obviously,
making KR available in an untrusted domain must not disclose any information about the
encryption keys K1 and K2 or the subscription plaintext S. The third requirement is thus:
Requirement 3: support for in-broker subscriptions re-encryption by the encrypted match-
ing scheme.
5.3 The DynamiK key management architecture
In this section we detail DynamiK, our key management architecture for privacy-preserving
pub/sub using encrypted matching. The description corresponds to an actual implementation
that we evaluate in Section 5.5. Each component follows from one of the requirements we set
in the previous section. The architecture is illustrated by Figure 5.1. When applicable, we
also list alternative choices for these components that would also match the requirements.
5.3.1 Grouping the individual hosts in security domains
We consider three security domains: one for subscribers, one for publishers and one for
brokers. The subscribers and publishers domains share the same trust level. They receive the
full key information required to encrypt subscriptions and publications. Brokers do not have
access to the plain messages content and receive just the restricted key update token when
an encryption key is updated in the system, allowing them to re-encrypt the corresponding
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Figure 5.1: DynamiK architecture displaying three distinct domains (note that the generic
model considers the possibility of multiple domains of one type).
stored subscriptions. We emphasize that our key management model allows splitting the
participating hosts in multiple domains using different keys. For simplicity and evaluation
purposes we however limit our implementation and deployment to three domains.
5.3.2 The secure group communication key management protocol
We develop a simple protocol for key dissemination that fits our architecture requirements. The
main purpose of this protocol is to offer an example instance of our model that provides support
for in-broker subscriptions re-encryption. Our implementation leverages the dependable
ZooKeeper [Hunt et al., 2010] coordination service.
Preliminaries
We define the entities participating in our protocol:
• KDC - a central key distribution coordinator ;
• KDMs, KDMp, KDMb - three key domain managers for subscribers, publishers, and
brokers, respectively;
• the individual hosts in each domain.
The KDC maintains a set of cryptographic contexts, which represent the information
attached to a key, and in particular the various forms that a key can take for different types of
users: publication encryption key for publishers, subscription encryption key for subscribers
and the key update token for brokers.
We define a secure pub/sub chain as a set of publisher-broker-subscriber security
domains passed by pub/sub data encrypted using the same cryptographic context. For
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example, when an investment company registers encrypted subscriptions to a pub/sub broker
service for encrypted publications emitted by a stock exchange, the three domains form a
secure pub/sub chain. The KDC keeps the mapping from cryptographic contexts to secure
pub/sub chains where these are used. A domain can be part of multiple secure pub/sub
chains, and therefore use multiple cryptographic contexts.
Service reliability
Our implementation relies on the ZooKeeper [Hunt et al., 2010] coordination service.
ZooKeeper simplifies the synchronization of distributed applications. It offers to the nodes of
a distributed system access to a shared namespace organized hierarchically, similarly to a file
system. ZooKeeper uses an ACL system to control the access to the shared configuration
data. One of the features of ZooKeeper is the support for watches, that allow a client to be
notified when there is an update (including creation and deletion) to a particular datum in
the namespace. The KDC and the KDMs use watches to disseminate information to the
other entities in the hierarchy, both for sharing keys and for notifications and synchronization
of the key update protocol.
The first reason for using ZooKeeper is making the key management system highly-
available. ZooKeeper provides dependability and consistency guarantees by replicating the
state over multiple servers and ensuring update linearizability. All the state used for the
protocol is stored in ZooKeeper. If the KDC or one of the KDMs crash while executing
the protocol for key distribution, they can be restarted, read their last configuration from
ZooKeeper and resume the key update. The second reason is the ease and facilities offered by
the synchronization API in coordinating the action of the entities involved in the protocol.
Key distribution
The KDC distributes the key information in a cryptographic context to the KDMs in the
secure pub/sub chain using that context. The particular key given to each KDM depends
on the domain: a specific pub/sub encryption key to KDMp and KDMs and the key update
token to KDMb. The KDC encrypts the distributed key with the KDM’s public key. In a
practical scenario, the number of domains in a secure pub/sub chain is limited. This makes
feasible to use individual public key encryption in the KDC to KDM distribution.
Further, the KDMs distribute the retrieved key information to the hosts in their security
domain. In our current implementation, we simply consider intra-domain communication
secure (e.g., the hosts are isolated in a network that is private to that domain). The intra-
domain distribution could take different forms depending on the use case, optimization needs
and security requirements (e.g., by adapting other secure protocols [Sherman and McGrew,
2003,Perrig et al., 2001] for key dissemination).
We describe next the key distribution steps when there is an update for an existing
key. The process for the initial key distribution is similar. A key update can be triggered
by a KDM joining or leaving a secure pub/sub chain, by an explicit request from a KDM
(e.g., when a individual host in the KDM’s domain gets corrupted and has to be evicted), or
simply as a periodical key refresh.
During a key update, the brokers maintain a transitional state and keep the subscrip-
tions encrypted with the old key along with the ones encrypted with the new key. When
in-broker subscriptions re-encryption is supported by the encrypted matching scheme, the
brokers generate the second set using the key update token (including for subscriptions
received during the key update phase). Otherwise, the protocol requires all subscribers to
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Figure 5.2: Illustration the DynamiK key update protocol.
re-encrypt and re-send their subscriptions. The protocol guarantees the consistency between
the version of encryption keys in use at the publisher’s side and the stored encrypted sub-
scriptions. The old set of subscriptions is removed when the key update phase ends and the
publishers have been notified of the new key. The transitional state ensures that the pub/sub
service is continuously functional, which is essential for critical applications. As evaluated in
Section 5.5, the time to maintain the transitional state is consistently reduced by the third
component of our system: the in-broker subscriptions re-encryption.
We describe below the complete key update protocol phase. The sequence of steps
is provided below and illustrated in Figure 5.2. Each step is executed in parallel by the
involved entities. The implementation of the protocol is solely based on interactions through
the ZooKeeper coordination service. Reaction to new data (e.g., when a new key is available
at step 2) or joining mechanisms (e.g., when the KDC waits upon KDMs to complete a
distribution) are implemented by the use of ZooKeeper watches on the corresponding datum
in the shared namespace.
• Step 1) The KDC sets an updated flag. Through previously set watches, all KDMs
and KDMb are notified of a new key availability. The key information (the new key
itself or the key update token) is stored in the ZooKeeper namespace. It is encrypted
with the corresponding KDMs’s public keys.
• Step 2) All KDMs and KDMb retrieve and decrypt the new key information. They
disseminate the key information in their domain.
• Step 3) Subscribers obtain the new key. They start using it in encryption, and notify
the KDMs. Brokers obtain the key update token. They start re-encrypting the stored
subscriptions. They keep both the new and the old subscriptions sets in a transitional
state. When the re-encryption is finished, they notify the KDMs.
• Step 4) When they have been notified by all hosts in their domains, KDMs and KDMb
notify the KDC through creating a retrieved flag.
• Step 5) The KDC waits for retrieval of retrieved flags from all KDMs and KDMb.
Then, it sets an updated flag to notify all KDMp about the new key.
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• Step 6) Each KDMp retrieves and decrypts the new key information. It notifies the
publishers in its domain.
• Step 7) Publishers obtain the new key. They start using it in encryption, and notify
their KDMp.
• Step 8) Each KDMp waits for notification from all publishers in its domain. It then
sets a retrieved flag.
• Step 9) The KDC waits for the retrieved flag notifications from all KDMp. In turn, it
notifies the KDMbs through a validated flag.
• Step 10) The KDMbs are notified of the validated flag. They notify the brokers in
their domains. This triggers the end of the transitional state and the deletion of old
subscriptions sets.
Since step 3 is executed in parallel at both subscriber and broker hosts, it might
happen that a broker receives a subscription encrypted with an old key after the stored
subscriptions have already been re-encrypted. We handle this case by allowing the broker to
re-encrypt on-the-fly such subscriptions and storing them along the others.
The protocol guarantees that publications encrypted with the new key are sent only
after all stored subscriptions are in the new re-encrypted form. Also, subscriptions encrypted
with the old key are removed only after the publisher hosts start using the new key. However,
due to network asynchrony, it might happen that some publications encrypted with an older
key are delayed and arrive at the broker after the subscriptions encrypted with the old key
have been removed. To avoid this problem, we make an assumption on a bound of such
asynchrony and maintain the transitional state for a short additional time (typically, less
than a second).
5.3.3 In-broker subscriptions re-encryption
As defined in Section 5.2, the third requirement of our architecture model is that the encrypted
matching scheme supports in-broker subscriptions re-encryption. We require a scheme that
permits obtaining a key update token KR that can be used in a transformation τ allowing
the untrusted brokers to securely re-encrypt the stored subscriptions. The scheme we selected
is Asymmetric Scalar-product Preserving Encryption (ASPE) [Choi et al., 2010]. We first
overviewed ASPE in Chapter 2. The original published scheme does not support in-broker
subscriptions re-encryption. We have however been able to extend ASPE to support it. In
Section 5.4, we prove that this modification to ASPE does not only keep the security strength
of the original scheme, but that we were also able to improve its resilience against the attacks
on which it was first analyzed.
The original pub/sub adapted ASPE published version [Choi et al., 2010] is focused
on the restrictive unidimensional case. We have already thoroughly covered ASPE multidi-
mensional case in Chapter 4 filling gaps in the published version. Therefore, in our work of
extending ASPE for in-broker subscription re-encryption we refer to the multidimensional
ASPE, which complies better with a practical scenario. For continuity purposes we summarize
in the following the description of this case, detailed in Section 4.1 of Chapter 4.
The number of attributes in a publication, and the maximum number of subscription
constraints on these attributes is d. Each value vi of a constraint is encapsulated in an
intermediary subscription point Si = (s1, s2, . . . , vi, . . . , sd). The all other dimensions except
vi are randomly set. Si1 = (q1, q2, . . . , vi−ri, . . . , qd) and Si2 = (q1, q2, . . . , vi+ri, . . . , qd) are
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two reference subscription points chosen symmetrically at random and at equal distance ri
from Si. The ri values are private parameters in the scheme. P designates a multidimensional
publication and q a positive random scaling factor added for security purposes. ASPE uses
as key K on the subscriber’s side the transpose of an invertible matrix MT , and on the
publisher’s side the matrix inverse M−1. As detailed in Section 4.1, points Si1, Si2 and P are
encrypted as:
S ′Ki1 = EK(Si1) = M
T (Si1,−0.5 ‖ Si1 ‖)T
S ′Ki2 = EK(Si2) = M
T (Si2,−0.5 ‖ Si2 ‖)T
P ′K = EK(P ) = M
−1q(P, 1)T
The target is to obtain an expression on Di = dist(Si1, P )−dist(Si2, P ), which can
be used to check the matching between a constraint value vi and the publication P . In that
purpose, an untrusted broker receives S ′Ki1, S
′
Ki2 and P
′
K , and evaluates:
(S ′Ki2−S ′Ki1)P ′K = 0.5qDi. (5.1)
Hardened ASPE
Our first contribution is to increase the scheme resilience to the attacks considered in [Wong
et al., 2009,Choi et al., 2010]. We enforce the rule that the subscriber computes on its own
the difference S ′Ki = S
′
Ki2−S ′Ki1, and submits S ′Ki to the brokers, instead of S ′Ki2 and S ′Ki1
as proposed in the original scheme. We discuss the security and practical implications of
hardened ASPE in Section 5.4.
ASPE with in-broker subscriptions re-encryption
Our second contribution is the support for in-broker subscriptions re-encryption. The
subscription encryption key in ASPE is a matrix MT . Let us consider a key K1 = M
T and
a key K2 = N
T . We want a key update token KR and a transformation τ that using KR
re-encrypts a subscription encrypted with K1 into the same subscription encrypted with K2.
A constraint value vi in a subscription S encrypted with K1 has the form
S ′K1i = S
′
K1i2
−S ′K1i1 = MT ((Si2,−0.5 ‖ Si2 ‖)−(Si1,−0.5 ‖ Si1 ‖))T . (5.2)
The same encryption using K2 results in
S ′K2i = S
′
K2i2
−S ′K2i1 = NT ((Si2,−0.5 ‖ Si2 ‖)−(Si1,−0.5 ‖ Si1 ‖))T . (5.3)
From (5.2) and (5.3), we observe that only MT and NT change when the key is updated, while
the rest of the expression remains the same. Thus, the key update token is KR , NTMT
−1
,
and the transformation τ is
S ′K2i = KRS
′
K1i
. (5.4)
For extra obfuscation and for rescaling the matrix elements, the new key matrix
NT can be multiplied with a random value r′ before distributing KR to the brokers. This
results in KR , (NT r′)MT
−1
. The scaling does not impact the matching correctness, and
subsequent key updates are completely independent of the previous random factors. We
prove the security of the obtained ASPE in-broker subscriptions re-encryption in Section 5.4.
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5.4 Security analysis
As we have already discussed in Section 2.1.1 encrypted matching schemes used in pub/sub
differ significantly from typical encryption algorithms. Encrypted matching schemes do not
necessarily feature a decryption algorithm, and there is no specific model in the literature for
evaluating the security of such schemes. The authors of [Raiciu and Rosenblum, 2006] argue
that the indistinguishability that can be obtained between encrypted messages is limited by
the matching possibility itself. This directly restricts the usage of typical indistinguishability
game proofs considered for attacks where the attacker has the power to actively choose either
the plaintext or the ciphertext. The security level achieved is typically lower than active
attacks, and it is limited to passive models, where the matching result between encrypted
messages is an acceptable leak.
The security analysis on the original ASPE scheme, initially proposed in [Wong et al.,
2009] for secure kNN queries, covers three attack levels:
• Level 1: the attacker can access only the ciphertexts set C (ciphertext only attack —
COA);
• Level 2: the attacker knows C and a subset of plaintext messages P, but not the exact
correspondence between P and the corresponding subset in C;
• Level 3: the attacker knows the exact correspondence between the plaintext set P and
a subset I of the ciphertexts set C (known plaintext attack — KPA).
The analysis in [Wong et al., 2009] concludes that the scheme is not secure against a
Level 3 attack, the attacker being able to form and solve a system of equations that allows
obtaining the key. The ASPE adaptation for pub/sub in [Choi et al., 2010] mostly relies on
the previous evaluation, without conducting any extra analysis.
5.4.1 Hardened ASPE security
We analyze the security of the hardened ASPE scheme introduced in Section 5.3.3. We
follow the same methodology presented in [Wong et al., 2009]. We consider as encryption
key the matrix MT with elements mi,j. ri is the random distance used in the encryption
of each constraint as described in Section 5.3.3, and d is the number of attributes in the
messages. Let us assume that the attacker has Level 3 knowledge of the mapping between
each plaintext value vi in a constraint and its ciphertext S
′
Ki = (e1i, e2i, . . . , e(d+1)i). From
this correspondence and from S ′Ki = S
′
Ki2−S ′Ki1, for each vi the attacker can form the system
2ri(m1,i−vim1,d+1) = e1i;
. . .
2ri(md+1,i−vimd+1,d+1) = e(d+1)i.
(5.5)
By solving for ri in each equation, the system can be rewritten as
e1i
m1,i−vim1,d+1 =
e2i
m2,i−vim2,d+1 = · · · =
e(d+1)i
md+1,i−vimd+1,d+1 . (5.6)
The terms in (5.6) can be paired in individual equations of the form
ejimk,i−ejivimk,d+1−ekimj,i+ekivimj,d+1 = 0. (5.7)
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The total number of such equations per constraint is
(
d+1
2
)
, which corresponds to all possible
combinations of the matrix rows k and j. The unknowns are the elements of the i-th and
d+1-th columns of the matrix key MT .
An attacker can form an extended system with the complete sets of equations obtained
in this manner for each constraint value vi in a subscription. Given that a complete
subscription covering all the attributes has d constraints, the total number of equations in
this system is d
(
d+1
2
)
. The unknowns are all the (d+1)2 elements of the matrix key. For the
same key target, the attacker can further augment the system by adding equations from
multiple subscriptions for which the mapping between the plaintext and ciphertext is known.
No matter how many subscriptions are in possession of the attacker, we can observe
the following. The system is composed of equations having the form of (5.7), which has no
free term. Therefore, the system is linear and homogenous. Consequently, the system has at
least one solution for the unknown key, i.e., the all-zero matrix. We also know that this is
not the only solution, since the key matrix cannot be null. It follows that the solution for the
unknown key is the nullspace of the system’s coefficient matrix. A nullspace determines an
infinity of individual solutions (although having a specific structure) [Strang, 2009]. Therefore,
an attacker cannot determine the key with the information given by the system.
The authors of [Wong et al., 2009] follow the same reasoning for the original ASPE
scheme by forming a system of equations that can be solved by a Level 3 attack (KPA);
the attack is also valid for the pub/sub adapted ASPE version presented in [Choi et al.,
2010]. In both cases, the system of equations can be solved because the brokers are given
two separate vectors S ′Ki1 and S
′
Ki2 instead of only S
′
Ki = S
′
Ki1−S ′Ki2 as we propose. It
should be noted that if a random value used in encryption is leaked (ri in (5.5)), then a
Level 3 attacker can solve our system like it can solve the scheme from [Choi et al., 2010].
However, guessing a random value used in encryption can be critical also in other schemes
(e.g., in [Nabeel et al., 2012] the encryption mechanism uses two random values that must be
kept private). Our hardened ASPE thus provides a greater level of security than the original
scheme, adding resilience against Level 3 attacks, while the original scheme does not. A
drawback of the increased security is that the broker cannot determine containment between
encrypted subscriptions anymore (e.g., if a subscription like value > 100 is more general than
value > 300). While it can improve the matching performance, as we have seen in Chapter 3
containment support is however not desirable from a security point-of-view as it may allow
inferring the nature of subscriptions based on knowledge of their definition domain.
5.4.2 In-broker subscriptions re-encryption security
We now analyze the security impact of the extension to ASPE for supporting in-broker
subscriptions re-encryption. We recall that a key update implies sending to the brokers the
matrix product KR = (N
T r′)MT
−1
. To simplify the discussion, and without loss of generality,
we consider r′ = 1 in the following. Each element of MT
−1
can be expressed using the terms in
the original key: MT
−1
= adj(M
T )
|MT | , where adj(M
T ) is the adjugate, and |MT | the determinant
of MT . Let NT (i) and KTR(i) be the i
th column of the matrices NT and KTR , respectively. We
also write [0]d+1 to denote the null square matrix of size d+1. From the definition of K
T
R , it
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follows that
adj(MT )T [0]d+1 . . . [0]d+1
[0]d+1 adj(M
T )T . . . [0]d+1
. . .
[0]d+1 [0]d+1 . . . adj(M
T )T


NT (1)
NT (2)
. . .
NT (d+1)
 =

KTR(1)|MT |
KTR(2)|MT |
. . .
KTR(d+1)|MT |
 . (5.8)
This expression corresponds to the system of equations that can be formed by an
attacker. If aj,k and tj,k are respectively the elements of adj(M
T ) and KR, the system of
equations can be written as
a1,1n1,1+a2,1n1,2+ . . . +ad+1,1n1,d+1 = t1,1|MT |;
a1,2n1,1+a2,2n1,2+ . . . +ad+1,2n1,d+1 = t1,2|MT |;
. . .
a1,d+1nd+1,1+a2,d+1nd+1,2+ . . . +ad+1,d+1nd+1,d+1 = td+1,d+1|MT |.
(5.9)
For a given instance of the old key MT and considering the elements of the new key
NT as unknowns, we can observe that (5.9) is a linear system. This illustrates that for each
solution that an attacker might obtain for MT , he can obtain a specific dependent solution
for NT . As proved before, the set of solutions for MT in case of a Level 3 attack is expressed
through a nullspace form and is of infinite size. Hence, without a solution for MT , an attacker
cannot determine the dependent solution for NT (and vice versa).
The security of in-broker subscriptions re-encryption support for ASPE thus depends
on the security of the original ASPE scheme and does not impact it. An attacker might try to
prune the search space for MT by eliminating cases where (5.9) has no solution for NT , but
this is not possible since we can prove that for every matrix MT , (5.9) has a nonzero solution
for NT . The coefficient matrix of system (5.9) is the first term in expression (5.8), which is a
diagonal block matrix. Its determinant is the product of the determinants of the diagonal
blocks adj(MT )T . Since MT is invertible, we know that the determinant of adj(MT )T is
nonzero. It follows that the determinant of the coefficient matrix in system (5.9) is nonzero,
which proves that a nonzero solution exists for NT .
Our solution maintains the same level of security as the original scheme against a
direct attempt to determine a key. However, we are aware that the proposed ASPE in-broker
subscriptions re-encryption presents issues in regard to forward secrecy. More precisely, if one
key MT is leaked, then an attacker having access to an untrusted broker can try to obtain the
key NT from MT and KR = (N
T r′)MT
−1
. The r′ random scaling factor obfuscates the exact
value of the new key, adding some resilience against obtaining it. Optionally, for increased
security, a key update can be periodically performed by distributing the key only to trusted
parties without using the in-broker subscriptions re-encryption. This will require subscription
resubmission, but since this is a background operation, it can be done at a slower pace and
without strict constraints on the key update duration. The transitional state design described
in Section 5.3 applies also to this case, thus if the re-subscriptions flow do not overwhelm the
brokers, the delays of processing publications shall remain unaffected.
In case of a Level 2 attack, the attacker knows a subset of plaintext messages, but
not the correspondence between these and the ciphertexts. The original ASPE scheme is
analyzed in such conditions by [Wong et al., 2009] against a brute-force attack. This relies
on solving equation systems, formed similarly to the case discussed for Level 3, but on a
trial-and-error basis. Due to the search space, the attack is considered unfeasible by [Wong
et al., 2009] even if the systems can be solved. In our hardened ASPE, the corresponding
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systems of equations do not provide an exact solution for the key. Therefore, the resilience
against a Level 2 attack is increased.
5.5 Evaluation
We present in this section the evaluation of the DynamiK key management architecture.
Our implementation targets the StreamHub [Barazzutti et al., 2013, Heinze et al., 2014]
content-based pub/sub engine. StreamHub aims at filtering at high-throughput and with
low delays. It was designed for deployment on public clouds and for using encrypted
matching. StreamHub splits the pub/sub service in three successive operations: partitioning,
matching and notification. It maps these operations to a chain of operators deployed on
a stream processing engine. Each operator is deployed over several machines and its load
is partitioned. The central operation, matching, maps to the Matcher operator. The
Matcher stores subscriptions and matches publications against them using ASPE with in-
broker subscriptions re-encryption. We also equip the Matcher operator instance with the
ZooKeeper-based key management system presented in Section 5.3. Our implementation is
done in C++ and for the key exchange protocol uses the Crypto++ and ZooKeeper libraries.1
We deploy the system on 12 nodes each with 8 Xeon cores at 2.4 GHz and 8 GB of memory.
Six nodes are dedicated to the key management infrastructure: KDC, KDMs, and ZooKeeper
server replicas. Six nodes support the StreamHub operators, among which 3 where we deploy
15 instances of the Matcher that perform the filtering in parallel.2 Each of these Matcher
instances corresponds to a broker in the DynamiK model terminology. The remaining nodes
are used for workload injection. We emulate the set of subscribers and one publisher on
a single host. The main purpose of our evaluation is to exemplify the critical advantage
brought by the in-broker subscriptions re-encryption in DynamiK, and the impact on the
service quality of the pub/sub engine itself.
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Figure 5.3: Impact of a key update on the notification delay.
We start by evaluating the impact of a key update on the pub/sub engine performance,
when in-broker subscriptions re-encryption is enabled. We use a constant flow of 500
publications per second. The system stores 5,000 subscriptions replicated on the 15 Matcher
instances. We use a synthetic workload of subscriptions and publications, each with 4
1http://www.cryptopp.com/ and http://zookeeper.apache.org/
2The subscriptions are replicated on all Matchers and we split the incoming flow of publications. Such
approach is possible, as considered in [Barazzutti et al., 2012a]. It is also possible to do the opposite, as
detailed in [Barazzutti et al., 2013].
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constraints or attributes. Each incoming publication matches 0.2% of the stored subscriptions,
triggering 10 notifications. We trigger a key update when sending the 138th publication.
Figure 5.3 presents the delay between the emission of a publication and the reception of the
first notification. The total key update time represents the time measured at the central KDC
for the duration of the entire key update phase across all domains. The brokers key update
time is the time measured at the broker domain’s KDM for the protocol phases that involve
this domain, starting with a key update notification trigger, up to the final confirmation of
deleting the previous-key encrypted subscriptions. In this experiment the total time for the
key update is 184 ms, with 120 ms specifically for the protocol steps involving the broker
domain.
The impact of the in-broker subscriptions re-encryption on the experienced delay in
normal conditions is present, but minimal. The 60 publications processed during the key
update phase involving the brokers have a median notification delay of 7.13 ms (average
8.05 ms, dev. 2.6 ms) compared to the median notification delay of 4.7 ms (average 4.7 ms,
dev. 1.24 ms) for the 160 publications that follow the key update.
Figure 5.4: Impact of subscriptions set size on key update time.
In Figure 5.4, we present the impact of the number of subscriptions stored at the
brokers on the key update time, from 1 subscription to 50,000 subscriptions. The in-broker
subscriptions re-encryption requires a linear time as expected, but is able to re-encrypt a
massive number of subscriptions in less than half a second. This is orders of magnitude
less than the time it would take to all subscribers to re-encrypt and re-submit the same set.
We actually emulate such a situation with 5,000 subscriptions when in-broker subscriptions
re-encryption is disabled. In this case, the subscribers need to re-encrypt and re-send.
We emulate the limitation at the transport layer by capping the bandwidth at a maximal
number of subscriptions sent per second. When the key update is triggered, the workload
injection machine emulates the resubmission by re-encrypting and sending 100, 250 and
500 subscriptions per second. We present the measured notification delays and the total
key update time in Figure 5.5. The key update time is now completely dominated by the
time required for subscribers to re-send their subscriptions. If the key update is triggered
to revoke a previously authorized subscriber, the revocation may only be effective after
several seconds. This leaves a much longer window of opportunity to an attacker than when
using in-broker subscriptions re-encryption. Another important aspect is the impact on the
measured notification delays. This depends on the rate of received re-subscriptions. Due to
the large number of publications processed during the key update, we present the median of
the notification delays rather than all actual times as we did for Figure 5.3. The increase in
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Figure 5.5: Key update impact without in-broker subscriptions re-encryption.
notification delay results from the extra load imposed by the re-subscriptions, which have
to be processed by the Matchers. It illustrates the tradeoff between the total key update
time and its impact on the service performance. Trying to minimize the key update time by
increasing the re-subscription rate adds a clear negative impact on notification delivery time.
Using in-broker subscriptions re-encryption is clearly a better approach in this respect.
The above evaluation targets the impact of the in-broker subscriptions re-encryption
in the distribution protocol, which is the main innovative contribution of our model and
implementation. However, the simplification of emulating the set of subscribers and the
publisher on a single host impacts the overall system key dissemination time by abstracting
the group dissemination time for the subscribers set. In a real large-scale deployment, this
time will depend on the number of subscribers and their transport links characteristics.3
We present the evaluation of the time taken by the key dissemination protocol when using
multiple hosts, including multiple subscribers, in Figure 5.6.
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Figure 5.6: Key distribution time.
To highlight the costs of the entire protocol itself each broker stores only 1 subscription.
In-broker subscriptions re-encryption takes negligible time. The increase in time for a key
update resulting from an increase in the number of hosts is limited: only up to 6 ms per
added host. We observe in our evaluation that the key distribution time is dominated by the
largest domain group. This is the reason why the variations obtained for 30 subscribers with
5, 10, and 15 brokers are not significant (in the range of 20 ms). We believe that splitting the
3External protocols [Sherman and McGrew, 2003, Perrig et al., 2001] can be adapted to optimize the
distribution.
88
domains into smaller groups might provide an interesting tradeoff in terms of performance
but leave this investigation for future work.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter we presented DynamiK, a novel key management architecture for privacy-
preserving pub/sub systems. Our solution addresses two important constraints associated
with pub/sub key management. In terms of design, we preserve a partial decoupling between
publishers and subscribers. In terms of performance and practicality, we are the first to
take in account the problem of subscription resubmission when the key is updated. We
propose the in-broker subscriptions re-encryption, a solution that eliminates the need for
subscribers to re-encrypt and re-send their subscriptions upon such a key update. We add a
novel mechanism for the ASPE encrypted matching scheme [Choi et al., 2010] to support this
feature, as well as additional security strengthening. Our implementation of the key update
protocol leverages the support of the ZooKeeper [Hunt et al., 2010] coordination service and
is instantiated for the StreamHub [Barazzutti et al., 2013] high-performance pub/sub engine.
Our model is generic enough to fit other schemes that could be extended to support
in-broker subscriptions re-encryption, such as RASP [Xu et al., 2014]. We will investigate
this possibility. Our future work also includes the integration of encrypted matching and the
DynamiK key management architecture with secure group communication protocols that fit
our model requirements [Sherman and McGrew, 2003,Perrig et al., 2001]. This can lead to
performance improvements, especially when domains grow large.
We finally consider that our work could be a first step in a larger-scale agenda of
research for key management protocols adapted to scenarios where key-dependent encrypted
queries are stored in untrusted domains and need to be updated in-place upon a key update.
Pub/sub is not the only context where using encrypted and persistent queries in untrusted
domains makes sense. Operators of Complex Event Processing (CEP) engines and active
databases in general could also benefit from similar techniques, using other encrypted
processing techniques (e.g., searchable symmetric encryption [Curtmola et al., 2006]).
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and open directions
This thesis is focused on techniques for supporting confidential publish/subscribe. In
Chapter 1, we identified two main research directions for providing pub/sub confidentiality.
The first direction is to allow an untrusted party (the broker) to perform the matching
operation over encrypted publications and encrypted subscriptions. For this, the schemes
used follow a specific paradigm, which we named encrypted matching. The second direction
is towards security models, where providing confidentiality is facilitated by access control
mechanisms establishing functions and rights for the system entities. We reviewed existing
work in Chapter 2. The recent amount of research and advances proves that confidentiality in
pub/sub systems is a topic of high interest. Nevertheless, we can also observe gaps, especially
related to functionality support or performance drawbacks. We attempt to cover these in our
work and, as discussed in the introduction, we specifically target solving issues in solutions
based on encrypted matching. Our work is not completely separate, however, from the design
of security models. Combining existing solutions that target different issues is just one of the
open directions in pub/sub confidentiality research, which we summarize in the following.
Key management
No existing confidentiality-preserving pub/sub solution comes with a key management proce-
dure that is practically viable. Each presents unsolved key management challenges.
The first challenge lies in the fundamental decoupling of publish/subscribe: publishers
do not know the destination of the publications, and subscribers do not know their origin.
This represents a major issue for the necessary exchange of common needed key information
between parties. We saw that solutions based on attribute-based encryption (ABE), such
as [Ion et al., 2012,Tariq et al., 2010], could partially overcome this problem by associating
keys with messages instead of associating them with system nodes. However, even with
this strategy, a trusted authority is required to provide some common information to the
participants. As we did in the solution presented in Chapter 5, one way to address this problem
is to consider weaker decoupling assumptions, which is reasonable for several applications, like
the stock exchange scenario we presented. The idea is that the host-to-host pub/sub is still
decoupled, but the association between publisher and subscriber domains is known. In this
loosely decoupled setting it might be possible to adapt standard key management solutions
for secure group communication. We proposed as an example a simple protocol based on
public key encryption, and using ZooKeeper [Hunt et al., 2010] to ensure availability. As
referenced in Chapter 5 existing secure group management protocols such as OFT (One-way
Function Trees) [Sherman and McGrew, 2003] or ELK [Perrig et al., 2001] might be adapted
for pub/sub. A reason for this is to address further issues like scalability in case of large
client numbers. Secure group key management is a complex research area spanning a variety
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of techniques and protocol architectures [Rafaeli and Hutchison, 2003, Zou et al., 2005].
Adapting secure group communication for pub/sub systems seems nevertheless promising
and should be studied further.
Another key management challenge, that we considered in Chapter 5 is the key update
problem in the context of encrypted matching schemes. The untrusted brokers store encrypted
subscriptions on which they must perform matching operations, making the key update
problematic. When publishers use the new key to encrypt the publications, matching over
subscriptions stored by the broker but still encrypted with an older key does not work.
The naive solution is that at each key update, the subscribers resubmit their subscriptions
re-encrypted with the new key, which is prohibitive for large systems. This prevents the
successful deployment of confidentiality preserving pub/sub systems in critical environments.
We have introduced modifications to the ASPE [Choi et al., 2010] encrypted matching scheme
in Chapters 4 and 5, through which this problem is solved by a support technique we named
in-broker subscription re-encryption. We believe a similar approach can be taken in case of
other encrypted matching schemes. In particular we consider the adaptation of RASP [Xu
et al., 2014] for pub/sub, for supporting this functionality. Searching ways to adapt other
schemes, possibly more advantageous in terms of performance or functionality is an attactive
direction of further development.
Confidentiality, performance and functional limitations
Some schemes, like ABE-based used for payload encryption, have intrinsic confidentiality
limitations under certain conditions. These can leak information since keys, associated with
message content, can be assigned to individual constraints. Consider a subscriber who is
authorized to receive publications about the two subscriptions (patient = “John” ∧ injury
cause = “car accident”) and (patient name = “Smith” ∧ injury cause = “fall”). If the
keys are associated to each attribute (a typical ABE based design), then the subscriber can
also decrypt the publication (patient = “John”, injury cause = “fall”) for which it is not
authorized. This situation was first observed by [Tariq et al., 2010], and to our knowledge they
are the only by now who took it into account. To avoid such cases, the encryption scheme
should be capable of binding multiple attribute keys into one single key per subscription.
The presence of this issue still remains to be investigated for other schemes that use ABE.
Other schemes also face performance/confidentiality tradeoffs. For instance, encrypted
matching is currently significantly slower than plaintext matching. Optimization tools
exploiting subscription containment can be developed to speed up the process. Unfortunately,
if containment over encrypted subscriptions is not permitted for confidentiality reasons, then
these tools cannot be used. One way to mitigate this problem is to use a security model
allowing to keep some of the data in plaintext, however, this can only be used for non-sensitive
data. We have presented our take on the problem with the prefiltering solution developed
in Chapter 3. Our solution, based on an additional Bloom filter encoding, quickly rejects a
fraction of the non-matching publications before using the costly encrypted matching. The
mechanism presents an attractive tradeoff between performance increases and confidentiality
leaks. While efficient encrypted matching is a straightforward goal in the ongoing research,
there exists also a side of the problem that relates with the scheme design. More precisely it is
desirable that an encrypted matching scheme uses a modular architecture, where containment
is optional (most of the schemes actually do this: [Choi et al., 2010,Raiciu and Rosenblum,
2006,Nabeel et al., 2012], but there are some which do not, e.g., [Tariq et al., 2010]). This
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way, containment information can be leveraged to improve matching performance in selective
cases, when confidentiality requirements are less stringent.
Besides the mentioned confidentiality and performance issues, encrypted matching
schemes often present also limitations in the expressiveness of the supported encrypted
subscriptions. For instance, string constraints and numerical inequalities are currently not
supported in many of the schemes overviewed in Section 2.1.2. We believe that a promising
path to overcome this issue is to investigate the possibility to adapt techniques developed for
encrypted queries on databases [Kamara, 2013].
Attack model limitations
Most of the techniques using encrypted matching consider confidentiality threats under the
passive honest-but-curious model. In practice, malicious entities might actively attack the
pub/sub system. For instance, a malicious subscriber can try to corrupt several brokers
on the public cloud and mount attacks using the capabilities of the colluded set of entities
under his control. Although some of the schemes we overviewed in Chapter 2 discuss how to
mitigate some active attacks [Ion et al., 2012,Choi et al., 2010], the overall resilience against
these threats is currently poorly understood and should be studied further. In this regard,
the security models overviewed in Section 2.2 are more flexible, since they are not typically
constrained to a specific cryptographic algorithm and can use classic schemes proven secure
for a wider range of scenarios.
Besides confidentiality provisioning, it is essential to consider the integrity of the
pub/sub messages and the overall availability of the system, which are often targeted by
active attacks. There is very little work done about these important topics in the context of
secure pub/sub, and we think that they could be studied further.
Toward security models with encrypted matching
To conclude our work, we have to admit that providing confidentiality in a pub/sub architec-
ture without encrypted matching seems more easier than with encrypted matching, since
well-established security models can be used that rely on thoroughly tested classic encryption
algorithms. However, without encrypted matching, the routing capabilities which are the very
core of content-based pub/sub systems are significantly decreased. In our humble opinion,
this current state of affair is only temporary.
The goal of homomorphic encryption is to do useful processing on encrypted data
without leaking sensitive information. This is a problem much more general than its application
in pub/sub, and a very active field of research more relevant than ever with the advent of
cloud computing. Unless most interesting encrypted matching applications for pub/sub can
be proven to be intrinsically non confidential (we think this is highly improbable), it is clear
for us that the numerous benefits of encrypted matching will encourage researchers to keep
working on this problem. As new algorithms are developed and potential attacks are studied,
encrypted matching will be integrated in good security models and pub/sub will become an
attractive solution for a large number of real-life applications.
93

Bibliography
Adi, A., Botzer, D., Nechushtai, G., and Sharon, G. (2006). Complex event processing for financial
services. In Proceedings of IEEE Services Computing Workshops, SCW, pages 7–12, Chicago, USA.
IEEE Computer Society.
Andrews, G. E. (1998). The Theory of Partitions. Cambridge Mathematical Library.
Astley, M., Auerbach, J., Bhola, S., Buttner, G., Kaplan, M., Miller, K., Robert Saccone, J., Strom,
R., Sturman, D. C., Ward, M. J., and Zhao, Y. (2004). Achieving scalability and throughput in a
publish/subscribe system. Research Report RC23103, IBM.
Bacon, J., Eyers, D., Moody, K., and Pesonen, L. I. W. (2005). Securing publish/subscribe for multi-
domain systems. In Proceedings of the ACM/IFIP/USENIX International Conference on Middleware,
Middleware, pages 1–20, Grenoble, France. Springer-Verlag.
Bacon, J., Eyers, D., Singh, J., Shand, B., Migliavacca, M., and Pietzuch, P. (2010). Security in multi-
domain event-based systems. it - Information Technology, 51(5):277–284.
Bacon, J., Eyers, D. M., Singh, J., and Pietzuch, P. R. (2008). Access control in publish/subscribe systems.
In Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Distributed event-based systems, DEBS, pages
23–34, Rome, Italy. ACM.
Bacon, J., Moody, K., and Yao, W. (2002). A model of oasis role-based access control and its support for
active security. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 5(4):492–540.
Barazzutti, R., Felber, P., Mercier, H., Onica, E., Pineau, J.-F., Rivie`re, E., and Fetzer, C. (2012a).
Infrastructure provisioning for scalable content-based routing: Framework and analysis. In Network
Computing and Applications (NCA), 2012 11th IEEE International Symposium on, NCA.
Barazzutti, R., Felber, P., Mercier, H., Onica, E., and Rivie`re, E. (2012b). Thrifty privacy: Efficient support
for privacy-preserving publish/subscribe. In Proceedings of the 6th ACM International Conference on
Distributed Event-Based Systems, DEBS.
Barazzutti, R. P., Felber, P., Fetzer, C., Onica, E., Pasin, M., Pineau, J.-F., Rivie`re, E., and Weigert, S.
(2013). Streamhub: A massively parallel architecture for high-performance content-based publish/sub-
scribe. In Proceedings of the 7th ACM International Conference on Distributed Event-Based Systems,
DEBS’13, Arlington, TX, USA.
Bellare, M., Canetti, R., and Krawczyk, H. (1996). Keying hash functions for message authentication. In
16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology, CRYPTO.
Bellare, M., Rogaway, P., and Wagner, D. (2003). Eax: A conventional authenticated-encryption mode.
Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2003/069. http://eprint.iacr.org/.
Belokosztolszki, A., Eyers, D. M., Pietzuch, P. R., Bacon, J., and Moody, K. (2003). Role-based access
control for publish/subscribe middleware architectures. In Proceedings of the 2nd international workshop
on Distributed event-based systems, DEBS, pages 1–8, San Diego, USA. ACM.
Bertino, E. and Ferrari, E. (2002). Secure and selective dissemination of xml documents. ACM Transactions
on Information and System Security, 5(3):290–331.
Bethencourt, J., Sahai, A., and Waters, B. (2007). Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption. In
Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP, pages 321–334, Berkeley, USA.
IEEE Computer Society.
Bloom, B. H. (1970). Space/time trade-offs in hash coding with allowable errors. Comm. of the ACM,
13(7).
Boneh, D. and Waters, B. (2007). Conjunctive, subset, and range queries on encrypted data. In Proceedings
of the 4th conference on Theory of cryptography, TCC, pages 535–554, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Springer-Verlag.
Carzaniga, A., Rosenblum, D. S., and Wolf, A. L. (2001). Design and evaluation of a wide-area event
notification service. ACM Transactions on Computer Systems, 19(3):332–383.
95
Chand, R. and Felber, P. (2004). Xnet: a reliable content based publish subscribe system. In Proceedings
of the 23rd Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems, SRDS, pages 264–273, Florianopolis, Brazil.
IEEE Computer Society.
Choi, S., Ghinita, G., and Bertino, E. (2010). A privacy-enhancing content-based publish/subscribe system
using scalar product preserving transformations. In Database and Expert Systems Applications, volume
6261 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 368–384. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg.
Cugola, G., Nitto, E. D., and Fuggetta, A. (2001). The jedi event-based infrastructure and its application
to the development of the opss wfms. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 27(9):827–850.
Curtmola, R., Garay, J., Kamara, S., and Ostrovsky, R. (2006). Searchable symmetric encryption:
Improved definitions and efficient constructions. In CCS 2006: 13th ACM conference on Computer and
communications security.
Daemen, J. and Rijmen, V. (2002). The Design of Rijndael: AES - The Advanced Encryption Standard.
Springer Verlag.
Dong, C., Russello, G., and Dulay, N. (2008). Shared and searchable encrypted data for untrusted servers.
In Data and Applications Security XXII, volume 5094 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
127–143. Springer-Verlag.
El Gamal, T. (1985). A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms. In
Advances in Cryptology, volume 196 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 10–18. Springer Berlin
/ Heidelberg, New York, NY, USA.
Eugster, P. T., Felber, P., Guerraoui, R., and Kermarrec, A.-M. (2003). The many faces of publish/subscribe.
ACM Computing Survey, 35(2):114–131.
Eze, B., Kuziemsky, C., Peyton, L., Middleton, G., and Mouttham, A. (2010). Policy-based data integration
for e-health monitoring processes in a b2b environment: experiences from canada. Journal of theoretical
and applied electronic commerce research, 5(1):56–70.
Farrell, S. and Housley, R. (2002). An internet attribute certificate profile for authorization.
Fiege, L., Zeidler, A., Buchmann, A., Kilian-Kehr, R., Mu¨hl, G., and Darmstadt, T. (2004). Security
aspects in publish/subscribe systems. In Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Distributed
Event-Based Systems, DEBS, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK. IEEE Computer Society.
Goyal, V., Pandey, O., Sahai, A., and Waters, B. (2006). Attribute-based encryption for fine-grained access
control of encrypted data. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications
security, CCS, pages 89–98, Alexandria, USA. ACM.
Graham, R. L., Knuth, D. E., and Patashnik, O. (1994). Concrete Mathematics: A Foundation for
Computer Science. Addison-Wesley Longman Publishing, second edition.
Gupta, A., Sahin, O. D., Agrawal, D., and Abbadi, A. E. (2004). Meghdoot: content-based publish/subscribe
over p2p networks. In 5th ACM/IFIP/USENIX Intl. conference on Middleware.
Heinze, T., Martin, A., Pasin, M., Barazzutti, R., Felber, P., Jerzak, Z., Onica, E., and Riviere, E. (2014).
Elastic scaling of a high-throughput content-based publish/subscribe engine. ICDCS’14.
Hunt, P., Konar, M., Junqueira, F. P., and Reed, B. (2010). Zookeeper: Wait-free coordination for
internet-scale systems. In Proceedings of the 2010 USENIX Conference on USENIX Annual Technical
Conference, USENIXATC’10, pages 11–11, Berkeley, CA, USA. USENIX Association.
Ion, M., Russello, G., and Crispo, B. (2010a). An implementation of event and filter confidentiality in
pub/sub systems and its application to e-health. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer
and communications security, CCS, pages 696–698, Chicago, USA. ACM.
Ion, M., Russello, G., and Crispo, B. (2010b). Supporting publication and subscription confidentiality in
pub/sub networks. In Security and Privacy in Communication Networks, volume 50 of Lecture Notes of
the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, Singapore.
Ion, M., Russello, G., and Crispo, B. (2012). Design and implementation of a confidentiality and access
control solution for publish/subscribe systems. Computer Networks, 56(7):2014–2037.
Jacobsen, H.-A., Cheung, A., Lia, G., Maniymaran, B., Muthusamy, V., and Kazemzadeh, R. S. (2010).
The PADRES Publish/Subscribe System. Hershey: IGI Global.
Jafarpour, H., Mehrotra, S., Venkatasubramanian, N., and Montanari, M. (2009). MICS: an efficient
content space representation model for publish/subscribe systems. In 3rd ACM International Conference
on Distributed Event-Based Systems, DEBS.
96
Jakobsson, M. (1999). On quorum controlled asymmetric proxy re-encryption. In Public Key Cryptography,
volume 1560 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 632–632. Springer-Verlag, London, UK, UK.
Kamara, S. (2013). How to search on encrypted data. Presentation Slides.
Khurana, H. (2005). Scalable security and accounting services for content-based publish/subscribe systems.
In Proceedings of the ACM symposium on Applied computing, SAC, pages 801–807, Santa Fe, USA.
ACM.
Kurpicz, M. (2013). Towards efficient privacy-preserving sql processing in untrusted clouds. Master’s thesis,
University of Neuchaˆtel.
Li, G., Hou, S., and Jacobsen, H.-A. (2005). A unified approach to routing, covering and merging in
publish/subscribe systems based on modified binary decision diagrams. In Proceedings of the 25th IEEE
International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, ICDCS, pages 447–457, Columbus, USA.
IEEE Computer Society.
Li, J., Lu, C., and Shi, W. (2004). An efficient scheme for preserving confidentiality in content-based
publish/subscribe systems. Technical Report GIT-CC-04-01, Georgia Institute of Technology.
Machanavajjhala, A., Vee, E., Garofalakis, M., and Shanmugasundaram, J. (2008). Scalable ranked
publish/subscribe. In Proceedings of the Very Large Data Bases Endowment, volume 1 of VLDB, pages
451–462. VLDB Endowment.
Martin-Flatin, J.-P., Znaty, S., and Hubaux, J.-P. (1999). A survey of distributed enterprise network and
systems management paradigms. Journal of Network and Systems Management, 7:9–26.
Mercier, H., Onica, E., Rivire, E., and Felber, P. (2013). Performance/security tradeoffs for content-based
routing supported by Bloom filters. In Proceedings of the 20th International Colloquium on Structural
Information and Communication Complexity (SIROCCO), volume 8179 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 129–140, Ischia, Italy.
Mu¨hl, G. (2001). Generic constraints for content-based publish/subscribe. In Batini, C., Giunchiglia, F.,
Giorgini, P., and Mecella, M., editors, Cooperative Information Systems, volume 2172 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 211–225. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg.
Mu¨hl, G. (2002). Large-Scale Content-Based Publish-Subscribe Systems. PhD thesis, TU Darmstadt,
Darmstadt.
Nabeel, M., Shang, N., and Bertino, E. (2009). Privacy-preserving filtering and covering in content-based
publish subscribe systems. CERIAS Tech. Report 15, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN.
Nabeel, M., Shang, N., and Bertino, E. (2012). Efficient privacy preserving content based publish subscribe
systems. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies,
SACMAT ’12, pages 133–144, New York, NY, USA. ACM.
Nanavati, M., Colp, P., Aiello, B., and Warfield, A. (2014). Cloud security: A gathering storm. Commun.
ACM, 57(5):70–79.
Newman, M. E. J. (2005). Power laws, Pareto distributions and Zipf’s law. Contemporary Physics,
46:323–351.
Oki, B., Pfluegl, M., Siegel, A., and Skeen, D. (1993). The information bus: an architecture for extensible
distributed systems. In Proceedings of the 14th ACM symposium on Operating systems principles, SOSP,
pages 58–68, Asheville, USA. ACM.
Paillier, P. (1999). Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree residuosity classes. In Advances in
Cryptology, volume 1592 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 223–238. Springer-Verlag.
Pal, P., Lauer, G., Khoury, J., Hoff, N., and Loyall, J. (2012). P3s: a privacy preserving publish-subscribe
middleware. In Proceedings of the 13th International Middleware Conference, Middleware ’12, pages
476–495, New York, NY, USA. Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
Parzyjegla, H., Graff, D., Schro¨ter, A., Richling, J., and Mu¨hl, G. (2010). From active data management
to event-based systems and more. chapter Design and implementation of the Rebeca publish/subscribe
middleware, pages 124–140. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg.
Perera, S. and Gannon, D. (2009). A scalable and robust coordination architecture for distributed
management. Technical report, Indiana University.
Perl, H., Mohammed, Y., Brenner, M., and Smith, M. (2012). Fast confidential search for bio-medical
data using Bloom filters and homomorphic cryptography. In E-Science (e-Science), 2012 IEEE 8th
International Conference on, pages 1–8.
97
Perrig, A., Song, D., and Tygar, J. D. (2001). Elk, a new protocol for efficient large-group key distribution.
In Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP ’01, pages 247–, Washington,
DC, USA. IEEE Computer Society.
Pesonen, L. I. W. and Bacon, J. (2005). Secure event types in content-based, multi-domain publish/subscribe
systems. In Proceedings of the 5th international workshop on Software engineering and middleware,
SEM, pages 98–105, Lisbon, Portugal. ACM.
Pesonen, L. I. W., Eyers, D. M., and Bacon, J. (2007a). Access control in decentralised publish/subscribe
systems. Journal of Networks, 2(2):57–67.
Pesonen, L. I. W., Eyers, D. M., and Bacon, J. (2007b). Encryption-enforced access control in dynamic
multi-domain publish/subscribe networks. In Proceedings of the 2007 inaugural international conference
on Distributed event-based systems, DEBS, pages 104–115, Toronto, Canada. ACM.
Pietzuch, P. R. and Bacon, J. (2002). Hermes: A distributed event-based middleware architecture. In
Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, ICDCS, pages
611–618, Vienna, Austria. IEEE Computer Society.
Pietzuch, P. R., Shand, B., and Bacon, J. (2004). Composite event detection as a generic middleware
extension. IEEE Network, 18(1):44–55.
Pohlig, S. and Hellman, M. (1978). An improved algorithm for computing logarithms over gf(p) and its
cryptographic significance (corresp.). IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 24(1):106 – 110.
Popa, R. A., Redfield, C. M. S., Zeldovich, N., and Balakrishnan, H. (2011). CryptDB: protecting
confidentiality with encrypted query processing. In 23rd ACM Symposium on Operating Systems
Principles, SOSP.
Rafaeli, S. and Hutchison, D. (2003). A survey of key management for secure group communication. ACM
Computing Surveys, 35:309–329.
Raiciu, C. and Rosenblum, D. S. (2006). Enabling confidentiality in content-based publish/subscribe
infrastructures. In Proceedings of the Second IEEE/CreatNet International Conference on Security
and Privacy in Communication Networks, Securecomm, pages 1–11, Baltimore, USA. IEEE Computer
Society.
Ristenpart, T., Tromer, E., Shacham, H., and Savage, S. (2009). Hey, you, get off of my cloud: exploring
information leakage in third-party compute clouds. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on
Computer and communications security, CCS, pages 199–212, Chicago, USA. ACM.
Rose, I., Murty, R., Pietzuch, P., Ledlie, J., Roussopoulos, M., and Welsh, M. (2007). Cobra: Content-
based filtering and aggregation of blogs and rss feeds. In Proceedings of the 4th USENIX Symposium
on Networked Systems Design & Implementation, NSDI, pages 29–42, Cambridge, USA. USENIX
Association.
Rowstron, A., Kermarrec, A.-M., Castro, M., and Druschel, P. (2001). Scribe: The design of a large-
scale event notification infrastructure. In Crowcroft, J. and Hofmann, M., editors, Networked Group
Communication, volume 2233 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 30–43. Springer Berlin /
Heidelberg.
Russell, J. (2002). Oracle 9i, application developer’s guide - fundamentals. Developer Manual.
Segall, B., Arnold, D., Boot, J., Henderson, M., and Phelps, T. (2000). Content based routing with elvin4.
In Proceedings of the Australian UNIX Users Group, AUUG, Canberra, Australia.
Segall, W. and Arnold, D. (1997). Elvin has left the building: A publish/subscribe notification service
with quenching. In Proceedings of the Australian UNIX Users Group, AUUG, Brisbane, Australia.
Sherman, A. T. and McGrew, D. A. (2003). Key establishment in large dynamic groups using one-way
function trees. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 29(5):444–458.
Shi, E., Bethencourt, J., Chan, T.-H. H., Song, D., and Perrig, A. (2007). Multi-dimensional range query
over encrypted data. In Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP, pages
350–364, Berkeley, USA. IEEE Computer Society.
Shikfa, A., A˜nen, M., and Molva, R. (2008). Privacy-preserving content-based publish/Subscribe networks.
Technical Report EURECOM+2633, Eurecom.
Shikfa, A., O¨nen, M., and Molva, R. (2009). Privacy-preserving content-based publish/subscribe networks.
In Emerging Challenges for Security, Privacy and Trust, volume 297 of IFIP Advances in Information
and Communication Technology. Springer Boston.
98
Singh, J., Eyers, D. M., and Bacon, J. (2011). Disclosure control in multi-domain publish/subscribe systems.
In Proceedings of the 5th ACM international conference on Distributed event-based system, DEBS, pages
159–170, New York, USA. ACM.
Somorovsky, J., Heiderich, M., Jensen, M., Schwenk, J., Gruschka, N., and Lo Iacono, L. (2011). All your
clouds are belong to us: security analysis of cloud management interfaces. In Proceedings of the 3rd
ACM workshop on Cloud computing security workshop, CCSW, pages 3–14, Chicago, USA. ACM.
Song, D. X., Wagner, D., and Perrig, A. (2000). Practical techniques for searches on encrypted data. In
Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP, pages 44–55, Berkeley, USA.
IEEE Computer Society.
Srivatsa, M. and Liu, L. (2005). Securing publish-subscribe overlay services with eventguard. In Proceedings
of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security, CCS, pages 289–298, Alexandria,
USA. ACM.
Srivatsa, M. and Liu, L. (2007). Secure event dissemination in publish-subscribe networks. In Proceedings
of the IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, ICDCS, page 22, Toronto,
Canada. IEEE Computer Society.
Srivatsa, M., Liu, L., and Iyengar, A. (2011). Eventguard: A system architecture for securing publish-
subscribe networks. ACM Transactions on Computer Systems, 29(4):10:1–10:40.
Strang, G. (2009). Introduction to Linear Algebra, 4th edition. Wellesley-Cambridge Press and SIAM.
Strom, R., Banavar, G., Chandra, T., Kaplan, M., Miller, K., Mukherjee, B., Sturman, D., and Ward, M.
(1998). Gryphon: An information flow based approach to message brokering. ArXiv Computer Science
e-prints.
Tariq, M. A., Koldehofe, B., Altaweel, A., and Rothermel, K. (2010). Providing basic security mechanisms
in broker-less publish/subscribe systems. In Proceedings of the Fourth ACM International Conference
on Distributed Event-Based Systems, DEBS ’10, pages 38–49, New York, USA. ACM.
Wang, C., Carzaniga, A., Evans, D., and Wolf, A. (2002). Security issues and requirements for internet-scale
publish-subscribe systems. In Proceedings of the 35th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System
Sciences, volume 9 of HICSS, page 303, Hawaii, USA. IEEE ComSoc.
Wong, C. K., Gouda, M., and Lam, S. S. (2000). Secure group communications using key graphs. IEEE/ACM
Trans. Netw., 8(1):16–30.
Wong, W. K., Cheung, D. W.-l., Kao, B., and Mamoulis, N. (2009). Secure knn computation on encrypted
databases. In Proceedings of the 35th ACM SIGMOD international conference on Management of data,
SIGMOD, pages 139–152, Providence, USA. ACM.
Wun, A. and Jacobsen, H.-A. (2007). A policy management framework for content-based publish/subscribe
middleware. In Cerqueira, R. and Campbell, R., editors, Middleware 2007, volume 4834 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 368–388. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg.
Xu, H., Guo, S., and Chen, K. (2014). Building confidential and efficient query services in the cloud with
RASP data perturbation. Knowledge and Data Engineering, IEEE Transactions on, 26(2):322–335.
Zhao, Y. and Sturman, D. (2006). Dynamic access control in a content-based publish/subscribe system
with delivery guarantees. In Proceedings of the 26th IEEE International Conference on Distributed
Computing Systems, ICDCS, page 60, Lisboa, Portugal. IEEE Computer Society.
Zhuang, S. Q., Zhao, B. Y., Joseph, A. D., Katz, R. H., and Kubiatowicz, J. D. (2001). Bayeux: an
architecture for scalable and fault-tolerant wide-area data dissemination. In Proceedings of the 11th
international workshop on Network and operating systems support for digital audio and video, NOSSDAV,
pages 11–20, Port Jefferson, USA. ACM Press.
Zou, X., Ramamurthy, B., and Magliveras, S. S. (2005). Secure Group Communications Over Data Networks.
Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
99
